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ABSTRACT
Why do parties other than major parties survive or even flourish under plurality 
rule electoral systems, when according to Du verger’s law we should expect them 
to disappear? Why should rational voters support third parties, even though their 
chances of being successful are often low ?
Using an institutional public choice approach, this study analyses third party 
voting as one amongst a continuum of choices faced by electors who pay attention 
both to the ideological proximity of parties, and to their perceived efficacy 
measured against a community-wide level of minimum efficacy.
The approach is applied in detailed case study chapters examining four different 
third parties. Two of the cases cover long-established and relatively successful 
third parties - the British Liberal Democrats; the Canadian NDP. The other two 
cases cover shorter-lived third parties - the New Zealand Social Credit; and the 
UNP in South Korea. In each case the study examines the party’s specific history 
and dynamics, looks at the social base of its support and its ideological 
positioning, explores the party’s perceived efficacy, and analyses the articulation 
of the third party’s strategy.
Two key themes emerge. First, plurality rule electoral systems impose severe 
constraints on third parties, but also create niches (such as one-party safe seats or 
regions, or unoccupied ideological space) within which a long-term third party can 
become established, flourish and develop strategies to partially overcome its lower 
perceived efficacy. Second, third party voting under plurality rule is not an isolated 
behaviour, but part of an integrated spectrum of choices (encompassing 
abstention, protest voting, tactical voting, and positive party support) which 
citizens make. People respond both to the ideological positioning and to the 
perceived efficacy of the competing political parties, within a specific voting 
context and using a collectively defined sense of what constitutes efficacious 
political behaviour.
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Chapter I
PLURALITY RULE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
AND NON-MAJOR PARTIES
1.1. PLURALITY RULE AND REPRESENTATION
It is widely accepted that electoral systems may have a great impact on the 
effective number of political parties. Duverger’s classic ‘law’ set out a 
relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties such that a 
plurality (or majority) single-ballot system tends to reduce the number of 
parties to two regardless of the number of issue dimensions, whilst a second- 
ballot (majority) and a proportional representation system tend to produce more 
parties corresponding to the number of issue dimensions (Duverger, 1964). 
This famous argument has attracted a lot of attention from political scientists 
since it was first formulated.
Plurality rule electoral systems, often called ‘first-past-the-post systems’, 
award a seat to the candidate who gets the largest number of votes (a plurality) 
in a given constituency. The basic argument in favour of this"system is 
associated with the virtues of a stable one-party government. Blais (1991: 240- 
3) summarised three virtues of this approach. First, plurality rule greatly 
increases the likelihood of a one-party government by ‘manufacturing a 
parliamentary majority’. Second, there is a strong relationship between a one- 
party majority government and its durability in office - that is, the system leads 
to a more stable government. Third, since the outcome of an election is clear- 
cut, plurality rule elections are more decisive and in this way assure greater 
accountability.
However, plurality systems may also cause some problems. The 
decisiveness of an electoral outcome may weaken stability under certain
1
circumstances which are connected to the characteristics of territorial 
representation. The emphasis on territorial representation is likely to exacerbate 
differences between different areas or regions, and makes it more difficult for 
common interests to be weighed adequately in relation to particular 
geographical ones (Reeve and Ware, 1992: 119). If a governing party is 
dependent upon a strong regional base of support its legitimacy may be reduced 
compared with a governing party with a clear national mandate. In other words: 
Where the basic cleavage in an industrialised country is socio­
economic rather than territorial, it will encourage the growth of a 
two-party system, and moderate government is a likely result. 
Where, on the other hand, the political culture is less homogenous, 
but riven with territorial or ethnic cleavages, the system will work 
very differently, emphasizing geographical concentration of support, 
and stressing territorial issue at the expense of socio-economic, as in 
Canada, for example. It is not surprising, therefore, that the plurality 
system is found to be least workable in such divided societies. It 
presupposes consensus, but may also help to reinforce it.(Bogdanor, 
1983a: 4)
The other problem of plurality rule electoral systems is its tendency to be 
disproportional and to produce a large number of ‘wasted’ votes. Since only the 
candidate with the most ballots is elected, the winner need not win the majority 
of votes. A two-candidate competition must produce a majority winner. 
However, the more candidates compete, the lower the share of votes which a 
winning candidate needs. If four candidates compete for a seat, in theory, just 
more than 25 per cent of the votes can enable a candidate to win. As a matter 
of fact, in the 1992 British General Election, four candidates were in a close 
competition in the Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber constituency.
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Table 1.1. Voting result in Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber in the 1992 British 
General Election
voters (%) eligible electors (%)
Liberal Democratic party 26 19
Labour party 25 18
Scottish National party 25 18
Conservative party 23 17
Green party 2 1
The result was that a Liberal Democrat candidate was elected by just 26 per 
cent of the voters (Table 1.1), and consequently, 74 per cent of the voters 
failed to be represented - and their votes could be considered as ‘wasted’. If 
abstentions are included, 81 per cent of the local eligible electorate were not 
represented by the victor’s alignment.
Those voters who are concerned about potentially ‘wasting’ their vote may 
choose a likely candidate to win who is not their most-preferred one. Such 
tactical voting, in turn, reinforces the stability of the two-party system at the 
cost of non-major parties. That is, plurality rule elections produce a ‘freezing of 
political cleavages’ (Reeve and Ware, 1992: 128) by putting pressure on voters 
to choose between one of the two largest parties.
Consequently, the merit of a plurality rule electoral system - a stable and 
effective government - is not compatible with an ideal norm of democratic 
representation - proportionality. Rather, a plurality rule electoral system is a 
mechanism of disproportional representation (Rose, 1983: 30). Since the 
mandate for governing is decided in terms of seats received, not in terms of 
votes won, a further deviation from proportionality also commonly occurs when 
a government is formed in a plurality system. The party with a majority of seats 
in the parliament will not necessarily have received the majority of votes. More 
often than not, less than 50 per cent of votes will suffice for the leading party 
to gain the majority of parliamentary seats. Sometimes the share of votes of an 
incoming government party may even be less than that of an opposition party. 
For example, in the February 1974 general election in Britain, the Labour party
won the election with 301 seats from 37.1 per cent of total votes while the 
Conservatives got 297 seats with 37.8 per cent of the votes - although in this 
case Labour’s failure to secure a majority of seats soon led to another general 
election nine months later.
Parties which are not large enough to count as one of the two leading 
contenders for office in a plurality rule system may be called ‘non-major’ 
parties. Non-major parties usually just have to come to terms with the 
disadvantages imposed on them under plurality rule. Most non-major parties are 
seriously under-represented, and a large proportion of their supporters’ votes 
are ineffective in electing MPs and hence are ‘wasted’. For example, in the 
1983 British general election, Labour won 28 per cent of total votes and 209 
seats while the Alliance secured only 23 seats from 25 per cent of the votes. 
The gap of about 3 per cent between the Labour’s and the Alliance’s share of 
the votes brought about a difference of as many as 186 seat (29 per cent of the 
Commons). Consequently, many votes for the Alliance barely affected the 
balance of party representation. Additionally, single-party majority 
governments commonly occur in plurality rule systems, and they do not provide 
any opportunity for non-major parties to take part in government, except in the 
most exceptional circumstances. Therefore, non-major parties are unlikely to 
improve their perceived efficacy at the level of national politics by achieving 
any share in managing the central government apparatus. In short, a plurality 
rule electoral system creates such difficult conditions for non-major parties that 
it may force them to remain permanently ‘minor’ parties.
Nevertheless, a large weight of empirical evidence goes against Duverger’s 
notion. Some third or fourth parties have established wide support even under 
highly unfavourable electoral systems. In Britain, for example, the Liberal 
Democratic party is clearly a non-major party but has succeeded in increasing 
and consolidating support, even though it is still unable to compete for power at 
the national level on equal terms. To take another example, in the 1992 South 
Korean election a new party succeeded in breaking through under a plurality
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rule electoral system which imposes systematic burdens upon non-established 
parties. These phenomena are intriguing and merit further study.
1.2. POLITICAL PARTIES UNDER PLURALITY RULE ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS
Countries adopting a pure type of plurality rule electoral systems are rather rare 
world-wide. New Zealand, which used to have a ‘typical’ two-party system 
under plurality rule elections, has now changed its electoral system to a 
German-style mixed member system, first used in 1996. The remaining 
countries which continue to employ plurality rule electoral systems are Britain, 
Canada, the United States, and some former British colonies such as Malaysia 
and India. If small variations are included under plurality rule then Australia 
(for lower house elections) and South Korea can also fall into this category. 
Apart from the United States, ‘Duverger’s law’ no longer applies very well in 
practice across this group of countries. Everywhere except in the USA the 
effective number of parties in the legislative body is apparently far more than 
two. Even though non-major parties have not usually mounted enough of a 
threat to replace one of the two major parties, they have quite widely succeeded 
in articulating and increasing their support under an unfavourable electoral 
system. However, it is hard to continue treating all the wide variety of non- 
major parties as a single category because they are dependent on quite different 
types of support - variations addressed in the next section.
A Typology of Parties
Some non-major parties under a plurality rule electoral system rely on 
geographically concentrated support, as is the case with the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru in Britain. Other non-major parties, such as the 
British Liberal Democrats, depend on regionally diffuse and rather volatile
support, and these two polar patterns more or less define the available range for 
non-major parties. Regionalist parties’ parliamentary representation may not be 
greatly below their shares of votes, indeed it may on occasion even be 
exaggerated. By contrast, parties with regionally diffuse support are usually 
heavily under-represented under plurality rule.
This first contrast suggests two key criteria to be used in separating out 
different types of non-major parties: their geographical range of competition 
and the level of proportionality in their representation. The geographical range 
of competition distinguishes some non-major parties competing only in a 
limited area from other ‘national’ parties. Proportionality of representation 
shows whether a party’s representation in the legislature benefits from a 
plurality rule, that is, whether it is over-represented or under-represented. The 
normal index used in this area is the ‘proportionality ratio’ statistic, obtained by 
calculating the ratio between the share of votes and seats of a party. That is,
R = (% share of seats/ % share of votes )
If the R score is 1, the party is represented in perfect proportion to its vote 
share - a rather rare outcome under a plurality rule electoral system. When a 
party is over-represented, the value of the ratio R will be larger than one; when 
under-represented, it will be smaller than one. If a party fails to win seats and 
so stays below the threshold of representation, then the ratio will be zero. 
Figure 1.1 shows the resulting typology of parties. There are four types of 
parties competing under plurality rule electoral systems. Type A are major 
parties competing for government nation-wide, which are over-represented by 
the electoral system and so have an R ratio which is usually larger than 1. Table
1.2 shows the extent to which two major parties under a plurality rule electoral 
system are over-represented.
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Figure 1.1. A Typology of parties under a plurality rule electoral system
representation competition  ►
i
over-represented
Nation-wide Regionally
(R * l) A Bi
under-represented
(R<1) C B B:
below the threshold
(R=0) D b 3
Type D consists of small parties which fail to overcome the high thresholds 
imposed by plurality rule electoral systems. As long as one of these parties fails 
to win seats, its R score is nil. As Reeve and Ware point out:
Indeed, the main barrier facing such parties (small parties) is not the 
size of the total electorate they must mobilize but the threshold, in 
terms of voter support, they must cross in plurality voting systems in 
order to elect representatives at any level (Reeve and Ware, 1992: 
120).
Often this type of parties gain no representation in spite of being supported by 
quite large and active social movements, and they also suffer from internal 
conflicts between ideologically committed party activists and the party 
leadership (Kang, 1996). The Green Party in Britain is a typical example.
Parties in Type B (which have been described in various ways such as 
regionalist parties, autonomist parties, separatist parties or nationalist parties), 
are seeking support in a limited region of the state’s territory, where the 
majority of the voters share a single exogenous quality such as ethnicity, 
language, or religion. Parties such as the Bloc Quebecois in Canada and the 
Scottish National Party fall into this category. These parties rely on a strong 
identity set which allows the people involved to distinguish ‘ourselves’ from
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‘others’. They often pursue a goal where it is hard to reach a compromise, such 
as independence or autonomy for the region. A firm and exclusive link to 
voters with a single exogenous characteristic often causes a backlash and 
eventually limits further support.
Table 1.2. The average seats/votes ratios (R) for political parties in four 
plurality rule countries in the recent period
Britain (1974-1992) Canada (1962-1988)
Party Type R Party Type R
Conservative A 1.29 Conservative A 1.16
Labour A 1.20 Liberal A 1.18
Plaid Cymru b2 0.95 Bloc Quebecois1 B, 1.31
SNP b2 0.37 NDP C 0.54
Liberal Democrat c 0.14
Greens D 0
New Zealand (1978-1984) South Korea (1992)2
Party Type R Party Type R
National A 1.26 DLP A 1.27
Labour A 1.22 DP A 1.08
Social Credit C 0.15 UNP C 0.58
Values D 0 Minjungdang D 0
1) in the 1993 Federal Election
2) seats won at the constituency level only.
SNP : Scottish National Party, NDP : New Democratic Party,
DLP : Democratic Liberal party, DP : Democratic party, UNP : Unification National party 
Sources: calculated from Butler and Butler (1994: 218-9) for Britain; Jackson and Jackson 
(1994: 477) for Canada; Norton (1988: 6) for New Zealand; Chosun llbo (1992: 132-7) for 
South Korea.
Even though support for those parties concentrates on a certain part of national 
areas, the ratio between seats and votes varies from party to party. If a party 
succeeds in mobilising regionally-based voters, the geographically concentrated 
support will greatly exaggerate its representation, compared with other non­
major parties. For example, in the 1992 British general election, Plaid Cymru 
secured four seats from 0.5 per cent of total votes while the Liberal Democrats
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gained only twenty seats from 17.9 per cent of total votes; and in Table 1.2 
Plaid Cymru has the highest R ratio of all the non-major parties. Its ratio even 
reached 1.3 in the 1992 election, so that the Welsh nationalists were more over­
represented than even the Conservatives and Labour.
The party (Plaid Cymru) managed this because its vote was very 
effectively concentrated in the Welsh-speaking seats. Plaid Cymru’s 
performance is proof, if proof were needed, that the first-past-post is 
unfair only to some small parties (Wilder, 1992: 5).
The success of Plaid Cymru also contrasts with that of the British Green party, 
which won more votes across the country nation-wide in the 1992 general 
election, but did not win any seats.
If a regionalist party represents a fairly populous region the successful 
mobilisation of the local voters’ support can enable the party to replace one of 
major parties, as is the case of the Bloc Quebecois in the 1993 Canadian federal 
election, where it achieved an R ratio of 1.31. This sudden rise dramatically 
highlighted the advantage of regionally concentrated support under a plurality 
rule electoral system.
However, it should be noted that not every party in this category can 
succeed in exaggerating its representation. Table 1.2 shows that the ratios of 
some type B parties are lower than 1 (that is they lie in sub-type B2 or B3 rather 
than Bi). A good example is the case of the Scottish National Party (SNP), 
which gained many more votes than the Welsh nationalists in the 1992 general 
election. The SNP won only three seats with about 630,000 votes while Plaid 
Cymru secured four seats with about a quarter of the SNP votes. Even in the 
October 1974 election when the SNP achieved its best outcome (11 seats, 2.9 
per cent of the national votes), its ratio remains only 0.58, placing it in the B2 
category. These ratios reveal that the support for the SNP is quite diffused 
across Scotland.
By contrast, parties of Type C depend on geographically diffused support 
nation-wide, and suffer the greatest disadvantage under a plurality rule electoral 
system. Since supporters do not share a single and distinctive identity set,
support for parties in Type C is never solid. They compete in elections nation­
wide, and are severely under-represented with an R ratio much less than 1. The 
ratio of the Liberal Democrats in Britain is as low as 0.14. The ratio of Social 
Credit in New Zealand in the recent past was 0.15. (The ratios of the NDP in 
Canada and the UNP in South Korea are appreciably greater, but both have a 
degree of regional appeal and are thus more intermediate between Type B2 and 
Type C). In spite of these low ratios, the parties involved nonetheless manage 
to survive or even increase their support under unfavourable conditions and 
without relying on regionally concentrated support. Thus, those parties in Type 
C pose a particularly acute problem for Duverger’s law.
In short, Type A consists of major parties and the others are all non-major 
parties. Among the three, Type D is small parties which stay below the 
threshold of representation. Types B and C constitute the third parties1 (except 
in the case of the Bloc Quebecois which became the official opposition from 
nowhere in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election)2.In the next section, the two 
types of third parties, Type B and Type C, are compared in detail.
Dunleavy’s group distinction and two types of third parties
Dunleavy (1991) developed some useful concepts by making a distinction 
between exogenous groups and endogenous groups:
Exogenous groups have an identity set, the ensemble of all the 
individuals who join the group, delimited by external factors. An 
exogenous group’s potential members are not randomly scattered in 
society but share a common situation defined outside their individual 
or collective control.... This identity set is crucial for group 
activities, but its size and composition are fixed beyond the group’s 
control. Endogenous groups are formed simply by the coming 
together of like-minded people. Only the actors involved determined 
what is common to an endogenous group’s potential members (or
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identity set). At an individual level the motivation for joining the 
group is self-selected (Dunleavy, 1991: 55).
Similarities can be found between exogenous groups and parties of Type B and 
between endogenous groups and parties of Type C respectively. Dunleavy’s 
concepts were originally designed for restructuring the theory of groups, and so 
some of them are not directly applicable to political parties. However, his 
notion has some important implications for understanding party competition, 
especially with reference to third parties.
Dunleavy’s definition of an endogenous group seems to apply to the 
characteristics of parties in Type C, which have a diffused and unstable identity 
set, and whose potential members are often socially invisible (Dunleavy, 1991: 
66). As a result of lack of committed support, such parties often find that 
quickly-won voters can also quickly depart (Rose and McAllister, 1986: 138). 
By contrast, parties in Type B, like exogenous groups, have a compact identity 
set, and their potential support concentrates in particular spatial locations. Most 
parties in type B are linked to some form of exogenous group (like the 
relationship between the Scottish people and the SNP). Because of these 
similarities, parties in Type B can usefully be called the ‘exogenous type’ of 
third parties, and parties in Type C can be called as the ‘endogenous type’.
Even though Dunleavy attempted a dichotomy between the two different 
groups, the notions of being ‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ are to be regarded 
as lying along a continuum. One merit of the continuum is to include major 
parties in the same framework of explanation. Major parties have surely 
established a considerable degree of exogeneity. Dunleavy said:
They (major parties) solidify an appeal to people in defined social 
locations, make alliances with corporatist interests, manipulate the 
electoral system to prevent new parties entering competition and 
establish themselves as the dominant party in one area of the political 
spectrum - hence creating strong dependence effects amongst voters 
(Dunleavy, 1991: 84-85).
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While building a distinct identity, major parties also deliberately avoid being 
seen to represent an exclusive and consolidated minority group identity, because 
it could undermine further support. Thus, major parties have developed a 
moderate but clear identity set, placing them somewhere in the middle along the 
continuum between being ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’. Table 1.3 summarizes 
these characteristics of the two types of third parties and major parties.
Table 1.3. The characteristics of major parties and two types of third parties
Type A Type B TypeC
• major parties • exogenous • endogenous
• moderate concentration • strong and compact • weak and unstable
of regional support identity set identity set
• moderate but clear • often linked with some • regionally dispersed
identity set ascribed features support
• strong historical • regionally limited and • under-represented
dominance in one part concentrated support under plurality
o f ideological spectrum • likely to be over­ electoral systems
• benefit from plurality represented under • usually centre party on
electoral systems plurality electoral the political spectrum
systems • several rival parties
•  usually monopoly
position
Different front-lines: Two types of third parties in elections
The characteristics of the endogenous-exogenous continuum can help 
differentiate between different ‘kinds’ of potential supporters and different 
electoral strategies of third parties. For example, the British Liberal Democrats 
would not adopt the same electoral strategy as that of the SNP.
The exogenous type of parties is based on a collective and binding interest 
of those who share a common exogenous characteristic. They have their own 
‘niche m arket’ based on a shared common exogenous characteristic. In an 
attempt to mobilise potential voters, those parties often claim themselves as a
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political wing to represent the collective interest of an exogenous group. For 
example, the SNP, the Lega Nord in Italy, or the Bloc Quebecois in Canada 
seek to advance their demand for autonomy (or independence) by attempting to 
forge a link in voters’ minds between their immediate and specific material 
concerns, and the existence of a real or imagined territorial community 
(Newell, 1994: 136).
However, an individual voter’s key exogenous characteristics need not 
necessarily coincide with his/her political identity. For example, being a 
Quebecker would not necessarily mean becoming an ardent supporter for the 
Bloc Quebecois even though he/she can be a potential supporter. The round 
area within the rectangle in Figure 1.2 indicates a set of potential supporters for 
an exogenous third party. The isolated round area indicates that the exogenous 
identity is not shared with other part of society. The potential supporters in a 
‘niche market’ may be classified into two levels in terms of the intensity of 
their political identity: committed supporters and reluctant (or dormant) 
supporters. Committed supporters are those who endorse the third party as a 
political wing to represent those with the exogenous identity.
Figure 1.2. Two levels of support for the exogenous type of parties
SOCIETY
reluctant (dormant) supporters
committed supporters
Non-supporters may have two reasons. Firstly, they may not need to support 
the party since they believe that other ‘national’ parties satisfactorily represent
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them. They can be called ‘dormant’ potential supporters. Secondly, some of 
them may be concerned about the low efficacy of the third party and its slim 
opportunity for winning, even when they are basically sympathetic. This type 
of person may be called ‘reluctant’ members of the identity set.
In addition, existing major parties tend to ‘pre-occupy or pre-empt’ 
potentially significant issues. Successful performance by existing parties would 
hamper any attempt to mobilise potential supporters for the exogenous type of 
third parties. Thus, the electoral outcomes achieved by an exogenous third 
party are contingent on how it can mobilise the reluctant or dormant members 
of the identity set it has defined (its potential supporters).
It seems adequate that the exogenous type of third parties focus on the 
intrinsic characteristic for mobilising potential supporters. Often such parties 
deliberately provoke or encourage a nationalistic sentiment, or try to intensify 
the feeling of discrimination against a minority group. If such uneasy 
circumstances are bound up with the intrinsic characteristic, then nobody in the 
relevant identity set can ‘stop being consumer’ of the party’s efforts 
(Hirschman, 1970: 102). As Newell pointed out,
regional autonomy parties necessarily seek to make salient for voters 
their identities as members of some territorially based unit below the 
level of the state as a whole...The SNP never fails to make appeals to 
Scottishness (Newell, 1994: 142).
By contrast, third parties of the endogenous type (Type C) have neither a 
specified geographical boundary of potential supporters nor do they represent 
an exclusive and compact set of interests. This type of third parties do not have 
a particular niche market on their own, but rely on initially ‘unidentified’ or 
hard-to-identify voters to support them nation-wide. Typically they occupy a 
centrist position and in Downs’ view they are likely to be squeezed by a 
convergence of two major parties towards the median voter’s position. 
However, in spite of these apparently severe handicaps, empirical evidence 
shows a general growth of support for the endogenous type of third parties in 
the last two decades in plurality rule countries. The following chapters are
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mainly devoted to exploring the underlying the logic of voters’ seemingly 
‘irrational’ choice to support the endogenous type of third parties.
1.3. RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODS
A basic perspective of this study is to focus on individual voters’ choice to cast 
an apparently ineffective ballot by supporting a third party. Empirically, this 
study compares four different third parties in four liberal democratic countries. 
In this section, the research scope and methods are explained.
Rational voters and Third party voting : The Public Choice approach
A public choice approach assumes a rational actor who seeks to maximise his or 
her self-interest when participating in a collective choice. That is, it assumes 
that there are important forms of political behaviour which are the result of 
choices made with a view to the efficient achievement of given ends (Ward, 
1995: 79). Affecting the outcome would be the major impetus of an individual 
choice. Everyone is eager to achieve their personally best outcome, even 
though the decision is made collectively - and so the approach is inherently 
individualistic.
However, the choice of an individual actor will be constrained by the 
surrounding environment. That is, rationality can be restricted by the 
institutional settings and conditions which could structure the availability of 
options (see Dowding, 1994). As Mueller pointed out:
The important differences that arise when alternative voting rules and 
democratic procedures are used illustrate the single, most important 
lesson public choice teaches - institutions do matter (Mueller, 1989:
6).
For example, the effectiveness of third party voting would be seriously 
hampered under a plurality rule electoral system because of its low likelihood
of government. But by contrast, at least in theory, under a proportional 
representation system no preference would be under-represented.
The basic perspective and assumptions here are in line with many other 
public choice accounts. However, instead of trying to build a pure form of 
algebraic model based on reasoning, this study employs an institutional public 
choice approach (Dunleavy, 1991: 1-2). Specifically, this study attempts to 
analyse in a formal theoretical way the logic of third party voting as a rational 
behaviour in conjunction with the institutional settings and conditions structured 
by plurality electoral systems, and to formulate hypotheses which can be 
subjected to systematic empirical investigation. Various public choice accounts 
of voting will be reviewed in the next chapter.
Four third parties: A Comparative approach
Even though studies of elections often focus on ‘apparently quite different 
phenomena’ (Eijk, 1993: 59), this study is rather interested in a contextual 
similarity in different settings. The purpose of this study is to explore a 
common political consequence of one electoral system - the rise of third party 
support under a plurality rule electoral system. A comparison is made between 
four third parties in four democratic countries: the Liberal Democratic Party in 
Britain, Social Credit in New Zealand, the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 
Canada, and the Unification National Party in South Korea (UNP). In spite of 
some institutional, cultural, or political differences between them, the four 
parties selected all represent the endogenous type of third parties (or parties of 
Type C in Figure 1.1) under plurality rule electoral systems. More importantly, 
each of the four cases has some good grounds to be labeled as a ‘successful’ 
third party.
It may be inadequate to call the Liberal Democratic Party in Britain as a 
‘non-major party’ because it has won close to or more than a sixth of votes 
nation-wide in every general election since 1974 and has established a firm 
support base at the local politics level. But in spite of the growth in its support,
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the party is still ‘minor’ in terms of its share of Westminster seats. The time 
period in this research covers the three elections from 1983 to 1992, over which 
the performance of the traditional third party has been greatly improved. 
Electoral results analysed here are geographically limited within Great Britain 
because the three main parties have not participated in elections in Northern 
Ireland.
Epstein once described Canadian party system as a ‘two-party-plus’ system 
(1964: 46-60). The New Democratic Party occupied the ‘plus’ position in the 
Canadian party system from its founding in 1961 until the 1988 federal 
election. From more radical left-wing origins, the NDP gradually adopted a 
moderate-left reform position that, at times, overlapped with centre-left Liberal 
positions (Jackson and Jackson, 1994: 421). The NDP managed to win 15-20 
per cent of the votes in every federal election between 1961 and 1988. 
However, its support was not so solid as that of the other two major parties. As 
a third party, the NDP took no strong position over the country’s major historic 
political issues such as the conflict between French and English Canadians. In 
the 1993 Canadian federal election, the New Democratic Party lost its 
traditional rank of the third party to the Reform Party. In a disappointing 
election result, the NDP garnered only 7 per cent of votes, and did not even 
form an official parliamentary party. The period covered in this study is prior 
to the sudden decline of the party support, and focuses on the 1984 and 1988 
federal elections in which the NDP enjoyed good electoral performance.
Social Credit in New Zealand (renamed the Democratic Party in 1985) was 
formed in 1953 as a political arm of the Social Credit Association, a monetary 
reform organization dating back to the early 1930s. Among the four third 
parties of this study, Social Credit was the ‘least successful’ third party. Apart 
from a ‘blip’ period between 1978 and 1981, its share of votes usually 
remained below the 10 per cent level. In the 1978 and 1981 elections Social 
Credit won 16 per cent and 21 per cent of votes respectively. However, even 
when support for Social Credit was in its heyday, its share of seats remained 
minimal. The Party secured only one seat in 1978 and two seats in 1981. Even
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though Social Credit was severely under-represented, the basic logic of its 
support was similar to that of the other three parties in this study. Miller said:
As well as functioning as a sectional party, the Democratic Party, as 
the ‘third* party in a two-party dominant system fills the role of 
‘protest* party. Its electoral support has waxed and waned 
accordingly, with consequent distortions to its sectional character in 
times of heightened political unrest (1989: 248. Emphasis in the 
original).
Even though Social Credit retained two seats in the 1984 election, the contest 
effectively signified the party’s political demise. This study mainly focuses on 
the growth of Social Credit support between 1978 and 1981.
The Unification National Party (UNP) in South Korea is rather a unique 
case amongst the four. The UNP was founded just before the 1992 National 
Assembly election by a successful businessman, Chung Ju-young. Chung is the 
founder and owner of the giant Hyundai Group which is one of the largest 
conglomerates in the country. Depending on his huge personal fortune Chung 
fought a energetic, pro-business election campaign, which attacked the 
economic record of the incumbent government. In the 1992 National Assembly 
election, the UNP made an impressive electoral performance, emerging as a 
strong third party by winning 17 per cent of total votes. However, when Chung 
decided to leave politics after his abortive presidential bid in December 1992, 
the UNP virtually began to collapse. This study focuses mainly on the electoral 
support for the UNP in the 1992 National Assembly election.
In comparing the four cases, both quantitative methods and a qualitative 
historical approach are employed. The qualitative historical approach is 
important to understand different backgrounds and conditions behind the 
‘success’ of the four third parties. Voters’ choices should vary according to 
different contexts constituted by different social-historical conditions. 
Quantitative methods are also used to analyse voting patterns and to understand 
the empirical evidence. The data sets used here include the survey data, 
aggregate election data and public opinion polls from each country (see
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Appendix). However, because of different designs of the surveys, and more 
importantly, because of the different political settings in each country, this 
study does not try to implement a common statistical model which can 
encompass the four cases.
Comparison of the four cases
In looking at some common effects of an electoral system on party politics, it is 
important to recognize that simply analysing apparently the same phenomenon 
cannot suffice without some contextual comprehension behind it. As Mackie 
and Marsh pointed out (1995: 182-3), ‘same phenomena, different meanings’ is 
a frequent mistake made in comparative studies. To avoid such mistakes, it is 
important to understand a phenomenon in terms of the context of where it 
occurs. Such differences may result from some inherent characteristics of the 
political systems which each country employs. For example, third parties in a 
federal state such as Canada could have a different political environment from 
those in an unitary state.
There are some substantial differences between the four cases. First of all, 
the four cases are different in terms of political systems (Table 1.4). Britain and 
New Zealand have quite similar political systems - a parliamentary government, 
unitary structure and pure plurality electoral system (until the 1993 general 
election in New Zealand). In addition, the two countries have been well known 
as stable two party systems, clearly orientated around left/right (or class-based) 
ideological differences (at least, until the 1993 election in New Zealand).
By contrast, Canada is the only federal state among the four cases, with two 
key levels of government: the central government and provincial governments, 
where each province is also a complete political and economic unit. Each 
province has developed its own identity, which is sometimes at loggerheads 
with each other.
In the federal form, the various levels of government obtain their 
respective powers from the country’s constitution, not from each
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other. Citizens owe some loyalty to more than one level of 
government, and both levels may act directly on the citizens (Jackson 
and Jackson, 1994: 240).
Patterns of party support often vary markedly from province to province. For 
example, the voting pattern of Alberta (not to mention Quebec) has been quite 
different from the other provinces.
Table 1.4. Differences of the four cases in political structure
country third party electoral system system of 
government
political
structure
Britain Liberal
Democratic Party
plurality rule election parliamentary unitary
New
Zealand
Social Credit 
(renamed the 
Democratic Party 
in 1985)
plurality rule election 
(until the 1993 general 
election)
parliamentary unitary
Canada New Democratic 
Party (before the 
1993 federal 
election)
plurality rule election parliamentary federal
South
Korea
Unification 
National Party (in 
the 1992 National 
Assembly 
election)
additional member system 
(237 constituency seats 
by plurality rule; 62 seats 
allocated in proportion to 
the number of 
constituency seats won)
presidential unitary
Between the four cases the South Korean case seems peculiar. She 
apparently lacks the historical relationship and the cultural, linguistic similarity 
which the other three countries share. Strictly speaking, the South Korean 
electoral system used in the 1992 National Assembly election was also a unique 
version of an additional member system, based on a plurality rule electoral 
system. It was designed to secure a strong government, rather than to enhance 
proportionality. In the 1992 National Assembly Election, there were 237 
single-member constituencies, each electing a legislator by plurality rule. Then
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a further 62 additional seats were allocated from party lists. However, the
additional seats were allocated only to parties which qualified by winning more
than 5 constituency seats. The number of seats allocated was not proportional to 
its share of votes, but to the number of seats that each party won nationally. It 
is obvious that a voter who voted for an unsuccessful candidate in his/her 
constituency wasted his/her vote twice (Morris, 1992/3: 60). In addition, a 
number of successful single independent candidates also contributed to 
deviating from proportionality because votes for such candidates could not 
affect the allocation of the additional seats. In the 1992 National Assembly 
election, there were twenty-one successful independent candidates who secured 
12 per cent of votes in total. Thus, in spite of its formal differences, this 
system still contained the same characteristics as a ‘normal’ plurality electoral 
system - it was, if anything, even less proportional. For such reasons, the 
Korean electoral system is here treated as a kind of plurality electoral system.
South Korea is also the only country of the four cases to employ a
presidential system. A voter in a presidential system operate in a different
situation from one in a parliamentary system. In a parliamentary democracy, a 
general election means an event to choose both the executive and the 
legislature. Ballots cast can be interpreted as an expression of support or 
rejection of the current party government, which may be perceived as referenda 
on the party government (Taylor, 1984: 54). By contrast, a general election 
under a presidential system does not mean a choice of a new government. The 
meaning of a general election is attenuated to the event for electing members of 
the legislative body, and so it sometimes looks less important than a presidential 
election. However, the 1992 National Assembly election had a special meaning 
and drew much attention because it was held just nine months before a 
presidential election. So many South Korean voters regarded the legislative 
election as ‘a dress rehearsal’ for the upcoming presidential election. Party 
leaders (or potential presidential candidates) also considered the election as an 
opportunity to test the waters.
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Secondly, another difference between the four cases can be found in terms 
of each party’s ideological position. The four cases encompass three different 
ideological positions - the left, right and middle position. The Liberal 
Democratic party in Britain is a centrist party; the NDP has been a left-wing 
party; and both the UNP and s Social Credit were right-wing parties.
Thirdly, the aggregate distribution of preferences (ADP) of voters also 
varies considerably between the cases. Many analysts suppose that Britain and 
New Zealand have almost identically shaped ADP curves, with a single-peaked 
and symmetrical distribution where the median voter’s position is close to the 
centre. By contrast, the ADP curves of both Canada and South Korea seems 
skewed to right, so that the median voter’s position is also in the right-side, not 
at the centre. South Korea particularly is much further biased to right. The 
narrow ideological scale and a strong ideological bias against left-wing ideology 
are partly attributed to the bitter experience of the Korean war and the enduring 
military confrontation with the communist North.
Table 1.5. Ideological positions and Supporting groups
ideological
position
supporting
groups
durability period
covered
Liberal Democratic 
Party
centre none yes 83-92
Social Credit right Social Credit 
Association
no 79-81
New Democratic 
Party
left Trade Unions yes 84-88
Unification 
National Party
right Hyundai Group no 92
Fourthly, three of the third parties included have a special relationship with 
a certain group of support - the exception being the British Liberal Democrats. 
Social Credit was based on the monetary reform movement - the Social Credit 
Movement. The New Democratic Party was created under the influence of
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trade unionism in Canada. The UNP was dependent heavily on the Hyundai 
Group. Although the special relationship does not necessarily mean entire 
dependence on the group, the influence from these linkages cannot be ignored. 
For example, it was inevitable that some voters could not distinguish the image 
of those parties from that of their supporting groups. In fact, many Koreans 
identified the UNP with the Hyundai Group. The image of Social Credit, 
whether favourable or unfavourable, was owed to the monetary movement. 
Likewise, the image of the NDP was inseparable from the trade unions. Table 
1.5 summarises some difference between the cases.
1.4. THIRD PARTIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES: THE UNITED 
STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Regardless of durability, the four cases in this study represent more or less 
‘successful’ third parties under a plurality rule electoral system. However, in 
some countries employing the same (or a similar) electoral system non-major 
parties repeatedly fail to be represented. The United States especially has a 
rock-solid two-party system which has never allowed any serious third party 
intervention in legislative elections. In Australia third parties have also never 
won seats in the House of Representatives for which a majority electoral rule 
(the alternative vote) is adopted, and they have also had very limited success 
even under a more favourable electoral system for the Senate (where the single 
transferrable vote is used). In this section, the reasons why third parties in these 
two countries do not succeed in entering are briefly discussed in conjunction 
with the four ‘successful’ cases.
Third parties in the United States
The United States seems to be the only country in which Duverger’s law still 
works almost perfectly. In spite of many attempts, no third party has seriously
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threatened the two-party system. Some differences can be found between the 
four cases studied here and American third parties. First of all, compared with 
the four countries there is no single dominant political cleavage structuring 
American party politics. Even though the Republicans and Democrats represent 
conservative and liberal ideologies respectively, the ideological difference is not 
so wide as in Britain and in New Zealand. Unlike Britain switches of voting 
between the two major parties are usual. Many voters can easily shift from the 
Republican to the Democratic party and vice versa between elections. Party 
politics also tends to converge on the median voter’s position, as Downs 
argued. The two major parties have successfully accommodated various new 
political demands over many decades, which otherwise a non-major party could 
raise. As Gillespie (1993) titled his book, third parties in America tend to 
represent ‘politics at the periphery’. Almost all third parties appearing in 
America were fringe parties or single-issue parties, which tended to raise too 
extreme or too specific issues to draw wide support from the public in general. 
They can hardly threaten the existing two-party system. Unlike the four 
countries in this study the American two-party system has not allowed (and 
probably will not allow) a centrist third party to emerge.
Secondly, in the United States, a president himself, not his party, usually 
takes the whole responsibility for government performance. Thus, the 
popularity of a president has basically little to do with voters’ evaluation of a 
local Congressman or Senator, even though its effect on a legislature election 
cannot be completely denied (often described as a ‘coattail effect’). Besides, the 
relationship between a Congressman (or Senator) and the local electorate is 
rather personal in American politics. Seeking re-election politicians try to 
represent their constituency’s interests in the legislature (see Cain et al., 1987). 
Thus, a poor evaluation of an incumbent president would not necessarily greatly 
harm a Congressman from the same party as the president’s. As long as the 
relationship between a legislative representative and the electorate is personal, 
collective dissatisfaction with an entire political party is unlikely to occur.
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Thirdly, the primary system in American party politics also helps to 
discourage the rise of any successful non-major party. Since in the primary a 
local party candidate is selected by popular vote, a locally unpopular 
incumbent legislator can be unseated by party voters at that stage. As a result, a 
party’s dominance (in a one-party dominant region) can be maintained by 
replacing an unwanted local legislator with a different candidate from the same 
party. Therefore, there is little need to resort to third party candidates to 
express dissatisfaction. Primaries also facilitate the incursion of new political 
elite (so long as they have money) into the established parties, making them 
even more ideologically flexible, and creating few incentives for any political 
entrepreneur to launch a party of their own. All these factors - the presidential 
system, convergence tendency of party politics, personal relationship with the 
electorate, and the primary system all effectively working against a rise of a 
third party - mean that although there have been a few isolated cases of 
successful independent candidates at the legislative level, it is very unlikely for 
a third party to become entrenched in the American party system.
Third parties in Australia
Australia uses two different electoral system between the House of 
Representatives (the alternative vote) and the Senate (STV). Both systems allow 
voters to express more than one preferences. However, the former is a majority 
rule whereas the latter is a proportional system. The two different electoral 
systems produce different electoral fortunes for Australian third parties.
Under the alternative vote system voters indicate an order of preferences. If 
one candidate receives a majority of the first preference votes, he/she is 
elected. In the event no candidate receives a majority of first-preference the 
candidate with the fewest number is eliminated, and his/her second preferences 
are transferred to the remaining candidates. This procedure continues until one 
candidate receives a majority of votes. Compared with a plurality rule electoral 
system this preferential system tends to produce few ‘wasted votes’ because a
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winner should gain the approval of a majority of voters. In theory, it suggests 
that:
parties with similar policies could nominate their own candidates 
without risk of helping the election of candidates of opposing parties, 
since voters for a candidate who did not receive many first 
preferences would be passed on to candidates shown as the next 
preference (Wright, 1986: 127).
In marginal constituencies second-preferences would play an important role in 
determining a winner. However, a geographically uneven distribution of party 
support will cause similar effects to those in plurality rule electoral systems. 
That is, the preferential system can work in a similar way to a plurality rule 
election in safe constituencies since no second-preferences are needed to decide 
a winner. In fact, Australia has many safe constituencies (Wright, 1986: 130) 
and there is commonly a large discrepancy between votes won and seats gained 
by one party. This is a similar effect to under plurality rule elections, and 
proportionality is not much improved in such situations.
Besides, the patterns of voting for the Democrats, Australia’s main third 
party since 1977, are quite similar to other third parties in this study. In a 
research about the Australian Democrats Marks and Bean (1992: 327) 
concluded,
there are remarkable similarities between the support bases of the 
Australian Democrats, the British Liberals and Alliance and the New 
Zealand Social Credit/Democratic parties. They all have weak social- 
structural bases, a relatively small core of loyal partisans and very 
weak ideological bases to their support. They gain a good deal of 
their support from contemporary political factors, which explains the 
fluctuations in their vote, but does not argue well for their future 
sustainability.
However, the Australian third party has never won seats in elections for the 
House of Representatives, although the Party secured some seats in the STV 
elections for the Senate. In spite of seemingly ‘remarkable similarities’, there is
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an essential difference between the preferential electoral system and a plurality 
rule electoral system in terms of third party voting. In a safe constituency in 
Australia dissatisfied voters would face different options from those under a 
plurality rule electoral system.
For example, suppose there is a dominant party (A) in a safe constituency. 
If no candidate wins a majority required, due to sufficient support for the third 
party C, then second preferences will matter. Because voters in the safe 
constituency have developed a certain degree of long-term commitment to the 
dominant party A, many voters are likely to still prefer the party A to a major 
opposition (B) even when they are disappointed with party A. That is, many 
dissatisfied voters, who chose the third party C as the first preference, still stick 
with the dominant party (A) by choosing it as their second preference. If there 
is no absolute winner in first preference votes, the dominant party will have a 
clear advantage over the third party (C) by collecting a greater number of the 
second-preference ballots. Even when a third party C is seen as a viable 
alternative, party C cannot possibly win a seat unless it is able to secure a 
majority of the first preferences, which is unlikely to occur in a safe 
constituency. This systematic barrier against third parties undermines growth of 
the non-major parties under the alternative voting system. Thus, the second- 
preference functions as a safety-valve to deter a sudden rise of third parties in 
Australia.
Unlike the House of Representatives, the STV system provides more 
favourable conditions for third parties, and the Australian Democrats have 
gained some seats in the Senate. Moreover, the Democrats have exercised a 
‘balance of power* in the Senate since 1980. However, non-major parties still 
have some disadvantages in spite of the proportional rule. Regional variations 
in party support - including the distribution of other than first preferences - still 
matter, especially when the district magnitude is not usually large enough to 
produce accurate proportional outcomes. As Katz (1984: 137) said, STV tends 
to localize and personalize politics. Seats in the Senate represent each state. At 
an ordinary Senate election, six seats from each state are being elected. (At a
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double dissolution, twelve seats from each state are being elected.) Since a 
state is the unit of allocation for seats, concentrated support for a non-major 
party in one or two states would be effective to gain seats. By contrast, evenly 
distributed support for a non-major party across the states would be ‘wasted’ 
when it is not large enough to reach the allocation quota. For example, in the 
1984 election, the Nuclear Disarmament Party gained 7.2 per cent of first 
preference votes nation-wide. However, the Party gained only one seat in the 
Senate.
Their role in holding the ‘balance of power’ did not boost the Democrats’ 
electoral fortunes, either. In spite of their greater prominence, their electoral 
results stayed the same or even declined. In the 1983 election the Democrats 
gained 9.6 per cent of vote for the Senate, which is the tiny increase from 9.3 
per cent in 1980. However, its share fell to 7.6 per cent one year later (in the 
1984 election). This shows that the Democrats do not build a solid base of 
support. As Papadakis and Bean said (1995: 97),
(the Australian Democrats and other third parties) lack a distinctive 
clientele in the form of a consistent appeal to well-defined social 
groups and they face institutional arrangements, such as electoral 
systems, which favour entrenched interests. Both of these factors 
make minor parties susceptible to sudden changes of fortune (even if 
they enjoy a run of success for a time) and constitute major 
challenges to their long-term political prospects.
In spite of different electoral systems, the Australian Democrats have suffered 
similar problems to other third parties of the endogenous type under plurality 
rule electoral systems. In elections for the House of Representatives, the second 
preferences in safe seats work against third parties. Under the STV elections for 
the Senate, a relatively small district magnitude functions as a hidden barrier to 
growth of third parties.
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1.5. CONCLUSION
This study deals with one political consequence of an electoral system. As 
Duverger argued, plurality rule electoral systems tend to create unfavourable 
conditions for non-major parties. There are two types of third parties with 
parliamentary seats under a plurality rule electoral system : the exogenous type 
of third parties and the endogenous type of third parties. The former seeks a 
kind of political ‘niche market’, appealing to a defined group sharing some 
exogenous trait. The parliamentary representation of such parties are sometimes 
exaggerated because of geographically concentrated support. By contrast, the 
endogenous type of third parties has diffused and unstable support, and they are 
seriously under-represented. The rise of support for the endogenous type of 
third parties is intriguing because those parties depend on ‘unidentified’ and 
‘uncommitted’ voters.
The four parties covered in this study all represent the endogenous type of 
third parties. In spite of the differences in their political systems, the four 
parties are also all more or less successful third parties. The four cases are 
sharply in contrast to the United States and Australia (the House of the 
Representatives) where no viable third parties have yet emerged. This contrast 
suggests the importance of the contextual settings in which the options of voters 
are affected.
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NOTE
1. The term ‘third parties’ may seem problematic, because some of the parties 
included under it are actually fourth or fifth parties in terms of their share of 
seats in the legislative body. However, there seems no widely accepted term 
and definition for non-major parties. As Smith pointed out:
There is no uniform ‘small’ party, and the wealth of described terms 
- minor, micro, splinter, fringe and ‘third’ - indicates that the 
concept of ‘smallness’ has a variety of connotations as well as levels 
(Smith, 1991: 23. Emphasis in the original).
A plurality rule electoral system usually represents a ‘duality of tendencies’ in 
Duverger’s terms, and two major parties stand for each pole of the duality. 
Even though non-major parties are not uniform, they constitute some form of 
third force which stay outside the duality of tendencies. Therefore, the term 
‘third parties’ seems suitable to the non-major parties analysed in this study. In 
addition, the four parties of this study actually took a third position in the 
legislative body in terms of numbers of seats during the period covered.
The term ‘third parties’ here refers to those non-major parties with seats in 
the legislative body. Third parties range from a party with a single seat to a 
party with more than 20 per cent of the share of vote nationwide such as the 
Liberal Democrats in Britain. However, those parties are forced to stay ‘minor’ 
because none of them is able to govern on their own. For the sake of 
distinction, non-major parties with no legislative seats are here called as ‘small’ 
parties. The term ‘non-major’ parties includes both third parties and small 
parties in this study.
2. A major party in Westminster model (or under a plurality rule electoral 
system) is assumed to be able to form a single-party government with the 
majority of seats in parliament. However, it is very unlikely for a party in Type 
B to form a single-party government on its own. As a matter of fact, the Bloc 
Quebecois could never win a majority of seats unless it competes nation-wide,
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which would inevitably weaken its regional basis of support. The number of 
parliamentary seats allocated to Quebec is 75 out of 295 seats (or 25 per cent of 
total seats). The position of the Bloc Quebecois as the second largest party was 
largely caused by other forces - the landslide victory of the Liberals, and the 
even division of the opposition seats between the Bloc Quebecois (with 54 
seats) and the Reform Party (with 52 seats). Thus, it seems inadequate to 
define the Bloc Quebecois as a major party even though it is not a third party. 
The case of the Bloc Quebecois is regarded as an exception.
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Chapter II
REVIEWING EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF 
PARTY COMPETITION AND THIRD PARTIES
Elections are one of the most important mechanisms for liberal democracy, so 
that many intellectual efforts have been made to improve understanding of 
them, and to illuminate party competition. But non-major parties have not 
drawn so much intellectual attention. This is not surprising because the first 
concern of most political scientists is to develop models of competition between 
major parties which seek to govern on their own. For example, Downs assumed 
that voters would cast ballots as part of a government selection process, not as 
an expression of preference (Downs, 1957: 48). As a result, many existing 
accounts of voting behaviour tend not to produce satisfactory explanations about 
a ‘defiant’ choice, such as a decision to cast a ‘wasted’ vote by supporting third 
parties under a plurality electoral system.
The focus of most existing work is on discovering whether or not 
equilibrium positions for parties’ policy positions can be shown to exist 
theoretically (Enelow and Hinich, 1984), and whether party competition will be 
stable or unstable over time. The significance of many of these arguments and 
counter-arguments has been difficult to establish, and the empirical analysis of 
parties’ manifestos has only recently proceeded far enough to connect up 
effectively with some of the simpler models (Budge, 1994). The focus on 
macro-features of party competition has meant that smaller phenomena, such as 
protest voting and abstention, have tended to be neglected. Yet there is 
considerable evidence that these ignored processes may hold the key to 
understanding important political dynamics.
For example, in the UK protest voting has been defined as voters reacting 
against specific policies or failures of their ‘natural’ parties rather than being
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positively attracted to another party (Heath et al, 1985: 113). The growth of 
third and fourth party support since 1960 seems to have been closely linked to 
possible protest voting. Liberal and Liberal Democrat support has tended to be 
higher under Conservative governments than when Labour was in power, 
perhaps because Tory voters look for an intermediate position to support when 
dissatisfied with ‘their’ governments, but revert fully back to supporting the 
Conservatives to get Labour out if they become unhappy with Labour’s policies 
when in government. The suggestion is that the rising base-level of third and 
fourth party support represents a partial consolidation by these parties of votes 
initially intended as ‘protest’ votes. Protest voting fuels third and fourth party 
fortunes, and they then convert some of this otherwise ephemeral backing into 
permanent support in coral reef fashion.
Protest voting has been conventionally regarded as an expression of 
disaffection against the party one traditionally supports, which connotes 
negative feelings. For example:
The (British) Liberal vote is a vote of disaffection; it represents 
movement away from a party rather than movement to the party; it is 
a vote signifying departure rather than arrival (Himmelweit et al., 
1985: 162).
From a Downsian perspective protest voting is basically irrational. If voters do 
not cast their votes for their first preference party A, then they should not vote 
at all. (On the other hand, if voters no longer prefer A but instead rank party B 
higher, then protest voting disappears in favour of a simple switch of 
alignments). However, very dissatisfied (negative) voters have other options: 
deliberate abstention or voting for an extremist party or fringe candidates. 
Protest voting need not be only an expression of disaffection; it may also have 
an element of attraction.
The notion that the Liberal vote signifies departure rather than arrival 
is a rather curious one. If people wish to express disaffection there 
are many other equally or even more potent ways in which to do it -
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staying at home on polling day, for example, or voting for an 
extremist party like the National Front or for one of the many fringe 
candidates who appear, particularly at by-elections. The fact that 
voters chose the Liberal party as the vehicle for their protest suggests 
an element of attraction as well as disaffection (Heath et al., 1985: 
114).
The accretion of third party support via protest voting is also problematic given 
where it takes place. A plurality rule electoral system will usually impose 
systematic disadvantages on non-major parties, and hence a new challenger 
(especially a centrist party) confronts particular difficulties in winning some 
localities.
Since existing models have mainly concentrated on major parties, they have 
neglected to provide logical explanations about the electoral progress of non- 
major parties. It seems that non-major parties under plurality rule electoral 
systems have played a more important role, given the fact that the traditional 
model of the British-style two-party politics is hardly met in real politics. In 
this chapter, existing models of party competition are discussed in light of third 
party voting. The first section reviews public choice accounts on voting and 
party competition. The second section considers accounts of abstention and 
participation in voting. The third section examines existing explanations about 
tactical voting.
2.1. EXISTING PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNTS OF PARTY 
COMPETITION
In spite of its enormous contribution to understanding party competition, 
existing public choice accounts have not come up with satisfactory explanations 
about rise of third party support. One reason for their failure is associated with 
the lack of contextual understandings about third party voting. This section
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briefly reviews existing public choice accounts by examining some of their 
assumptions.
Downs and the proximity model
Since Anthony Downs published his seminal work, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957), economic models of party competition, often called public 
choice theory or rational choice approach, have been greatly developed. The 
logic of Downs’ model of party competition is based on the rationality of pure 
office-seekers and the principle of proximity. Downs saw party competition as a 
government selection process and the rationality of parties (or candidates) lies 
on winning election. That is: ‘parties formulate policies in order to win 
election, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’ (1957: 28). 
An individual voter is assumed to have a most preferred position along the 
spectrum (single-peaked preferences) and to vote for a party closest to his/her 
optimum position. Ideology is regarded as a ‘short cut’ to save the cost of being 
informed about a wider range of issues. Parties move their location along the 
political spectrum to capture the maximum number of voters, and the typical 
consequence of party competition (under certain assumptions) is convergence 
on the median voter’s position, resulting in an equilibrium.
In the proximity model party competition is seen as a market where parties 
compete to ‘sell’ their policies to voters. It is assumed that a voter will choose a 
party which occupies a position along the policy spectrum nearest to her own 
preference - just as holiday-makers buy their ice-cream from nearest stalls on a 
beach, and ice-cream stalls take positions where they will attract the maximum 
number of customers. Downs argues that:
support will be highest at the point of the candidate’s position along 
the ideological spectrum, and will decline as the distance of positions 
between voters and the candidates increases. Thus a party must be
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nearer a large number of voters than any other parties are (1957: 
128).
Eventually, the centre position is where two competing parties meet.
This centre area becomes smaller and smaller as both parties strive to 
capture moderate votes; finally the two parties become nearly 
identical in platforms and actions...Like the two grocery stores in 
Hotelling’s famous example, they will converge on the same location 
until practically all voters are indifferent between them (1957: 117).
In a two-party competition, thus, converging on the median voter’s views 
maximises the pool of voters from whom either party or candidate in a 
competition may hope to draw support. Moving away from this position will 
lose votes, and eventually control of government to the rival party or 
candidate.
The majority of researches in the spatial model have provided similar 
findings. For example, Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970) also found that 
candidates converge even in a bimodal distribution of preference. Considering 
the concept of the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy, they argued 
that if the sensitivity is low, candidates can change their positions without 
worrying about losing votes, and so will converge even under a bimodal 
distribution of preference.
Even though the median voter theorem has been repeatedly confirmed, 
some of Downs’s assumptions such as complete information, one-issue 
dimension, and a uni-modal, symmetric preference distribution have been 
criticised for being unrealistic. Many attempts to revise his assumptions have 
been made. It is well known that the median voter theorem can be well applied 
to party competition in one-issue dimension, but that parties are not likely to 
reach equilibria in a multi-issue dimension because of cycling of preferences 
and subsequent instability (for example, see Mueller, 1989: Chapter 10 and 
11).
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By distinguishing plurality maximisation and vote maximisation, Hinich and 
Ordeshook (1970) showed that in a multi-candidate election a candidate will 
try to maximise the difference in the vote between herself and her nearest 
competitor - plurality maximisation. Thus, candidates would focus more on a 
particular segment of the electorate, and would be less concerned with the 
preferences of all votes. They demonstrated that two competing candidates who 
maximise plurality diverge from the mean of a symmetric and unimodal 
distribution of preferences.
Dunleavy and Ward (1981) raised a question about Downs’ assumption that 
voters’ preferences are fixed. They criticised other approaches for assuming 
that politicians exclusively pursue preference accommodating strategies. 
Instead, they paid attention to governmental role to influence the electoral 
process. According to them, people’s preferences are determined endogenously 
within the process of party competition:
In any public choice account, the party of government is run by 
rational leaders anxious to maximize their chances of re-election. For 
them state power has the qualities of a free good which can be used 
for securing partisan advantage. Wherever their party is not certain of 
winning enough support to be elected, leaders should logically exploit 
this free good to create at least a minimum majority. In conditions of 
acute uncertainty party leaders may want to build up a secure margin 
of victory. In either case it makes sense to use their control of 
government so far as they can to accomplish changes in aggregate 
(and hence individual) preferences favourable to their party 
(Dunleavy, 1991: 118. Chapter by Dunleavy with Ward).
According to the ‘preference-shaping model’, political parties do not 
necessarily in a passive way accommodate a ‘given’ distribution of preference, 
but party leaders instead try to reshape or accommodate people’s preferences to 
move them closer to their parties’ position. This approach is more feasible in
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political systems with party-based competition than in countries where 
competition is essentially candidate-based (Dunleavy, 1991: 141).
Generally speaking, Downsian models have not produced feasible 
explanations about ‘success of centrist third parties’. Those accounts simply 
imply that third parties are to be squeezed by the convergence of two major 
parties on the median voter’s position. As Downs said, the winner-take-all 
outcome of a plurality electoral structure tends to narrow the field to two 
competing parties (1957: 124). From his point of view, this convergence would 
leave little room for entry of a third party at the centre, which does not 
correspond with some empirical evidence.
Distribution of voters’ preferences and third party support
The basic Downsian approach assumes two-party competition. When more than 
two parties join the competition, such explanations as the median voter’s 
theorem are not likely to be applicable. Taking into account the existence of 
third parties, some political scientists put forward findings which are different 
from the median voter’s theorem. For example, Brams and Straffin (1982) and 
Palfrey (1984) suggested that when there is a prospect of third-party entry at 
either extreme, two parties will not necessarily converge to the median voter’s 
position. Similarly, Cox (1985) proved that candidates do not have an incentive 
to converge toward the centre of the political spectrum in multi-candidate 
plurality rule elections. He suggested that multi-candidate equilibria under a 
plurality rule are either nonexistent or noncentrist - that is, some candidates will 
locate at extreme positions relative to the distribution of voters. Adopting a 
different approach from Cox’s position, Feddersen et al. (1990) argued that 
candidates enter at the median voter’s position, assuming strategically rational 
voters under a plurality electoral system with a unimodal distribution of 
preference. In their view voters want to maximise expected utility over policy 
outcomes, rather than simply voting for the closest candidate. In addition,
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Fedderson et al. recognised that the number of parties is an endogenous feature, 
opposing the view that the number of competing parties can assumed to be 
given.
However, the purpose of those arguments is to seek a point of equilibrium
s
along the spectrum which enable third parties to enter. Assuming a fixed 
number of parties, they tried to find equilibrium points or to justify the 
‘existence’ per se of third parties (candidates). The context and circumstances 
behind the equilibrium are usually neglected, which restricts their ability to 
produce plausible explanations about different outcomes in a similar setting - 
such as the different entry points of third parties in Britain and Canada under 
the same electoral system. In addition, given the fact that plurality rule electoral 
systems tend to penalise candidates from a non-major party, proximity will not 
necessarily be a single principal determinant to understand these parties’ 
performance. The major parties will have a much stronger influence over voters 
than non-major parties, and their slim chances of winning power makes third 
party candidates effectively unable to compete on equal terms.
In his simplest model Downs assumed that all voters’ preferences are single­
peaked and slope downward monotonically on either side of the peak (Downs, 
1957: 115-6) . He considered a number of ADP configurations, ranging from 
an even distribution of voters, through a symmetric bell-shaped distribution, to 
lop-sided ADP curves. But the image of the bell-shape has been rather more 
influential than the others, fitting closely with conventional assumptions about 
established liberal democracies. However, even if this image was appropriate 
nationally, the shape of the voters’ aggregate preferences at a sub-national level 
may not necessarily be a bell-shaped distribution. In many countries regions 
with a more homogenous class character and socio-economic status display a 
similar political propensity. If a region is composed of a homogenous set of 
people, its distribution of preference could be asymmetrically skewed and/or 
multi-peaked. Mueller was also aware of the existence of ‘bias’. He noted :
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The assumption that interest groups are biased toward or away from 
certain candidates or parties accords with observed voting patterns. 
Whites in the South and blacks everywhere in the United States tend 
to vote Democratic. Yankee farmers tend to vote Republican 
(Mueller, 1989: 203).
He understood that the ‘biased’ distribution of preferences increased the 
influence of interest groups on candidates or parties. Thus, the ‘bias’ is seen to 
be irregular because he thought that the bias from influence of interest groups 
leads the principle of one man, one vote to be ‘distorted’ (Mueller, 1989: 205). 
However, he did not recognise a regional variation of distribution of voters’ 
preferences.
Yet it is well known that plurality electoral systems tend to create regional 
polarisation because of geographically uneven distribution of preferences. As a 
result, these electoral systems tend to produce many one-party dominant regions 
where the leading party has consolidated stable support over a long time and 
where the other parties cannot be considered as serious challengers. Besides, 
the ‘dualism tendencies’ of plurality rule electoral systems (in Duverger’s 
terms) sometimes creates immobility of party choice between two major parties. 
Such immobility of party choice is especially conspicuous in one-party 
dominant regions where the majority of local voters share a similar tendency 
Figure 2.1 shows possible distributions of the local preferences (the thick 
lines) where the median voter’s position is assumed to have moved to the left, 
and where parties A and B are major parties nationally. But locally the leftist 
party A is close to the median voter’s position while the right-wing party B is 
out on a limb. Compared with other areas where the preferences are a bell­
shaped distribution (the dotted lines), party B is not likely to be a viable 
competitor locally against the dominant party A, and is likely to be a permanent 
loser. Instead, a centrist third party C is closer to the median voter’s position 
than party B, which implies that the non-major party remains as a second- 
preference among the majority of the local voters. In a certain circumstance,
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the non-major party C can be an alternative to the dominant party A. Third 
party voting is related to the immobility of party choice and the skewed 
distribution of the local preferences.
Figure 2.1. Skewed distribution of aggregate preferences
median voter
or
median voter
_________ a skewed distribution o f preferences (e.g. one-party dominant regions)
a bell-shaped distribution o f preferences (e.g. marginal constituencies)
In Britain the number of marginal seats has fallen and regional polarisation 
of voting has grown. Many articles have reported that substantial and increasing 
regional voting patterns in recent elections (for example, see Johnston and 
Pattie, 1987,1989; Bodman, 1985; McAllister and Studlar, 1992; Curtice and 
Steed, 1986). The existence of regional distributions o f preferences, which 
could differ from one at the national level, plays an important role in third 
parties’ support. As Bogdanor (1983a: 7) said, under the plurality system, the
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number of seats a party gains will depend upon the distribution as well as the 
size of its support.
As noted, Downs implied that a convergence of two (major) parties on the 
middle to capture moderate voters would always squeeze out a centrist third 
party. However, this explanation is applicable only to marginal constituencies 
where two major parties compete closely. By contrast, once we consider the 
existence of many safe constituencies (and regions) it seems clear that a centrist 
third party can always continue to compete with the major parties, at some 
level. Without considering the aggregate distribution of preferences at a sub­
national levels, third party support will not be properly explained.
It seems paradoxical that one-party regions (the most difficult terrain in 
terms of winning seats) seem to be more favourable conditions for the growth 
of third parties than marginal constituencies. Yet it is hard for a non-major 
party to attract votes where two major parties compete closely, because the 
major parties’ pull of influence over voters is much stronger than that achieved 
by any non-major parties. Hence in two-party marginal constituencies voters 
are more likely to remain loyal to their first preference choice, and less likely 
to support a third party even if they are dissatisfied with their normal party’s 
policies or behaviour (Johnston, 1984a: 104). Conversely, a one-party dominant 
region can provide helpful conditions for a third party, as Pinard noted in his 
study of Canadian provincial elections. He identified one-party dominance as 
one of the crucial ‘conducive’ conditions for the rise of third parties. Third 
parties in an established two party system benefit from a protest vote, 
particularly when one of the major parties is locally weak. His logic is based on 
a double frustration.
After a long period of dominance by a strong party, a dissatisfied 
electorate turns in part to the traditional opposition party. But if this 
party is soon considered to have failed...then the electorate is not 
ready to return so rapidly to the dominant party it just repelled; they
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shift instead to a third party (Pinard, 1975 : 26. Italics in the 
original).
Eagles and Erfle (1993) tried to empirically test Pinard’s one-party dominance 
thesis and the influence of community solidarity or cohesion on the form of 
political mobilisation.
Although both Pinard’s and Eagles and Erfle’s studies suggested that one- 
party dominant region should be a favourable conditions for third parties, they 
did not pay attention to an underlying logic of individual voter’s voting decision 
such as why he/she protest votes instead of abstaining.
Intensity of preference and partisan commitment
Many public choice approaches tend to follow the analogy of elastic consumers 
in a free market ready to respond to change in price. When the price rises, 
consumers stop buying. When the price goes down, consumers want to buy 
more. The choice in the market should vary according to changes of price. 
Likewise, Downsian approaches assume that voters are kept well aware of 
change of parties’ policy positions, and the calculation of party differential 
leads to a choice in each election. That is, voters are assumed to be elastic 
enough to respond to changes in policy positions. Downs assumed that ‘all 
parties are faced by the same citizenry’ (1957: 100), and ideology is regarded 
as simply a cost-saving devices when calculating party differentials.
Parties are also assumed to move their position fairly freely, just as 
producers respond to changes of demand and price. From Downs’ point of 
view, the party differential could be endogenously changed according to 
movements of a party along the ideological spectrum. Downs assumed that 
there is nothing to restrict the perfect mobility of parties unless they move 
ideologically past each other. In his model,
political parties are not agents of specific social groups or classes; 
rather they are autonomous teams seeking office per se and using
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group support to attain that end (1957: 97).
As a result, two parties may become nearly identical in platforms and actions 
(1957: 117).
However, consumers’ behaviour is sometimes inelastic in spite of changes 
of price. Some consumers are so familiar with a product that they may refuse to 
stop buying the product or to move to another similar product in spite of change 
in price, which Barry called ‘brand-loyalty’. Barry noted:
For brand loyalty, as I understand it, is precisely the unwillingness of 
a customer to switch from one brand to another even when the other 
brand is either objectively better or objectively identical but cheaper, 
more easily available, etc. (Barry, 1974: 98).
Even though such ‘brand-loyalty’ seems irrational from an economist’s point of 
view, the analogue can be applied to the relationship between political parties 
and committed voters. When the relationship between a party and voters has 
been established over a long period of time, any change of party position would 
not much influence voters’ view of the credibility of the party.
It is a frequently expressed criticism that a public choice approach does not 
properly explain voters with partisan commitment (or party identification). 
Rather, the significance of partisan commitment (or party identification) has to 
be understood in terms of the cleavage structure of a society. It is often the case 
that each (major) party in a two-party system is perceived to represent one of 
two competing poles along the main cleavage in society. In addition, plurality 
rule electoral systems tend to ‘freeze’ the cleavage by reducing the number of 
parties. Voters are likely to be aligned with a party which is perceived to 
represent ‘their side’ of the cleavage. Even though proximity matters, there is 
basically a party ‘for’ me ; and there is a party ‘against’ me. That is, party 
competition is not a free market and the party differential is rather exogenous. 
Where political parties colonise a certain section of the electorate, voters will 
not shift between the two major parties so much as Downs assumed. For
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example, for a committed Labour supporter a move by the Conservatives to 
shift their policy position towards him/her would be meaningless.
The long-term relationship between voters and a party also limits the 
feasibility zone in ideological space within which a party can move to attract 
the majority of voters. If a party is dependent heavily on a certain section of 
voters, for example, working class voters, then the priority of the party policy 
has to be bound to the voters’ preference, such as social welfare policies. 
Wittman (1983) argued that candidates (or parties) have preferences over 
policies, opposing the assumption that politicians are pure office-seekers:
To have policy goals does not mean that the politician is ideologically 
dogmatic, unconcerned with winning, or values a platform position 
as an end itself, but rather that candidates, like voters, are interested 
in policy implementation....Certainly it would be strange to assume 
that all the voters are interested in policy but that the candidates are 
not, especially when many government policies are public goods (or 
bads) consumed by all (1983: 142-3).
He found that policy-oriented candidates would be closer to the median voter in 
more competitive districts (1983: 150). In other words, only in marginal 
constituencies will the median voter’s theorem work; in safe seats a change in 
the party’s policy position will have a negligible effect.
The directional model is also opposed to the assumption of the Downsian 
model that most people have specific policy preferences. The alternative 
directional assumption is that voters have only a general or diffused sense of 
which direction they prefer to move in. Thus, they choose a party in terms of 
alternative directions in the policy spectrum rather than in terms of an ordered 
set of alternatives. That is:
the strongest support for the candidate comes at one extreme and the 
strongest antagonism comes at the other extreme, except the neutral 
candidate who receives identical evaluations from everyone.. .The 
more intense a candidate is on an issue, the more the candidate
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generates intense support or opposition with regard to that issue. 
(Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989: 98)
In another article, they also said:
The centre is not a position of advocacy; it is a neutral zone of 
indifference between the two issue alternatives. Thus, in order to 
generate issue-based support, a party must stimulate voter interest by 
taking fairly strong stands on some issues. There are simply no 
rewards for hugging the centre (Macdonald et al., 1991:1123).
According to the directional model voters prefer candidates who are on their 
side of issues and adopt intense positions. Thus, this model leads to different 
views about what constitutes effective political strategy. Whereas there is a 
strong incentive for candidates to be centrist in the Downsian proximity model, 
there is a strong incentive for candidates to be non-centrist when they are on the 
popular side of an issue in directional model (Macdonald and Rabinowitz, 
1993: 61). Briefly, in the proximity model voters ask ‘How close are your 
positions to mine?’; whereas according to the directional model they ask ‘Are 
you on my side?’ (Macdonald et al., 1991 :1126).
Even though the directional model implicitly suggests that voters’ choice 
would be influenced by a cleavage structure which divides between ‘ours’ and 
‘theirs’, this model also fails to explain successful ‘centrist’ third parties:
A location at the exact center of the space conveys complete 
neutrality. At the center the vector has no length, indicating no 
intensity and no direction. A candidate at the exact center of the 
[issue] space should be equally liked and disliked by everyone, since 
such a candidate would stimulate no emotions, either favourable or 
unfavourable (1989: 101)
This view cannot properly address the reasons for the existence of relatively 
successful centrist parties such as Liberal Democrats.
Most rational choice theorists assume transitive preference orderings. As 
long as the consistency requirements of an Arrovian weak ordering are met, any
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choice can be interpreted as rational (Riker, 1990: 173). In Downsian terms, if 
party A is closer to a voter than B, and B is closer than C, then party A is 
closer than party C. The voter is expected to vote for A because party A is 
closest. However, as Green and Shapiro pointed out, the ordering does not 
indicate the intensity of preference.
Transitivity assumes nothing about the intensity of preferences or the 
amount by which the different outcomes are valued in comparison 
with one another ... Transitivity requires only minimal consistency 
within preference orderings (1994: 15).
In party competition, the same distance would not mean the same degree of 
intensity of preference. Closeness to a voter’s position along the spectrum only 
indicates the ordering of preferences. According to Downs, the closer a party is 
to a voter, the more preferred it is.
Centrist third parties are not likely to be the first preference for many voters 
where two-party politics predominates. However, because of the strong rivalry 
built up between two major parties, centrist parties are also not likely to be the 
least preferred choice. Instead, centrist third parties are usually placed as a 
second preference. The logic of third party voting is closely related to two- 
party politics and voters’ commitment to any of the two parties. Contrary to 
Downs’ assumption, voters under a plurality rule electoral system are not 
‘elastic consumers’ ready to stop buying a product. Rather, a long-term 
commitment has often been built up between voters and parties, which makes 
voter behaviour ‘inelastic’. Because of commitment and rivalry, and the 
consequent immobility of party choice, centrist third parties can be seen as a 
second preference. Contrary to the directional model, centrist third parties have 
a certain kind of preference, although it could be passive, reactive, and 
responsive.
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Prospective voting, retrospective voting and evaluation
Downs saw elections as means of selecting a government. The rationality of 
voters focuses on deciding the benefits which would flow from implementation 
of party A’s policies if A wins an election. Like a consumer who wants to 
choose the best product which will reward him/her the best utility, voters are 
assumed to choose the best among different packages of policies offered by 
parties.
Citizens in our model cast their ballots only to influence government 
policies. They are interested in each party’s statements only insofar 
as those statements serve as guides to the policies the party will carry 
out when in office (Downs, 1957: 107).
Downs assumed that voters would support a party by calculating a future return 
from their decision. Voters are assumed to vote for the party they believe will 
provide them with a higher utility income than any other party during the 
coming parliamentary period. In formal theories (for example, see Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968), voters are assumed to be concerned with the different 
expected utility incomes from period f+7, that is, expected payoffs in the 
future. Fiorina also pointed out:
Downsian retrospective voting is a means to prospective voting. The 
Downsian citizen compares the challenger’s and the incumbent’s 
platforms, interpreting the latter in light of the incumbent’s past 
performance (Fiorina, 1981: 13).
However, a strong emphasis on prospective voting creates problems in 
explaining non-major party voting. From a Downsian point of view, only a 
party which can win a government would guarantee voters’ maximum utility. 
Voting for a third party which is unlikely to win should be irrational because 
the party would never be in a position to provide any higher utility by 
implementing its policies.
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Instead, Fiorina argued that voters vote retrospectively. He addressed three 
differences between prospective and retrospective voting (1981: 6-11). Firstly, 
electoral outcomes may signify quite different things, depending on whether 
citizens are in a primarily retrospective or prospective frames of mind. For 
example, the victory in Gulf War appealed only to a certain part of American 
voters. Secondly, prospective voting presumes a policy orientation in the 
electorate, whereas retrospective voting presumes a result orientation. Fiorina 
noted:
The traditional theory of retrospective voting implicitly assumes that 
citizens are more concerned about actual outcomes than about the 
particular means of achieving those outcomes, that citizens care about 
results rather than the policies that produce those results - for 
example: “End the war. Whether you bomb them back to the Stone 
Age or withdraw and claim victory, just end the war.” (1981: 8).
Thirdly, voters in general are not well-informed and not well aware of policy 
differentials. He argued that retrospective voting requires far less of the voter 
than prospective voting. Thus:
Politicians need not discern the precise policy preferences of their 
constituents. They need not only anticipate the reactions of their 
constituents to the conditions brought about by the policy instruments 
they adopt (1981: 11. Italics in the original).
From Fiorina’s point of view, the Downsian approach is not much different 
from retrospective voting approach. He noted:
the competency theory of retrospective voting merges with the 
Downsian theory in that approval or rejection of the past is 
tantamount to approval or rejection of existing policies and 
presumably their continuance (1981: 14).
Retrospective voting can be understood as contributing to a dominant 
cleavage under plurality rule elections, in that voters are divided in line with a 
cleavage and the two major parties usually represent each pole of the cleavage.
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Because voters already recognise the party differentials they will predict the 
prospective outcomes and know which party will provide a higher utility. For 
example, Conservative voters would be worried about a Labour government 
even though ‘New Labour’ seems attractive.
Fiorina’s notion is in line with Key’s punishment-reward theory (Key, 
1966). The basic logic is that if the incumbent has performed well then we will 
vote for them as a reward. Otherwise, we would vote for the opposition as a 
punishment. As Fiorina titled his book, he tried to explain voting in American 
national elections in which a sociologically-based cleavage structure is not 
salient and many voters easily switch between the Republican and Democrats 
party across elections.
By contrast, if we assume a society in which two parties represent two poles 
of a strong social cleavage (such as class, ethnicity or region), the terms 
‘punishment’ and ‘reward’ have different meanings. Fiorina considered the 
evaluation of the performance of the incumbent party (or candidate) as a 
starting point. However, where there is a long-term relationship between 
parties and voters, the evaluation of his or her party only matters, whether in 
government or not, because the other major party always remains less 
preferred. Poor performance by a Conservative government will naturally 
strengthen the relationship between the Labour party and supporters attached to 
Labour. The poor performance of the Conservative government will seriously 
affect Conservative voters. Thus, the options available to attached voters are 
between endorsement or protest, not between two competing parties. If a 
traditional party ‘satisfies’ them they will vote for it. However, even if the 
party does not satisfy them, it does not necessarily mean that they will vote for 
the other competing party. For many committed Conservative voters the options 
are not between (and never will be between) the Conservatives and Labour.
Retrospective voting in this kind of set-up is not a means of punishment- 
reward. Instead for attached voters it allows a choice only between
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endorsement-protest. And the most likely beneficiary of ‘protest’ would be 
likely a third party, even a centrist one.
2.2. EXISTING PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNTS OF ABSTENTION
The most acute problem for rational choice accounts of protest voting and 
abstention is Downs’ famous argument that voting in general is irrational. 
Downs thought that the return from voting would never be likely to be larger 
than the cost of voting.
Since time is a scarce resource, voting is inherently costly...When 
there are costs of voting, they may outweigh the returns thereof; 
hence rational abstention becomes possible even for citizens who 
want a particular party to win. In fact, since the return from voting 
are often minuscule, even low voting cost may cause many partisan 
citizens to abstain (Downs, 1957: 256).
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) developed Downs’ argument, and described a 
calculus of voting by assuming that ‘voting’ as well as ‘not voting’ could be 
rational. Their model is:
R = PB - C +  D
where R : utility from act of voting 
B : the differential benefit
P : the probability that a voter will bring about the benefit from voting 
C : the cost of voting 
D : political satisfaction or benefit
They recognised that voters gain political satisfaction (benefits) from voting 
which helps to encourage them into the polling station. Emphasizing the 
probability of participation in voting, they were also concerned with how voting 
can be pivotal. Like many other accounts on voting they also considered that
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the benefit from voting can only be obtained from a winning candidate or from 
influencing the outcome. Thus:
The citizen’s decision task ... is that each is trying to estimate his 
probability of affecting the outcome., which is a function of what he 
believes all others will do (Ordeshook, 1986: 228).
The study of specific (rather than generalised) forms of abstention within 
public choice has also tended to be neglected. Although Mughan (1986) 
emphasized the importance of short-term political contexts independent of long­
term forces in influencing voting turnout, there are relatively few sustained 
empirical studies of abstention, and few of these consider rational choice 
explanations. However, some basic ideas have been developed. Consider a bell­
shaped aggregate distribution of preferences along a single issue dimension, 
with a peak close to the median voter position, and two-party competition 
(Figure 2.2).
Conventionally rational choice accounts identify two possible sources of 
specific abstention. Abstention through indifference occurs if the two parties A 
and B converge so closely that the party differential is no longer sufficient to 
create a benefits stake offsetting voting costs. ‘Abstention from indifference 
occurs when the utility difference between the two candidates fails to exceed a 
certain positive threshold’ (Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 90). If parties have 
converged towards indistinguishability, then abstention through indifference can 
presumably occur in a certain number of voters at any point on the ideological 
spectrum (as in Figure 2.2).
Abstention through alienation occurs where a party moves ‘too far’ away 
from a section of its previous supporters for them to see any positive benefit 
from backing it. With median voter convergence pressures this form of 
abstention is expected to occur chiefly with ‘extreme’ voters on either pole of 
the issue dimension. ‘When a voter abstains from alienation, the utility 
difference between the two candidates may be great, but neither candidates is 
liked’ (Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 90).
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Figure 2.2. Abstention through Indifference and through Alienation
party A party B
median voter
Iffil abstention through indifference abstention through alienation 
Figure 2.3. Differential Abstention and Party Equilibria
Point party A party B
point D
median voter
^  abstention through alienation 
NOTE: Point D and F are indicative only.
Differential abstention through alienation could be crucial for the 
development of party competition. For example, consider Figure 2.3 where we 
envisage that left voters (for party A) have a considerably greater propensity for 
alienation abstention than do right voters (for party B). If A attempts to move to 
the median voter position it must chronically lose to party B; it can only 
successfully compete by shifting rightwards o f the median voter, which in turn 
entails that it must be able to ‘leapfrog’ over party B. If  A cannot leapfrog then 
B will simply sit close to the median and win permanently. If A can leapfrog
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then the party competition process may not stabilise anywhere close to the 
median. Instead it will tend to migrate rightwards over successive elections, 
with increasing levels of abstention by left voters as a result, perhaps stabilizing 
at a point such as D in Figure 2.3. Beyond D either party may win by breaking 
out of the rightward drift and shifting radically back to a point left of the 
median voter (such as F) and reactivating left voters.
Until the notion of generalized rational abstention can be tackled, 
explanations of specific abstention are severely undermined. The experiential 
approach, adopted by Dunleavy and Margetts (1994), stresses the importance of 
voters’ objective situations in defining their experience of democratic 
involvement or political participation. They criticize existing rational choice 
theory for giving no clear justification for assuming a priori that voters should 
adopt a demanding and unrealistic ‘objective’ standard - so that the touchstone 
for my participation is personal decisiveness. Instead, they suggest that:
[a] more plausible starting point might be that individuals define an 
appropriate “aspiration level” against which to judge their 
involvement, continuing to participate if this level is achieved, and 
dropping out if it is not (1994: 176).
In another article, they also say that:
rational actors will operate with ‘aspiration levels’ for their personal 
influence or efficacy which are fixed endogenously within the 
political process itself (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995 : 86).
They raise serious questions for the view that ‘rational’ voters should abstain by 
showing that most participants in an election (73 per cent of all voters in the 
1992 British general election) are a ‘winner’ on at least one of three levels of 
success - national, regional or constituency level. Dunleavy and Margetts 
suggest a potential linkage between the proportion of voters who count as 
‘winners’ and the levels and trends in turnout (1994: 177-9).
Their notion is based on the perception that voters have a ‘subjectively 
owned’ benefit from participation in voting, denying the importance of
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pivotality in voting. By classifying four kinds of benefits which an individual 
voter can get from voting, they suggest that voters’ ‘subjectively owned 
outcome’ could be a substantial influence on their voting decision (Dunleavy 
and Margetts, 1995: 68), even when a no-hope party or candidate cannot 
satisfactorily provide benefits from government or social approval. People are 
more likely to have such a ‘subjectively owned outcome’ where party choice is 
immobile and divisive, and partisan attachment is solid. Dunleavy and Margetts 
(1995:20) said:
Default or party benefits are likely to be substantial in comparison 
with both kinds of expressive benefits, especially in polarized 
situations where political alignments are adversarial or are closely 
associated with different social locations (for example, social class or 
ethnicity).
The emphasis on the pivotality as a main drive for voting contradicts 
empirical evidence. In most democratic countries the majority of citizens still 
participate in voting. More importantly, some voters participate by supporting 
an apparent loser. If voting is inherently costly, as Downs said, voting for a 
party which is unlikely to win seems more irrational. Dunleavy and Margetts’s 
suggestion is significant because they projected voting as a ‘rational’ action for 
the vast majority of electors, and hence threw into focus specific reasons for 
abstention or for changes in preferences. Third party voting is also to be 
understood in conjunction with the contextual circumstances influencing the 
decision about whether or not to participate.
2.3. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF TACTICAL VOTING
Sometimes voters do not vote sincerely. They could desert a more preferred 
candidate with a lesser chance of winning for a less preferred candidate with a 
better chance of winning. This tactical thought may change the result. As
55
noted, Fedderson et al. showed that when voters behave tactically (or are 
‘strategically rational’ in their terms) the entrance of new candidates will occur 
at the median voter’s ideal point (1990). Tactical voting occurs when voters opt 
for their second-choice party B in order to defeat their least-favoured party C in 
conditions where their first-preference party A has little hope of winning. From 
a rational voter’s point of view, people should not be expected to cast their 
votes for a party with little hope of winning because to maximise a voter’s 
utility in elections a first condition is simply to escape casting a ‘wasted vote’. 
Hence rational voters will instead vote for the second-preference party which 
seems to have better chance of winning and thus producing a greater amount of 
utility. Downs says:
A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit him 
most; then he tries to estimate whether this party has any chance of 
winning. He does this because his vote should be expended as part of 
a [government] selection process, not as an expression of preference. 
Hence even if he prefers party A, he is ‘wasting’ his vote on A if it 
has no chance of winning because very few other voters prefer it to B 
or C. The relevant choice in this case is between B and C. Since a 
vote for A is not useful in the actual process of [government] 
selection, casting it is irrational (1957: 48. Italics added).
Accordingly, non-major parties under plurality electoral systems have been 
often regarded as held back by the tendency towards tactical voting, because 
rational voters are assumed not to waste their votes by supporting a hopeless 
party.
In recent years the study of tactical voting has become ‘something of a 
growth industry’ (Niemi et al., 1992: 229), even though tactical voting per se is 
not a new phenomenon. Particularly, the growing interest in tactical voting in 
Britain seems to be related to the higher levels of third party support. As 
Galbraith and Rae say:
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In a de-aligned electorate with a more ‘consumerist’ as opposed to 
‘solidary’ approach to voting, the major barriers to tactical voting 
arising from class or party identification are removed (1989: 128).
The proportion of voters supporting the two major parties in Britain had fallen 
from 97 per cent in 1951 to 70 per cent in 1983. In addition, fewer MPs can 
claim to represent a majority of the voters in their constituencies. Thus, it is 
likely that tactical voting in conjunction with third-party support could more 
often play a critical role in deciding a winner.
Major parties frequently try to encourage tactical voting in their favour, 
persuading voters that supporting a non-major party would not be effective but 
only help the rival major party (presumptively their supporters’ least-favoured 
party) to win. For example, in the run-up to the 1992 British general election 
campaign John Wakeham, the then energy secretary and Tory party campaign 
co-ordinator, tried to capitalise on tactical voting, saying in a letter to his 
constituency at Colchester South and Maldon:
Liberals everywhere must therefore make a crucial decision over the 
coming months about how most responsibly to exercise their vote. 
They can decide to stick with their party, risk letting Labour in 
through the backdoor and consigning their own party to generations 
in the wilderness. Or they can come over to the Conservatives (The 
Times, January 13,1992. Italics added).
As a matter of fact, the leadership of the Liberal Democratic party during the 
electoral campaign period made efforts ‘to tackle head-on the party’s biggest 
electoral handicap, the belief of a large proportion of the public that a vote for 
it will be wasted’ (The Times, February 13,1992). Despite their efforts, the 
percentage of Liberal Democratic votes cast for successful candidates turned out 
to be only 7 per cent of its 6 million votes in 1992. (By contrast, the percentage 
of ‘successful’ Conservative votes was 71 per cent of its total votes won, and 
the percentage of ‘successful’ Labour votes was 57 per cent of its total number 
of votes in 1992.)
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Nevertheless, the support for the Liberals and the Liberal Democrats has 
increased by eight times from 3 per cent in 1951 to over a quarter of the vote in 
1983. The growth seems to strikingly contradict what the rational voter 
assumption implies, but existing accounts have usually neglected some features. 
Firstly, a non-major party is not always a victim of tactical voting; it could also 
be a beneficiary if the former voters of one of the two major parties vote for a 
non-major party. Tsebelis called this phenomenon ‘inverse tactical voting’ 
(1986). He argued that the flow of votes is not only from small parties to big 
parties, but also vice versa. However, he had a proportional representation 
system in mind when writing about ‘inverse tactical voting’. Studying Japan’s 
single non-transferable vote, Cox (1994) also suggests:
in multi-member districts voters who care only about the outcome of 
the election will strategically desert both candidates who are “too 
weak” and candidates who are “too strong” . Such outcome-oriented 
voters desert weak candidates in multi-member districts for the same 
reason as in single-member districts. They desert strong candidates 
when those candidates have one of the M seats sewn up but there are 
other seats still up for grabs; for then the voter’s vote has a much 
greater chance of affecting the outcome if cast for one of the 
“marginal” candidates - those on the edge between winning and 
losing (1994: 616. Emphasis in the original).
However, few studies have paid attention to ‘inverse tactical voting’ in plurality 
rule electoral systems. Michael Steed claimed in his analysis of the 1974 British 
general election:
A very special form of this centrist vote for the Liberals is the tactical 
vote, which has contributed critically to the election of Liberal MPs. 
Apart from the Scottish Highlands and Islands and from 
Montgomery, every Liberal seat won in the last 25 years has owed 
much to the preference of a majority of Labour partisans for Liberal
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Party over the Conservatives, or to the similar anti-Labour preference 
of Conservatives (1979: 89. Italics added).
It seems controversial whether ‘every’ Liberal seats won from 1950s to 1974 
depended ‘critically’ on tactical voting, and Steed did not give any analytic 
proofs to back up his argument.
‘Inverse tactical voting’ under a plurality rule electoral system can be well 
observed at the sub-national level. As Riker pointed out aptly, which of the 
several parties is weakened by tactical voting depends on conditions in the 
constituency.
If the third party nationally is the weakest locally, then sophisticated 
voting by its supporters weakens it. However, if the third party 
nationally is one of the two large parties locally, then sophisticated 
voting by supporters of the weakest party (i.e. one of the two large 
parties nationally) strengthens the third party (Riker, 1982: 762).
That is, ‘inverse tactical voting’ is another product of the immobility of party 
choice under plurality rule electoral systems. Where one major party (A) is 
dominant and the nationally opponent party (B) remains a permanent loser, 
some of the former supporters for party B could tactically vote for a viable 
third party. Their immediate concern could be to reduce or remove the party’s 
dominance. ‘Inverse tactical voting’ is a local phenomenon based on regional 
variation of party support under a plurality rule electoral system. For example, 
in a study about the 1987 British General Election, Curtice and Steed (1988) 
said:
The influence of the tactical situation upon the propensity of Labour 
voters to switch to the Alliance is very clear... we divide the 
Conservative/Alliance seats according to how far the Alliance were 
ahead of the third-placed Labour candidate in 1983....it appears that 
the willingness of Labour voters to defect was dependent more on 
how hopeless their party’s situation was, than on how close the 
Alliance was to winning’ (Curtice and Steed, 1988: 336).
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Secondly, tactical voting has often been confused with protest voting. No 
chance of winning for the first preference party has been doubtless regarded as 
the important reason to bring about tactical voting in most existing public 
choice accounts and electoral studies - which could lead people to support a 
party which is also still unlikely to win (usually a third party) by voting 
tactically.
However, in their research on tactical voting, Franklin, Niemi and Whitten 
admit that:
many voters cast their votes for the other one of the two leading 
parties; some supported the third party in the constituency, showing 
no evidence of trying to avoid a ‘wasted vote’....indeed, even among 
‘main reason’ tactical voters, nearly half behaved in a way that does 
not accord with the wasted vote hypothesis. Consequently, the 
anomalous behaviour owes little to the manner in which we identified 
tactical voters (1994: 549-50. Italics added).
They tried to explain this ‘anomalous behaviour’ by distinguishing non-wasted- 
vote tactical behaviour called ‘expressive’ tactical voting from ‘instrumental’ 
tactical voting which seems close to its traditional meaning.
This general expression (expressive tactical voting) is intended to 
cover all instances in which individuals might vote not so as to alter 
the winner in their constituency but instead to send some message or 
signal, to their own party or to some other. For example, a voter 
might wish to humble a party that is poised to win by an 
overwhelming margin or register some support for a party that cannot 
win. Sometimes a voter might expressively vote for a small party in 
order to show support for the policies espoused by that party in the 
hopes that the voter’s preferred party might be induced to adopt 
them. To distinguish the more traditional, ‘wasted-vote’ form of 
tactical voting, we will call it ‘instrumental’ because its intent is to
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help determine the winner of the race in a constituency (Franklin et 
al., 1994:552)
However, as Heath and Evans (1994) pointed out correctly, ‘expressive tactical 
voting’ would be close to the term of protest voting. Although Franklin and 
colleagues (1994) recognised a need to distinguish protest voting from tactical 
voting, they did not identify the inherent differences between tactical voting and 
protest voting.
There is an apparent similarity between protest voting and tactical voting. 
Both types of voting occur when voters deliberately choose a party to which 
they are not really committed. Thus, both protest voting and ‘inverse tactical 
voting’ seem to be a temporary response to the situations which voters face. 
Such a temporary response with lack of commitment indicates one reasons why 
support for the endogenous type of third party is unstable. In other words, both 
forms of behaviour are not sincere voting. However, tactical voting is different 
from protest voting in terms of where it occurs and against which party voters 
cast their ballots, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
2.4. CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, existing public choice accounts of voting and party 
competition do not seem to produce convincing explanations about third party 
support. Most attention in public choice has focused on competition between 
major parties who seek to govern. Politicians are assumed to be pure office- 
seekers who want to enhance the likelihood of being elected. Under 
appropriate conditions parties tend to converge to the median voter’s position to 
attract maximum votes. This convergence process leaves effectively no room 
for a centrist third party which should be squeezed out. From a voter’s point of 
view, there is also no reason why he/she will vote for a non-major party. The 
benefit to citizens from voting is assumed to come from backing a winning
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candidate, and will reach its apex when the vote is decisive. As Downs 
assumed, voters should cast ballots as part of a government selection process. 
Since in a plurality rule electoral system a non-major party has no real chance 
of joining a government, ‘rational’ voters should not vote for the third party.
However, these accounts run against much empirical evidence because some 
third parties have succeeded in widening and consolidating their support. One 
reason for this gap is that the basic unit of analysis is normally taken as a 
political system as a whole, and variations inside within the unit of analysis can 
easily go unchecked. However, if the unit of analysis goes down to the sub­
national level, the assumption of the uniformity should be changed. Third or 
fourth party voting can be understood in their regional or local context.
Existing accounts are also likely to follow the analogy that voters behave 
like consumers in a perfectly competitive market. However, voters in plurality 
rule electoral systems are forced to choose in an imperfect competition because 
the entrance of new parties is limited. Moreover, the established parties tend to 
represent (or are perceived to represent) each part of the major social cleavage 
in the country, which further develops the relationship between the party and 
voters. Contrary to Downs, voters are not necessarily ‘elastic consumers’ ready 
to switch from buying a familiar product to any available alternative. A long­
term relationship is usually established, which makes the voters’ behaviour 
‘inelastic’.
If the relationship is long-term, the payoff of a party is already recognised. 
Voters know which party will benefit him/her (and will not). From prospective 
voting, securing a government is important because the government party will 
be able to implement policies. To committed voters, the basic momentum of 
decision is evaluation of performance of his or her party, whether in 
government or not. As long as the party satisfies him/her, the relationship will 
be stable. The alternatives available to attached voters are ‘endorsement or 
protest’, not ‘reward or punishment’.
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Even though non-major parties often fall victim of tactical voting in major 
party marginals, these parties can also benefit from‘inverse tactical voting’. 
This phenomenon is closely related to the immobility of party choice and to 
regional variations in party support under a plurality rule electoral system, 
which indicates again the importance of context for third party voting. Existing 
public choice accounts tend to overlook the context within which a voting 
decision about a third party occurs.
Due to lack of the contextual understanding, existing approaches do not 
produce a comprehensive explanation of the full range of voters’ choices such 
as protest voting, tactical voting or abstention. Rather, each choice of voting 
has been explained as if it were an isolated phenomenon. An alternative 
approach encompassing a full range of connected electoral choices is considered 
in the next chapter.
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Chapter III
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:
THE QUALITY-SATISFICING APPROACH AND 
THIRD PARTY VOTING
The starting point for an alternative public choice approach to third party voting 
has to lie with the basic behavioural postulate of public choice, as for neo­
classical economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer 
(Mueller, 1989: 2), which we saw in Chapter II was taken to imply that voters 
would only be ‘rewarded’ when a ballot goes to a winning side, most 
particularly when their vote was pivotal, that is, the critical increment which 
brings a choice of government about. However, the likelihood that a non-major 
party wins an election is effectively zero, yet in spite of this apparently low 
effectiveness, some voters choose to support them. To criticise ‘pivotal choice 
theory’, Dunleavy suggested that a rational actor is not necessarily preoccupied 
with an immediate outcome (or payoff) of his/her decision. He instead 
emphasized
a focus upon “having a useful effect” and recognising the separation 
of objective probabilities and subjective probabilities and collective 
stake discounting rates for rational actors in collective action contexts 
(Dunleavy, 1996: 26. Emphasis in the original).
This chapter suggests an alternative approach to analysing third-party voting, 
called the quality-satisficing approach. This approach assumes that rational 
voters will seek satisfaction in conjunction with a pooled level of benchmark, 
rather than aiming at maximisation of their utility. The chapter also pays 
attention to the contextual conditions which a plurality rule electoral system 
tends to create, such as immobility of party choice and geographically uneven 
distributions of preferences. The chapter begins with Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice
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and loyalty’ approach, which can be usefully transposed to analyse protest 
voting and specific forms of abstention. The following section introduces a 
satisficing account of voting, and discusses the logic of third party voting in 
relation to protest voting and abstention. The last section addresses how a third 
party draws support from inverse tactical voting.
3.1 HIRSCHMAN’S APPROACH
By using the variation of familiar demand function in economics, with the 
difference that quality bought is made to depend on changes in quality rather 
than price, Hirschman argued that a decline of quality results in a loss of 
revenue, as consumers respond to the worsening quality of goods (Hirschman, 
1970). When the quality of a good declines in a market, there are two ways for 
the firm’s customers or the organisation’s members to respond: exit and voice. 
The former option is to stop buying the firm’s products or to leave the 
organisation, whereas the latter means to express their dissatisfaction directly to 
management or to some other authority. He argued that people take up voice 
options rather than exit options when they believe a quality decline to be 
remediable, or whenever the exit option is unavailable. He basically assumed 
that ‘repairable lapses’ are inevitable, and exit and voice are the key 
mechanisms of recuperation. Hirschman said:
in perfect competition...the firm is not deprived of an effective 
correction mechanism because performance deterioration, which 
cannot possibly affect either quality or price, is reflected directly in a 
decline in revenue (due to increasing costs) (1970: 25)
Even though he thought that the notions of exit and voice are applicable to 
every level of organisations, including the political world, as the sub-title of his 
book implied, a direct application of Hirschman to party competition requires 
some revisions. Firstly, Hirschman understood the political world only as a 
general political system. Consequently, he thought exit options are unlikely to
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be used in politics and he pointed out, in particular, that full exit from a state is 
impossible (Hirschman: 31, 99). Since the starting point of the Hirschman’s 
notion is about firms in a competitive market and the consumers’ response, the 
analogy between firms and political parties is more appropriate. Unlike citizens 
in the state, voters can take the exit option in elections by simply deserting a 
political party which they used to support.
Secondly, in elections voters may have another available option to express 
their dissatisfaction besides resort to voice or exit, namely abstention. If ‘voice’ 
means to stay anyway and ‘exit’ means to desert, Hirschman’s dichotomy 
seemingly leaves no room for the case of abstention. Abstention can be a 
response to a decline in quality, but it does not apparently mean ‘exit’ - ‘leave 
the organisation’ in Hirschman’s terms. Rather, abstention may imply choosing 
to reserve a decision or to be in-between exit and voice.
Barry (1974) extended his ideas, pointing out that the two options of exit and 
voice are inherently different categories with each other. He said:
to speak of a choice between exit and voice is in fact to collapse two 
separate choices into one another. One choice is between exit 
(leaving) and non-exit (staying), the other is between voice (activity, 
participation) and silence (inactivity, non-participation). In any 
situation, one choice has to be made out of each pair of options, even 
if only by default. (Barry: 1974: 91)
According to Barry dissatisfied customers have four possible options: be silent- 
and-stay, stay-with-voice, be silent-and-exit, and exit-with-voice. However, 
when these four options are applied to voters in an election, there is effectively 
little difference between ‘being silent-and-stay’ and ‘stay-with-voice’ in 
elections. Stay-with-voice could be different from silent-and-stay in that the 
former option may include actions such as a visit to the party headquarters for 
protest or sending letters for appeal. However, the two options are identically 
expressed in elections - voters continue to cast their ballots for the traditional 
party.
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The working assumption here is that voters will normally respond to a 
change of quality provided by their party. However, we do not expect all voters 
to behave in the same way. Some voters do not signify any deterioration of 
quality; they take the ‘non-exit’ option. Downs saw uncertainty about the 
course of events as bringing about this ‘inertia’, saying: ‘voters are not always 
aware of what government is or could be doing, and often they do not know the 
relationship between government actions and their own utility incomes’ 
(Downs, 1957: 80-81). Such uncertainty includes not only lack of information 
but also a lack of confidence about the information. As long as a voter is not 
aware of the decline of quality, he/she will keep voting for his/her traditional 
party.
However, normally when a voter recognises a loss of quality, he/she will 
tend to respond and to express his/her dissatisfaction. The response of a 
dissatisfied voter will vary depending on whether he/she has another alternative 
party to vote for or not. Where there are only two parties (A and B) available, 
the options to respond to the decline of quality from party A are to shift to 
party B; abstention; or stick with party A. As noted in the previous chapter, 
plurality rule elections tend to produce immobility of party choice, so that the 
other opponent party B cannot be an acceptable alternative. Thus, a voter’s 
available options are effectively reduced to abstention or continuous support for 
the previous party A. Those who want to respond to the decline of quality 
would have only one option: abstention. Where party support is more polarised, 
more voters would be forced to abstain when they are dissatisfied with their 
previous party because they are still reluctant to endorse the rival party.
If voters have an alternative (party C), another possible response is protest 
voting. Here, instead of directly shifting to a rival major party B, voters just 
want to give their party A some warning by suggesting the possibility of long­
term losses. In Hirschman’s terms, this is a mixed option between exit and 
voice, because its content is a kind of voice, but its form is evidently an exit. 
Hirschman saw this kind of response as a ‘mechanism of recuperation’ (1970:
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3): ‘The immediate and most obvious reaction is a determined search for ways 
and means to take up the slack, to retrieve the ideal of the taut economy’ (1970: 
13). In particular, the underlying assumption of voice is that a decline in 
organisational performance is remediable (Hirschman, 1970: 31). Barry 
suggested:
Voice should be conceived of not only as a possible “response to 
decline” but as a possible response to the belief that a firm or other 
organization could do better...constant quality may be associated with 
the belief that improvement is possible.(Barry, 1974: 90)
Thus, protest voting is an ‘exit-with-voice’ option, in Barry’s terms, which 
voters deliberately choose to express their dissatisfaction. The belief that party 
A could do better only arises if the voter has an established confidence in A. 
Protest voting occurs among fairly consistent supporters, and where a party has 
strongly established its support for a long time, as in one-party dominant 
regions. The underlying assumption is here that a certain degree of 
commitment has been developed between local voters and the dominant party. 
In other words, the response of protest voting functions as a ‘mechanism of 
recuperation’ for sustaining a long-term relationship.
The choice of protest voting as ‘exit-with-voice’ is associated with two 
conditions. Firstly, according to Barry, the expected value of exercising voice 
will have to be higher than another currently available alternative plus the cost 
of exercising voice. Only when the expected value of the change in policy 
produced will outweigh the time and effort expended, will people want to 
exercise voice (Barry, 1974: 92-4). That is, those with higher expectation are 
more likely to protest vote. Secondly, the choice of protest voting relies on 
viability of an alternative. When an unhappy voter with his/her previous party 
has an alternative which looks viable, he/she will be more likely to protest vote 
for it. In sum, if the combination of the expectation of improvement and the 
viability of an alternative party offsets (or compensates for) the amount of the 
declined quality, he/she exercises voice option. That is:
68
U(dissatisfaction) < Alternative + Exp(voice) (3.1)
where ‘U(dissatisfaction)’ is the amount of dissatisfaction with the 
performance of a traditionally supporting party;
‘Exp(voice)’ is the expected value of the improvement
secured by protest voting instead of abstention; 
‘Alternative’ is the difference in value between the best two alternatives.
When a voter does not expect sufficient improvement to meet the inequality 
above, he/she will abstain. In addition, a big difference between the best two 
alternatives can lead a dissatisfied voter to abstain because the alternative is not 
viable. Thus, protest voting will increase where the quality gap between the 
best two alternatives is small and voters expect considerable improvement.
Figure 3.1. Possible options of protest voters in one-party dominant region, 
responding to decline of quality
Dissatisfaction with traditional party
Not
i— respond
Respond
no alternative
— alternative
r not viable
viable —
high expectation 
low expectation
vote for 
initial party
abstain
abstain
protest voting
abstain
By employing Hirschman and Barry’s ideas, available options which an 
individual voter may have in elections are summarised as Figure 3.1. Choices 
are influenced not only by the decision whether or not to respond, but also by 
the existence of a viable alternative party and by voters’ personal expectations 
about participation in voting. The figure above shows that the decision to
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abstain can occur for different reasons, the first of which (context) is addressed 
in the next section.
3.2. ‘QUALITY’ LEVELS, SATISFICING AND VOTERS’ DECISIONS
The core of Hirschman’s notion is that consumers will ‘respond’ to a decline of 
quality. By assuming that perceptions of political ‘quality’ focus on both a 
party’s efficacy and its ideological proximity, this section explores how voters 
will respond to a quality decline.
Efficacy and Ideology
To adapt Hirschman’s approach to cope with the analysis of voting behaviour it 
is necessary to introduce a few changes into the conventional apparatus of 
spatial models. As seen in the previous chapter, the standard approach relies on 
the proximity assumption that voters choose the party closest to them in 
ideological space (Downs, 1957). An individual’s support will be most 
enthusiastic when the party’s position is exactly the same as the voter’s 
optimum point. In the simplest spatial models, all voters closest to party A 
support it: only the greater proximity of other parties would change their minds 
(or in some circumstances lead a decision to abstain because of indifference). 
More recent work stresses a probabilistic approach, where some uncertainty is 
irreducible: here the further away a party is from a voter’s own best position, 
the less likely he/she becomes to vote for it (Hinich and Munger, 1994, 166- 
76). Conventionally the Downsian spatial model also focuses on elections held 
under systems (such as plurality rule) where voters must make only a single 
choice, and hence where only their first preferences seem to matter. However, 
dissatisfied voters who are ready to ‘respond’ to a quality decline would 
consider their ‘second’ preference. Where two major parties take an extreme 
pole along the left-right spectrum, a centre position should be the second
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preference in terms of proximity.
As noted, directional theory suggests that as voters prefer candidates who 
are on their side of an issue and intense in their stance, the strongest support 
comes for candidates with distinct (but not ‘extreme’ or unfeasible) positions, 
denying the proximity theory that voters will support parties that are closest to 
them on an issue (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). According to the 
directional approach closeness does not count when a party is centrist on an 
issue. That is, the centre is not a position of advocacy (Macdonald et 
al., 1991:1123). The usefulness of this approach is apparently weakened by 
some empirical evidence of growth of support for centrist parties such as the 
British Liberal Democrats through the 1980s. This approach neglected to 
perceive that in a polarised politics the centre could be the second choice from 
either side of the spectrum, although the centre might not be a position of 
advocacy.
To understand third party voting, it seems insufficient to suppose that some 
voters unhappy with party A shift to the nearest party C simply due to 
proximity. What voters really want is a government positioned near their 
optimum position, rather than just a party nearby. When they support any party 
most people want to achieve concrete benefits in policy, as well as to simply 
represent their views in a public fashion. The concept of party efficacy is useful 
as the (perceived) capability of the party to carry its policy positions into effect. 
That is, party efficacy is an individual voter’s projected expectation that a party 
will (or can) do ‘something good for me’. If a party is more capable of 
implementing policies which its supporters favour, its efficacy will rise. 
However, it is noteworthy that how voters evaluate the efficacy of a party does 
not always coincide with its objective capability or accomplishments. For 
example, a gradual recovery in the economy often does not boost support for 
the governing party. Voters’ subjective evaluation of party efficacy will also 
vary, for example, depending on whether the election is local or national.
As a matter of fact, voters’ decisions in local elections are obviously
71
influenced by national events as well as local politics. Local elections (and by- 
elections) are frequently claimed by opposition parties as a referendum to 
measure national opinion and the credibility of the incumbent government at 
that time. If we assume that a voter’s evaluation of parties in a local election 
consists of national and local efficacy, it can be summed in a simple equation:
Uefr/A = p*\Jn +  q*Vl (3.2)
where Ucff/A indicates a voter’s evaluation of party A’s efficacy;
U« is the party A’s efficacy level in national politics;
U/ is the party A’s efficacy level in local politics; 
p  is voter’s subjective evaluation parameter at the national level; 
q is voter’s subjective evaluation parameter at the local level; 
and p+ q  =1, 0 ^ /? ^ l ,
Major parties provide more efficacy at the national level because they have a 
realistic chance of forming the national government, and so they obviously a 
high score of Un. Non-major parties may demonstrate efficacy at the local 
level, but they cannot match major parties on equal terms at the national level. 
Their score of U/i remains fairly low, but the score of U/ can be higher. 
Particularly where they have built up confidence and credibility in local 
politics, the score of U/ will rise further.
party A party B
u« 90 40
U / 60 80
The table above is a numerical example to show a different evaluation of 
party efficacy depending on whether the election is local or national. Each 
number in the table, which is arbitrarily chosen, points an individual voter’s 
evaluation score for party A and B. Party A is a major party which secures a 
high level of efficacy at the national level, but party A is locally less successful. 
Party B is a third party which has a limited efficacy at the national level under a
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plurality rule electoral system, but the party B has raised its efficacy locally.
Parameter q will be higher than p  in local elections, given that the major 
concern of local elections is usually local affairs. Suppose p —0.2 and <7=0.8 in 
a local election, then a voter’s evaluation of efficacy of party A and B will be:
Ucii/A = 0.2 * 90 +  0.8 * 60 = 66
Uefr/B = 0.2 * 40 +  0.8 * 80 =  72
The result demonstrates that the non-major party B has a higher efficacy score
than the major party by 6 points in spite of its low efficacy at the national level.
This example shows that the voters’ locally-made evaluations could be different 
from the assessment at the national level. It also gives an important clue to 
explain why some non-major parties under a plurality rule electoral system such 
as the Liberal Democrats in Britain have produced better results in local 
elections than general elections. Under ideologically polarised party politics, 
differences in efficacy between the major parties can also be large. Those voters 
who have a clear preference between competing parties could hardly consider a 
rival major party to be an alternative. In one-party dominant regions where 
most people have a shared propensity toward politics, differences in efficacy 
between the competing major parties will be enormous.
As noted in the previous chapter, Dunleavy and Margetts (1994) argue that 
voters’ perceived ‘success’ may be a key to understanding why people vote, and 
who they vote for, given the regional and local context of their decisions. 
Similarly, it is here argued that the subjective evaluation of the party efficacy 
plays an important role in third party voting. Although most studies have 
considered party efficacy mainly in national politics, efficacy in local politics 
might also matter, particularly in local elections.
That is, an evaluation of a party consists not only of ideological proximity 
but also of party efficacy, though at the local level.
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A pooled standard of quality
Spatial models have traditionally assumed that voters are utility maximisers. 
Already qualified by the notion of probabilistic voting, an alternative approach 
here, namely a ‘quality-satisficing’ account1 assumes that an individual voter 
sets a minimum required level of quality below which they will not consider 
voting for a party. People will support a party which delivers a higher level of 
‘quality’, consisting of both efficacy and ideological proximity, than their 
minimum required level. A party which successfully provides better quality 
than the required level will keep voters happy and loyal; otherwise, they would 
be dissatisfied with the performance of that party and want to express it.
If more than one party meets the required level, then on a quality-satisficing 
model it becomes difficult to predict how voters will behave. They may choose 
in a fine-grain way to support the party with the highest quality level; or they 
may decide randomly between them; or they may abstain through indifference 
(especially if one of the several acceptable parties in contention is very likely to 
win, and no unacceptable party is likely to win).
How do people arrive at estimations of quality, and how do they set a 
minimum required level? Conventionally spatial models have tended to see 
these processes as individually resolved. However, both as a way of simplifying 
the analysis, and as an empirically supported proposition, this study instead 
assumes that a much more socially- or contextually-influenced process is at 
work - a pooled standard which a group of people share for estimations of 
quality.
A pooled standard implies that people in a similar setting tend to develop 
similar views and to respond in a similar way. As often discussed, an 
environmental structure surrounding a set of voters makes influences on their 
preferences.
There seems to be no simple way in which we can empirically 
disentangle the effects of this variation from any underlying social
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patterning of costs and benefits invariant across agents. Nevertheless, 
in certain cases, there may be such great similarities between 
preference rankings of the actors that there is a strong preposition 
that such social patterning exists. Further, if a certain option, or 
small range of options, stand out in the preference rankings of all the 
actors involved, whether positively or negatively, we might speak of 
a strong social patterning of agents’ preferences (Ward, 1987: 606. 
Italics in the original).
‘A strong social patterning of preferences’ can be interpreted in the way that 
people in a similar environment are likely to develop a certain degree of 
collective homogeneity of preferences. As a matter of fact, when Hirschman 
said ‘decline of quality’, he had implicitly assumed an aspiration level with 
which consumers generally agree. That is, their reactions (or responses) as a 
‘mechanism of recuperation’ implies consumers’ wish to get the quality back up 
to the ‘normal’ level. Unless a reaction occurs purely individually, or just a few 
customers want to react, the normal level of quality (or an aspiration level of 
quality) will be shared collectively in a market. Since Hirschman understood 
the options of voice and exit as functions to remedy some ‘slack’ in the 
economy (1970: 1-15), it seems certain that he had a pooled standard of 
quality in mind (or ‘the ideal of the taut economy’ in his terms).
We can also see some empirical evidence that many people respond to a 
certain event (or situation) in a similar way. For example, when Gurr (1970) 
formulated a theory of rebellion, he focused on collective frustration and 
relative deprivation, saying “ [discontent arising from the perception of relative 
deprivation theory is the basic, instigating condition for participants in 
collective violence” (1970,13). The term of ‘relative’ deprivation indicates that 
there is a collectively-shared aspiration level which dissatisfied people desire to 
reach. That is, such kind of a collective action, though violent, implies a 
‘response’ to a lapse of quality in relation to a pooled standard, sending their 
wish to get the quality back up to the aspiration level.
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Besides, turnout rates in local elections (and by-elections) tend to be quite 
consistent and shows a stable pattern over time, though they are relatively low 
in many countries. Similarly, widespread distrust of existing political parties in 
the wake of a political scandal or unrest often leads to low turnout in elections, 
as shown in the 1996 Japanese election and in the 1997 Pakistani election. 
These examples also indicate that many voters similarly view (and evaluate) a 
political situation they commonly face.
A pooled standard of quality seems more noticeable where residents are 
homogeneous in terms of socio-economic conditions because they are likely to 
develop and share a similar political disposition. Taking the regions of a 
country as the key context, this approach assumes that voters as a whole 
construct a pooled standard of the ‘quality’ level against which political parties’ 
performance should be gauged. This is an established way of thinking and 
perceiving within that region, or a collectively-shared ‘aspiration level’. This 
social norm or widely-accepted standard reflects not only a national evaluation 
but also regional circumstances.
Simon’s approach and the quality-satisficing account
The term ‘satisficing’ was originated by Herbert Simon (1947). He argued that: 
‘Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded 
rationality - of the behaviour of human beings who satisfice because they have 
not the wits to maximize’ (1947: xxviii. Italics added). My point seems similar 
to Simon’s argument because this study assumes that people with an aspiration 
level will respond when the quality provided goes below the aspiration level 
(that is, it fails to ‘satisfy’ them). In other words, both assume individuals using 
standard operating procedures as a heuristic device and a shorthand guide to 
rational action (Ward, 1995: 81).
However, this study takes some substantially different viewpoints from 
Simon’s. Firstly, according to Simon administrative man can make his choice 
without examining all possible alternatives, and with relatively simple rules of
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thumbs. Simon assumes limited calculating ability is a major obstacle to 
rationality. The ‘bounded rationality’ which he assumed comes from ‘lack of a 
complete ordering of the pay-offs’ (1955: 109). When Simon said the limited 
rationality, he had a ‘sequential’ decision-making process in mind. For example, 
Simon (1955: 115-7) said,
We suppose that an individual is selling a house. Each day (or other 
unit of time) he sets an acceptance price: d(k), say, for the kth 
day....If he receives one or more offers above this price on the day in 
question, he accepts the highest offer; If he does not receive an offer 
above d(k), he retains the house until the next day, and sets a new 
acceptance price d(k+ l)....It is interesting to observe what additional 
information the seller needs in order to determine the rational 
acceptance price, over and above the information he needs once the 
acceptance price is set. He needs, in fact, virtually complete 
information as to the probability distribution of offers for all relevant 
subsequent time periods. Now the seller who does not have this 
information, and who will be satisfied with a more bumbling kind of 
rationality, will make an approximation to avoid using the 
information he doesn’t have.
By contrast, I assume a voter who examines all possible alternatives with a 
complete order of preferences in a given situation. That is, this study is based on 
‘a well-organised and stable system of preferences’ (Simon, 1955: 99). The term 
of ‘satisficing’ is closely related to the immobility of party choice caused by a 
plurality rule electoral system. In a system of polarised party politics, one party 
would be close to a voter while the other would stay away. Under the 
circumstances in which voters are committed to a party, the evaluation would be 
made over whether the party satisfies the actor, not over which party can 
maximise utility. If the term ‘rational’ indicates that the means are assumed to be 
consistent with the ends (Stevens, 1993: 18) (or it just means the Arrovian 
definition of rationality), the quality-satisficing approach does not breach the 
assumption of rationality. In one-party dominant regions under plurality rule
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electoral systems where there is an established set of preference ordering among 
parties, uncertainty around the bounded rationality is inherently limited. In other 
words, the whole set of possible alternatives is simultaneously given, rather than it 
needs to be sequentially searched for one by one.
Secondly, Simon paid attention to ‘procedural rationality*.
The models of problem solving describe a person who is limited in 
computational capacity, and who searches very selectively through 
large realms of possibilities in order to discover what alternatives of 
action are available, and what the consequences of each of these 
alternatives are (Simon, 1985: 295).
That is, Simon assumes that a rational man ‘searches’ for an alternative which can 
ultimately satisfy him. The alternative which he chooses can be the one with a 
lower level of quality than the initially-set level. Using the example in the 
quotation above, the newly set level of price d(k+l) must be cheaper than the 
original acceptance price d(k). The aim of searching is to seek an alternative to 
which he/she can accommodate in a given situation in which he/she has ‘the limit 
of computational capacity’.
By contrast, the quality-satisficing model pays attention to the mode of 
‘mechanism of recuperation’ in Hirschman’s terms when the aspiration level is not 
met. My point lies on ‘response’ to the lapse of quality. The aim of responding is 
to ‘restore’ an initially-set level of quality, not to search for a possible alternative 
with a lower quality. The purpose of such a response is rather instrumental to get 
things back to ‘normal’ ones. Thus, the meaning of ‘satisficing’ is different 
between the Simon’s and the quality-satisficing approach. For Simon, ‘satisficing’ 
is a process of accommodation in uncertain situations. By contrast, the quality- 
satisficing approach assumes a fixed benchmark level of satisfaction.
The third one is related to Elster’s criticism of Simon’s approach. Elster said:
In the theory of the firm, for instance, rational theory needs only one 
assumption, namely, that the firm maximizes profits. Satisficing theory 
needs many assumptions, stipulating one aspiration level for each of the 
many subroutines of the firm and, when that level is not attained, one
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search mechanism for each routine (1990: 42).
This study is not completely free from Elster’s criticism because the aspiration 
level could be different from region to region. However, as noted, one important 
assumption of this research is a pooled level of quality. Plurality rule electoral 
systems tend to exist where there are regions in which a certain degree of political 
homogeneity has been established, a trait which the electoral system in turn 
enhances. In those regions many people are likely to share a similar level of 
expectations about a party’s performance. That is, an aspiration level can be 
socially influenced and relatively standardised within a region. This study is 
concerned with individual voters’ choices in terms of a locally standardised 
aspiration level.
Protest voting and one-party dominant regions
This quality-satisficing approach may look especially appropriate in the kind of 
one-party dominant regions, which are fairly socially homogenous, and where 
voters in general see politics similarly. As noted, the incidence of protest voting 
seemed to be higher in one-party regions than in areas where two or more 
major parties contest with each other on even terms. One-party regions also 
allow the analysis to be simpler by restricting the range alternatives voters have 
to consider.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates an individual voter’s choice in a one-party 
dominant region, taking as an example a left-wing region such as northern 
England or central Scotland. The figure includes two levels: individual (Figure 
3.2a) and collective (Figure 3.2b). In Figure 3.2a the horizontal axis shows a 
conventional left/right ideological spectrum along which any individual voter is 
located according to their preference. Parties take up different positions along 
the scale by choosing policy positions. The vertical axis measures party quality, 
composed of efficacy and ideological proximity. The line r in the figure shows 
the minimum required level of quality for voters in this region. The quality 
provided will be at its highest for voters whose personal optimum is exactly at a
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party’s position. Quality levels decline for voters further away from that 
party’s position, as assumed in proximity theory. Line Ql indicates the amount 
of quality which party 1, the dominant major party in the region, provides. 
Line Q2 indicates the quality supplied by a third party at the centre, while line 
Q3 is the quality line of the rival major party on the opposite side of the 
ideological spectrum.
The underlying assumption is the immobility of party choice. While the 
centre party may improve its provision of quality, the opposite major party in 
the region has difficulty improving its quality among the ideologically biased 
voters. Thus, its quality line (Q3) stays low. Line Q4 indicates the quality line 
of an extremist party which (as drawn) can provide better quality than Q2 and 
Q3 until point p.
There are five zones in Figure 3.2a : A, B, C, D, and E. As long as one 
party’s quality line is higher than the minimum r level (and only one party), the 
voters in zones B and E of the graph will remain loyal to that party. Voters in 
zone B where Ql is above the minimum required level are firm supporters of 
the traditional party. Voters in zone E also feel sufficiently satisfied with the 
quality provided by the centrist third party.
By contrast, in zones A, C and D where all the parties’ quality lines are 
below the r level, people will be disaffected and seek another possible option to 
their previous alignment. Voters in these zones do not make a clear choice 
among parties because of the lower quality than the aspiration level r. They are 
unstable (or undecided, floating) voters who might be captured by other parties 
or give up voting altogether.
However, a one-party dominant region can create favourable conditions for 
a centrist party (Q2). In Figure 3.2a, the centrist party competes for the unstable 
voters (zone C and D) with only one contender (Qi). Because of this situation 
the centre party can not only escape from being squeezed between two major 
rivals but also emerge as a viable alternative in quality terms for at least some 
voters.
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Figure 3.2. The basic framework (in the left)
a) individual level
Quality
high
low
CentreLeft
b) collective level
number o f 
voters
aggregate distribution 
^  of preferences
high
level o f abstention
low
CentreLeft
Ql : quality provided by the dominant (left-wing) party 1 in the region
Q2 : quality provided by the centrist third party 2
Q3: quality provided by the rival major (right-wing) party 3
Q4 : quality provided by the extremist (left-wing) party 4
r : minimum required level o f quality (the aspiration level o f quality)
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Even though the unstable voters in zones A, C and D in Figure 3.2a are all 
dissatisfied (because no party’s quality line is above the r level), there is a clear 
difference in how voters behave across the three areas. Line Ql is still higher 
than Q2 in zone C, while Ql is below Q2 in zone D. The centre party in zone D 
is considered better than the established dominant party, but cannot satisfy the 
voters either. Voters in zone A may behave as almost pure ideologues. As the 
quality drops, they begin to feel alienated. An extremist party (denoted by Q4) 
might grow up to express their views. However, it is very unlikely that such a 
party could be a viable alternative. Under a plurality rule electoral system it 
will tend to have low efficacy, and may often attract social censure (as with 
racist parties in the UK). Thus, protest voting in zone A will rarely occur, 
except when voters in zone A expect that some great improvement will follow 
from their protest.
The distinction among the three zones will become more distinct by 
applying the inequality 3.1 to Figure 3.2a. In zone D in the figure, people will 
protest vote for party 2 if
UD (Q - Qi) < UD (Q2 - Qi) +  EXPd (voice). (3.3)
i.e. Ud(Q - Q2) ^ EXPd (voice).
Here the (Q2 -Qi) term is certain to be positive (Q2 -Qi > 0), that is, the
alternative party 2 has a higher value than the traditionally supported party. By 
contrast, in zone C, the same equation gives:
Uc (Q - Qi) < Uc (Q2 - Qi) +  EXPc (voice). (3.4)
i.e. Uc (Q - Q2) ^ EXPc (voice).
Here the difference of quality provision between the dominant party and the 
centrist party, given by the (Q2 -Qi) term, is always negative (Q2 -Qi < 0). In 
other words, the value of the best alternative is lower than that of the traditional 
party. For a voter in zone C to use protest voting to exercise voice they must
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have a higher expected value of improvement than in zone D. In both zones C 
and D if the relevant conditions above are not satisfied, voters will abstain.
Finally the likelihood of protest voting in zone A depends on where Q4 is 
located. If Q4 is well below Ql as drawn here (Ql »  Q4), the likelihood is 
low. Thus, protest voting will rarely occur, except when voters in zone A 
expect that a great improvement will follow their protest. The relevant 
inequality for protest voting for Q4 is:
UA (Q - Qi) < UA (Q4 - Qi) + EXPa (voice). (3.5) 
i.e. UA (Q - Q4) ^ EXPa (voice).
If this condition is not satisfied, they will abstain. However, Q4 may be much 
closer to or even above Ql: similarly there is no a priori reason why Q4 might 
not be above the level r in some situations.
Abstention and quality-satisficing approach
Summing up the discussion above, where voters have no realistic alternative 
apart from supporting their traditional (but declining quality) party, then 
abstentions are likely to be higher - that is, in zones A, C and D. Assuming 
probabilistic voting anyway, the implied pattern of abstentions is shown in 
Figure 3.2a, where the vertical dimension of the graph shows the bunching of 
voters at different points along the left/right ideological spectrum. (The 
aggregate distribution of preference is skewed to the left side because we are 
modelling a one-party dominant region of the left.) Zone A corresponds well to 
the alienation form of abstention suggested in existing public choice accounts. 
However, the increase in abstentions in zones C and D is not predicted by 
existing accounts for two reasons. Although centrist abstention from alienation 
is a possibility, in established models voters must use the same ideological 
proximity threshold to rate all available parties. Given the strength of pressures 
on parties to converge on the median voter, centrist alienation should be quickly
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eliminated in established models. Here the introduction of the quality measure 
combining both ideological positioning and efficacy, set against a required level 
of efficacy, effectively allows voters to apply different proximity thresholds to 
different parties. Even with strong median convergence pressures, considering 
party quality helps to explain why in a one-party dominant region with a third 
party as the ideologically proximate alternative to a traditionally chosen party of 
declining quality, centrist abstention through ‘alienation’ is likely to occur.
This approach also illuminates how changes in party positioning can affect 
centrist abstention. Figures 3.3a,b,c show a stable Q2 curve, but a number of 
shifting positions for Ql. When Ql is well to the left (Figure 3.3a), then Ql 
and Q2 intersect at w below the r level, and the C and D zones from Figure 
3.2a lie between v and x. Given that zones C and D include dissatisfied voters, 
centrist abstention should be high here.
If party 1 now shifts to the right to Q’l (Figure 3.3b), then the intersection 
with Q2 takes place instead at x, which lies on the r line. Here centrist 
abstentions would be eliminated unless a voter expects improvement by protest 
voting (that is, U(Q - Q’i)= 0 and U(Q2 - Q’i)= 0 ). If party 1 shifts further to 
the right at Q” l (Figure 3.3c), then the intersection with Q2 takes place at y, 
above the line r.
Figure 3.3a. Situations when Qi and Q2 intersect below the level of r
Quality
high
low
v w X
Left Centre
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Figure 3.3b. Situations when Qi and Q2 intersect on the level of r
Qualit)
high r
low
Left Centre
Figure 3.3c. Situations when Qi and Q2 intersect above the level o f r
Qualit)
high r
low
x y z
Left Centre
New forms of zones C and D open up between x and z, where maximising 
voters will still have strong incentives to participate, but the kind of satisficing 
voters envisaged here may again abstain because whoever wins will deliver 
satisfactory quality - a phenomenon which has been characterised as ‘positive 
indifference’. Thus, this approach shows some important continuities between 
abstention from alienation and from indifference, an insight missing in existing 
work.
Variation of quality provision and voters’ decision
We can consider the most likely reason why abstentions or protest voting
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should increase generally in an electorate, namely, that voters perceive that the 
quality offered by one or more of the parties in competition has declined, as 
shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. The impact of reduced efficacy for party 1 (Qi shifts down)
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Figure 3.5. The impact of change of party l ’s ideological position 
(Ql apex moves toward centre)
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In Figure 3.4, party 1 stays at the same spot in ideological terms, but Ql simply
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drops vertically down to Q l’. Zones A, C and D on the horizontal axis, that is, 
the zones for unstable supporters, all enlarge at the same time.
Figure 3.5 is the same situation as Figure 3.3 (but the intersection between 
Ql and Q2 still occurs below r), where the dominant party has moved its 
ideological position towards the centre. As a result, Zones C and D near the 
centre all reduce, which shows that the move satisfies some unstable voters in 
Zone C and D. By contrast, this move alienates ideologically committed 
supporters in Zone A. Zone A enlarges.
Figure 3.6. The impacts o f different swings o f the dominant party
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In a one-party dominant region, the leading party has established its links 
with fairly consistent supporters. However, repeated poor performance would 
eventually undermine established confidence in a dominant party. As seen 
Figure 3.6, the lost credibility will be reflected by steeper decline of quality 
line. Across one-party dominant regions there must be difference in terms o f 
voters’ loyalty or commitment to the dominant party. If voters in a certain 
region are assumed to be more strongly committed and loyal supporters, their 
response to the decline o f quality will not be so sharp. In economic terms, they
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are like inelastic customers to change of price. In Figure 3.6, Qi represents less 
elastic supporters than Qe. Zones A/, Cl, and D/, indicating unstable voters 
created by the decline from Ql to Qi, are not so large as Ae, Ce and De created 
by line Qe. Protest voting or abstention will occur at lower levels among 
inelastic voters responding to a decline in quality.
In fact, the changes pictured in Figure 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 are only a small sample 
of the applications to which the basic diagram in Figure 3.2 lends itself. Table 3.1 
shows some strong predictions which the model makes about the consequences of 
different kinds of changes in the shape or positioning of Ql and Q2, assuming that 
the intersection between the two curves takes place below the level of r. As Table 
3.1 shows, the zones of undecided (unstable) voters, C and D will increase in three 
cases: poor performance by the locally dominant party (Qi swings down); where 
there is a move toward a more extreme position by the locally dominant party 1 
(Qi apex moves toward extreme). Both these instances indicate that support for 
the centrist party depends passively on the poor performance of the dominant 
party.
The third case needs to be explained. A good performance by the third party 
could absorb some dissatisfied voters. However, a poor performance by the third 
party (Q2 swings down) also increases the zones of unstable voters, reducing zone 
E where there are satisfied voters with the third party. As the inequality 3.1 
suggests, abstention can be an alternative to protest voting. When the centrist 
third party shows a poor performance, that is, the alternative to the locally 
dominant party is not viable, dissatisfied voters will abstain.
The ability to generate so many testable propositions about conditions 
encouraging abstention and protest voting illustrates the strength of the 
approach adopted here. It should provide a firmer basis upon which to found an 
empirical investigation of these issues, and of the conditions under which third 
party support can grow under the difficult conditions of plurality rule elections
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Table 3.1. The impact of different changes in Ql and Q2
on the zones where voters may protest vote and abstain
ZONE
CHANGE A B c D E
Qi swings (shifts) down + - + + 0
Qi swings (shifts) up - + - - 0
Q2 swings (shifts) down 0 0 + + -
Q2 swings (shifts) up 0 0 - - +
Qi apex m oves toward centre + 0 - - 0
Qi apex m oves toward extreme - 0 + + 0
+ =  area gets larger ; - = area gets smaller ; 0 = no change
3.3. THE QUALITY-SATISFICING APPROACH AND TACTICAL 
VOTING
One merit of the quality-satisficing approach is to provide an integrated 
explanation of the full range of voters’ choices. As noted above, the basic 
framework in Figure 3.2 is assumed left-voters in a left-wing dominant region. 
This section examines the choices available for right-wing voters in the left- 
dominant region.
‘Inverse’ Tactical voting
As pointed out in the previous chapter, non-major parties can benefit from 
tactical voting. That is, third parties can attract tactical voters as well as protest 
voters. Such ‘inverse’ tactical voting also results from the immobility of party 
choice, which may be greatest in one-party dominant regions. There are two 
differences between protest voting and tactical voting. Firstly, protest voting 
occurs where someone’s traditional party is expected to win or remains a strong 
competitor. By contrast, tactical voting occurs when there is little hope for their 
first-choice party to win. For example, in a one-party dominant region, a 
minority of voters support the national rival party to the locally dominant party.
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They are overwhelmingly outnumbered and so hardly expect their votes to be 
effective under plurality rule. For these voters tactical voting could be attractive 
to ‘get the dominant party out’ by choosing a second-preference centrist party. 
So an important difference between tactical voting and protest voting is where it 
occurs along the ideological spectrum. In one-party dominant regions, for 
example, protest voting comes from voters with the same ideological preference 
as the dominant party, while tactical voting occurs among opposing voters who 
are in the minority.
Secondly, protest voting amongst the majority in a region occurs when 
voters expect some improvement from their traditional party. Tactical voting, 
on the other hand, does not depend on such an expectation of improvement. By 
calculating differences of the expected utility of a voter between an individual’s 
first and second preferences as measured by the feeling thermometer scores, 
Caine argued that the choice of the strategic voter depends less on participation 
utilities and more on the relative comparison of alternatives (Caine, 1978). 
Caine apparently assumed that the decision motivating tactical voting comes 
from comparison of positive utilities between alternatives. However, as Catt 
argued, the first step towards tactical voting is strong negative feelings towards 
one candidate, particularly in rather polarised party politics.
So you are not really looking for a better outcome, which is 
uncertain, but for an outcome which may be better but will not be 
worse than the expected outcome of your sincere vote. (Catt, 1989:
550)
Existing accounts have explained that because voters see the expected utility 
from choosing a likely party to win is greater than from choosing their first 
preference party, they vote tactically. However, the utility won from averting a 
loss (by helping the second preference party to defeat the least preferred) could 
be more important because the initial momentum of tactical voting should be 
the negative feeling against an incumbent party. Tactical voting may not be a 
voting of ‘for’, but voting of ‘against’. Therefore, while protest voting is an
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expression from expectation o f improvement, tactical voting basically comes 
from disapproval of other party. As Catt aptly pointed out:
It is the intention nor the effect which makes a tactical vote...the first 
important aspect is my loathing...This gives the motive for 
considering a switch from the party that is my favourite and which I 
would normally vote for. Secondly, I considered the chances of the 
other candidates. I did not just randomly vote for any of the parties I 
do not loathe but instead sought information on the efficacy of a vote 
for each option. Thirdly, I was prepared to vote for a party that was 
not my favourite. In other words, instead of voting to show which 
party I like best, I actually made a switch away from that party. 
(Catt, 1989: 549)
Niemi and colleagues also suggested that tactical voting is related to negative 
feeling about the party winning the constituency (or dislike of the leading party, 
in their terms) (Niemi et al., 1992: 236).
When a voter’s traditional party has effectively no hope of winning, the 
choice is normally over whether he/she sticks with that party or abstains 
because of the immobility of party choice. However, the same question as 
protest voting arises here. Why do people decide to vote tactically instead of 
abstaining, given the cost of voting?
Given that a voter’s first preference party has no hope of winning, he/she 
will have three available options: to keep loyal to the party; to abstain; or to 
vote tactically. In spite of it having no hope of winning locally, some voters 
will still vote for their party. But if a voter is not satisfied with their traditional 
party (because it has little hope of winning, or low quality provision, etc.), then 
he/she must decide between abstention and tactical voting.
If protest voting needs ‘expectation of improvement’, tactical voting will 
need a strong sense of ‘disapproval’ against the least preferred party. Replacing 
‘expectation of improvement’ with ‘disapproval’, we can revise the inequality
3.1. A condition for tactical voting will be as follows:
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U(dissatisfaction) < Alternative + U(disapproval) (3.6)
where ‘U(dissatisfaction)’ is the amount of dissatisfaction with the 
performance of a traditionally supporting party;
‘U(disapproval)’ is the intensity of dislike for (and the desire to defeat) 
the opposition major party;
‘Alternative’ is the different value between the best two alternatives.
When a voter does not have a sufficiently negative feeling against the likely 
winning party, he/she will abstain. When the second-choice party seems more 
viable and less disapproved; that is, the party provides good quality (or higher 
party efficacy and more acceptable ideological proximity), then tactical voting 
will increase.
Figure 3.7 looks at choices among the right-wing voters in a left-wing 
dominant region, based on Figure 3.2. Party 1 is assumed to be the left-wing 
dominant party in a region, party 2 is the centrist third party, and party 3 is a 
rival major (right-wing) party. Among right-wing voters Qi may well be the 
lowest quality curve in spite of the party’s locally dominant position. Figure 
3.7b shows that the number of voters in the centre to right section of the 
ideological spectrum is relatively small as this region is a left-wing dominant 
region.
There are five zones in Figure 3.7b: E, F, G, H and I. As assumed, as long 
as one party’s quality line is above the minimum required level r, voters will 
stay loyal. Voters in zone E and H are satisfied with the quality which the 
parties 2 and 3 provide respectively. So some voters (in zone H) still stick with 
a party which is highly unlikely to win. However, zones F, G and I are all 
below the level r, and so here dissatisfied voters seek another possible option. 
The basic logic behind tactical voting is the same one that lead dissatisfied (left- 
wing) voters to choose protest voting, as explained above. The curve Q3 is 
higher than Q2 in zone G, but Q2 is higher than Q3 in zone F. If party 2’s 
performance has locally won a good reputation, or its ideological position
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seems acceptable as an alternative, then party 2 is likely to be a beneficiary of 
tactical voting.
Figure 3.7. The basic framework (in the right) 
a) individual level
Quality
high
low
Centre Right
b) Collective level 
number o f voters 
high
aggregate distribution 
"of preference
low
Centre Right
Qi : quality provided by the dominant (left-wing) party 1 in the region;
Q2 : quality provided by the centrist third party 2;
Q3: quality provided by the rival major (right-wing) party 3;
r . minimum required level o f  quality.
Where an alternative does not look viable, however, tactical voting is unlikely
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to occur unless a voter has a strong sense of disapproval against the leading 
party. In zone I where Q3 is lower than the minimum quality line r, voters are 
not satisfied with their traditionally supported party 3. If there is no viable 
alternative, that is no better quality provision than Q3 (as drawn here), voters 
will abstain.
By employing inequality 3.6 the difference between two zones will be 
distinct. In zone F in the figure, voters will tactically vote if:
Uf(Q - Qs) < Uf(Q2-Q3) +  UF(disapproval). (3.7)
i.e. Uf(Q -Q2) ^ UF(disapproval).
Here the quality gap between their preferred party 3 and the centre party 2, 
Uf(Q2-Q3) is certain to be positive (Q2-Q3 > 0) because Q2 is higher than Q3. In 
contrast, in zone G, the same inequality will be as follows:
Ug(Q - Q3) < Ug(Q2-Q3) + Uc(disapproval). (3.7)
i.e. Ug(Q -Q2) ^ Uo(disapproval).
In zone G, the difference in the quality provided by Q2 and Q3 is always 
negative (that is, Q2-Q3 < 0). Compared with zone F, for tactical voting to take 
place amongst people in zone G, they must should have a strong sense of 
disapproval against party 1, the dominant party locally.
Likewise, the likelihood of tactical voting among voters in zone I relies on 
how much they dislike the dominant party 1.
Ui(Q - Q3) < U,(Q2-Q3) +  Ui(disapproval). (3.7)
i.e. Ui(Q -Q2) < Ui(disapproval).
Here the difference between two best alternatives is much larger than in zone 
G, (that is Q2-Q3 «  0). Thus, tactical voting would hardly occur without a
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deep loathing for the dominant party 1. If this condition is not satisfied, then 
voters will abstain.
Figure 3.8 summarises available options of an tactical voter in one-party 
dominant region. Choices may vary depending not only on the decision whether or 
not to respond, but also on the existence of a viable alternative party, as is similar 
to protest voting.
Figure 3.8. Possible options of tactical voters in one-party dominant region 
No hope for traditional party to win
owned 
outcome
not
satisfactory
weak disapproval 
strong disapproval -
not viable 
alternative
— viable 
alternative
vote for 
initial party
abstain
abstain
tactical
voting
Variations in quality provision and tactical voting
One of the conditions for tactical voting which Heath and colleagues (1988) 
suggested is that tactical voting will increase as one’s preferred party goes 
further from contention. Figure 3.9 shows that the size of each zone will 
change as the provision of quality declines. When Q3 shifts down to Q ’3 (that 
is, one’s preferred party moves further away from being in contention), 
dissatisfied voters in zones F, G and I will greatly increase. More voters would 
be expected to vote tactically, if they have a strong enough feeling of 
disapproval.
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Figure 3.9. The impact o f  reduced efficacy of party 3 (Q3 shifts down)
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Figure 3.10. The impact of change of party 2 ’s ideological position 
(Q2 apex moves toward centre)
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In Figure 3.10, the ideological position of the centrist party moves to the 
right, where it is closer to the majority voters in the region. As a result, zones 
F and G enlarge greatly at the cost o f zone E. As noted in the earlier section, 
this move can provide a more favourable condition to the centrist party because 
it may fit the ideological preference among the majority in the region. Thus,
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the centre party could attract more votes from the majority of the left, even 
though the move loses some supporters on the right, perhaps as many as the 
reduced area of zone E. However, this move creates more unstable voters in 
zones F and G, who lose a viable party for tactical voting. As a result, more 
voters in zone F’ and G’ will abstain.
Table 3.2 shows the predictions about the changes of each zone’s size 
according to movement of quality lines Q2 and Q3. Zones F, G and I (in 
particular F) are the possible areas of tactical voting. A positive sign in the 
table implies more tactical voting. Table 3.2 shows that tactical voting will 
occur more frequently when a voter’s first-preference party does not perform 
well (Q3 swings (shifts) down); or his/her second-choice party has increased its 
efficacy nationally or locally (Q2 swings (shifts) up); or a voter’s first- 
preference party (Q3) moves to a position more opposed to the local majority 
of voters (making it much less likely to win); or Q2 moves closer to position of 
median voter in the region (and so becomes a more acceptable, and viable, 
alternative among the majority of voters). These explanations generally coincide 
with findings in existing accounts of tactical voting, but illustrate more clearly 
the similarities with and differences from protest voting, and the relatively 
complex relationship between both and abstention.
Table 3.2. The impact of different changes in Q2 and Q3
on the zones where voters may tactically vote and abstain
ZO NE
CHANGE E F G H I
O3 swings (shifts) down 0 + + - +
O3 swings (shifts) up 0 - - + -
O2 swings (shifts) down + - - 0 0
O2 swings (shifts) up - + + 0 0
O2 apex moves toward centre - + + 0 0
O3 apex moves toward right 0 + + 0 -
+ = area gets larger ; - = area gets smaller ; 0 = no change
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3.4. CONCLUSION: PROTEST VOTING, TACTICAL VOTING AND 
THIRD PARTY SUPPORT
Although many election analyses use the term protest voting or tactical voting 
to explain change of alignments, the distinctive definition of the concepts has 
remained obscure. In addition, abstention has been understood particularly in 
terms of too simple a cost-benefit perspective in most public choice accounts. 
As a result, the fact that abstention can be one of effective tools to express 
voters’ discontent is often ignored among political scientists.
By focusing instead on the variable ‘quality’ provided by political parties, 
the quality-satisficing approach allows us to frame a comprehensive explanation 
of the choices between protest voting, abstentions and tactical voting, which in 
existing accounts often seem discrete or unrelated to each other. Figure 3.11 is 
a comprehensive figure, based on Figure 3.2 and 3.4 (again assuming a 
predominantly left-wing region). As noted before, voters from zone A to I are 
in different situations with each other. Voters in zones where each party’s 
quality line is higher than the minimum required level r are all satisfied with the 
previous party: zone B for the left-wing party, zone E for the centre party and 
zone H for the right-wing party. Voters outside these three zones are 
discontented with the quality provision from their initial party, and thus they 
want to express their dissatisfaction or respond to a quality deficit in some way.
Voters in each zone will respond differently depending on which party they 
have previously supported and whether or not there are alternatives. Voters in 
zones A and /  have no alternatives, and thus the most dissatisfied are likely to 
abstain. This is abstention from alienation, as explained in existing accounts. 
People who have alternative parties of some positive quality but in more remote 
ideological locations could protest vote. Voters in zones C and D who used to 
be loyal to the locally dominant party have two options. Depending on their 
expectation of improvement and viability of the centrist party 2, they will either
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abstain or protest vote. By contrast, zones F and G indicate the possible area of 
tactical voting or abstention. If voters there have a strong feeling o f disapproval 
against the dominant party, they will vote tactically; otherwise, they will 
abstain.
Figure 3.11. The comprehensive framework
al individual level
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b) Collective level
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Qi : quality provided by the dominant (left-wing) party 1 in the region;
Q2 : quality provided by the centrist third party 2;
Q3: quality provided by the rival major (right-wing) party 3;
r : minimum required level o f quality
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Table 3.3. Likely options for dissatisfied voters in each zone
zone A B C D E F G H I
vote for 
initial party
satisfac
-tion
satisfac
-tion
satisfac
-tion
abstain aliena­
tion
indifference indifference aliena­
tion
shift to the 
centre party
protest voting tactical
voting
As seen in Table 3.3, the centrist party’s possible areas for winning votes 
range from zone C to zone F. Except in zone E where voters are satisfied with 
that party, its support depends heavily rely on protest voting or tactical voting. 
It may be that, as in the case of the Liberal Democrats in Britain, support for a 
centrist party under a plurality rule electoral system fluctuates across elections, 
and the characteristics distinguishing the party’s voters may not be not easily 
classified. In fact, such traits are rather distinctive characteristics of the 
endogenous type of third parties, depending of course on the relative sizes of 
the zones (which is set by the parties’ mutual positioning and performance in 
relation to the socially-set efficacy level, r), and how many voters are located in 
each zone (which is set by the social context in different regions). In Figure 
3.11a as drawn, centrist party support would be fluid because compared with 
the size of the zone E (the party’s satisfied and loyal voters), zones C, D, F and 
G are quite large; and the amount of votes from inverse tactical voting would 
not exceed the number of protest voting (because as drawn in Figure 3.11b, 
inverse tactical voting comes from those who locally constitute the minority).
The motivation of much third party voting may be reactive and negative, 
and if so, these voters’ decision to back a centrist party is more influenced by 
the evaluation of other parties than by the third party itself. In Figure 3.11a, 
when Q2 moves toward the centre by taking moderate policies, zones E, F and 
G would get smaller. The move can make the major party absorb the unstable
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voters in zones F and G and satisfy only those voters in the centre (zone E).
Cox argued that except in special circumstances centrist candidates will find 
their support eroded as the remaining candidates converge toward them (Cox, 
1985). According to directional model, the centre is not a position of advocacy. 
Similarly, Duverger argued that the centre does not exist in politics (Duverger, 
1964: 215). Besides, as non-major parties apparently have less strong pull of 
influence over voters, particularly under a plurality rule electoral system, it is 
hard to consolidate their support. Thus, a centrist party must seek to take 
advantage of dissatisfaction among other parties’ voters. Its key means of 
attracting them is to try and enhance the ‘quality’ it can provide by raising its 
perceived efficacy, at least at the local level, and by adopting an ideological 
position flexible enough to adapt to different regional situations.
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Chapter IV
THIRD PARTY SUPPORT IN BRITAIN:
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1983-1992
4.1. THIRD PARTY POLITICS IN BRITAIN
Since the end of World War II, the British party system has been widely 
considered a typical example of two-party politics, and seen as a key element in 
the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. Voters are divided into 
two classes, middle-class and working class, and a competition occurs between 
two parties, Conservative and Labour, each dependent upon distinctively 
divided support of class. Pulzer’s (1967: 96) famous dictum about British 
politics was that: ‘Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is 
embellishment and detail’. However, this notion is rather simple and 
exaggerated although the relationship between class and party choice still holds 
true. The Conservative and Labour parties did not exclusively draw electoral 
support from their ‘own’ class even at the peak period of the two-party system. 
The Conservatives in particular have won considerable support from working 
class at most elections (see Dunleavy, 1989: 184, Figure 6.3), and Labour has 
also attracted some middle-class voters.
In theory, the Westminster model assumes that each of two major parties 
seeks a mandate of its own by winning the majority of votes nation-wide. In 
practice, no British government since 1945 has secured a majority of seats on 
the basis of a majority vote. The majority of seats in the House of Commons 
have been often ‘manufactured’ by a plurality rule electoral system, rather than 
earned by a political party. To foster a stable and effective government, the 
British system gives some institutional strong advantages to the two major
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parties. That is, the Westminster model is characterised by a single party 
government and two-party dominance, supported by the disproportional 
representation.
Figure 4.1. Share o f votes and seats won by all non-major parties (1945-1992)
xo 30
20 
10
0
45 51 59 66 74(Feb) 79 87
50 55 64 70 74(Oct) 83 92
Source: calculated from Butler and Kavanagh (1992).
However, the pattern of two-party dominance does not look as firm as it 
used to be, particularly in terms of votes. When the Conservative and Labour 
monopolized politics in the 1950s, the two parties jointly won more than 90 per 
cent o f votes and secured more than 98 per cent of seats. But the share o f votes 
polled by the two parties fell to 70 per cent in the 1983 election. Third parties, 
particularly the Liberal party (or the Alliance, the Liberal Democrats) filled the 
gap instead (Figure 4.1). Whereas 89 per cent of constituencies saw
Conservative and Labour candidates share first and second place in 1964, only 
just over half (52 per cent) did in 1987 (Heath et al., 1988: 52). As seen in 
Figure 4.1, the rise of third party support is a fairly stable one, in spite o f the 
large gap between their shares o f votes and seats.
VOTE
SEAT
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Class loyalty has been considerably diluted, and the belief that Britain has a 
two-party system cannot be properly sustained since the February 1974 election 
(for various explanations and debates about partisan and class dealignment, see 
Denver, 1994: 52-84). According to Crewe:
partisan dealignment in all its manifestations - a plummeting of party 
membership, a weakening of party identification, a wavering and 
prevarication among major party supporters, negative voting, and a 
growing instability and unevenness of electoral change - have all 
occurred, indeed, accelerated, over the past three decades (1982: 
279).
The table below gives the odd ratios of a non-manual person voting 
Conservative rather than Labour compared to the odds of a manual worker 
voting Labour rather than the Conservative. There is a striking contrast between 
the period 1945-70 and the period after 1979, which clearly indicates that class 
politics has become relatively less relevant. This change has been closely linked 
to the rise of third party support.
Table 4.1. Odd ratios of class voting
Average 45-70 1979 1983 1987 1992
odds ratio 5.6 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.4
Source: Crewe (1993: 99).
The Liberal Democrats and third party support
The Liberal Party, the predecessor of the current Liberal Democratic Party, 
used to be a powerful governing party before the First World War. In the 1906 
general election, the Liberal party, fielding 539 candidates, gained a huge 
majority of as many as 400 seats out of 670 in the House of Commons. 
However, since the 1918 election which has been considered as ‘a hinge-point
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between the sectarian and religious-based allegiances of the inter-war years’ 
(Stevenson, 1993: 8), the Liberals’ electoral fortune was dramatically on the 
wane in the face of Labour’s advance. The surge of the Labour support in the 
1945 general election, in particular, ‘swept away the last vestiges of the Liberal 
Party’s pretensions to being a contender for government or even a realistic third 
force’ (Stevenson, 1993: 24). Through the 1950s the Conservatives party and 
Labour dominated elections whereas the Liberal party struggled to avoid its 
political demise. In the 1951 General elections, for example, the Liberal could 
only put up 109 candidates, and won only 2.5 per cent of vote and gained six 
seats. To make matters worse, more than half of the candidates lost their 
deposit (Table 4.2). This disastrous electoral performance continued in the 1955 
election, when the Liberals came to the brink of extinction as an independent 
political force.
However, in other ways the 1955 election marked a watershed in the 
Liberal’s electoral revival. It was the first election in which the Liberals not 
only halted the decline but also made any improvement on their previous 
performance since 1929. The party’s Gallup poll ratings also began to increase 
to two-digit figures in late 1957. More importantly, the Liberal began to win 
seats in by-elections. Their first by-election victory since 1945 was at 
Torrington in March 1958, which seems to be an isolated victory rather than a 
harbinger of the party’s revival. With the by-election victory at Orpington in 
March 1962, ‘for the Liberals, after a generation in the wilderness, the 
promised land seemed at last to have arrived’ (Cook, 1993: 141). Two years 
later, the Liberal party achieved the biggest electoral success since 1945, at 
least in terms of votes polled. In the 1964 election it garnered 11.2 per cent of 
votes, almost doubling the previous result, and secured three more seats. The 
ratio of lost deposit also impressively fell to 14 per cent.
The party’s electoral fortune again turned downward. In the 1970 general 
election, its share of votes dropped down to 7.5 per cent, and it won only six 
seats. The ratio of lost deposits rocketed up to 55 per cent (Table 4.2), so that
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the Liberals’ support seemed ephemeral. Yet in the February 1974 General 
election, the Liberals won almost one fifth of total votes and 14 seats. The ratio 
of lost deposit fell down to only 4 per cent - apparently the best performance 
since 1945. However, only eight months later, following its leader’s 
involvement in a bizarre scandal with sexual undertones, the party earned only 
a disappointing outcome. Its share of votes fell by 1.2 per cent and it lost one 
seat. In particular, the ratio of lost deposits greatly increased to 20 per cent, 
almost a fourfold rise. This slower decline continued to the 1979 election, in 
which all the electoral results were worse. The party’s ratio of lost deposits rose 
again to more than 50 per cent.
It was when the Alliance was set up in March 1981 following the formation 
of the new Social Democratic Party (SDP) that the third force was for the first 
time in the post-war period seen as a potentially credible alternative to compete 
for government power. Voting intentions surveyed by Gallup evened out across 
the three parties when the Alliance began. In December 1981 the polling rate of 
the Alliance reached a peak of 50 per cent. Even though the Alliance achieved 
an unprecedented outcome, the election result in 1983 revealed that its 
credibility as an alternative governing party still remained in doubt. The 
Alliance repeated a similar pattern of Liberal support, which was evenly spread 
across the population. Moreover, they failed to carve out a distinctive socio­
economic section of the electorate (Studlar and McAllister, 1987: 48; Curtice, 
1983: 111-6).
The sudden rises of third party support, in 1962, in 1974 and in 1983 were 
more or less associated with preceding by-election victories. However, such 
surges of the Liberal support always apparently ended in one-off blips. While 
the Liberal (Democrats) often enjoyed successes in by-elections and in local 
elections, support for the major parties still seems solid when it comes to the 
matter of choosing a government. After the 1987 election it was apparent that 
the SDP’s high hopes of ‘breaking the mould’ of British politics was gone.
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Table 4.2. Election results of the Liberal Democratic party, 1945-1992
Election Share of vote 
(%)
Seats No. of 
candidates 
fielded (A)
No. of lost 
deposit (B)
ratio:
B /A {%)
1945 9.0 12 306 76 25
1950 9.1 9 475 319 67
1951 2.5 6 109 66 61
1955 2.7 6 110 60 55
1959 5.9 6 216 55 26
1964 11.2 9 365 52 14
1966 8.5 12 311 104 33
1970 7.5 6 332 184 55
1974(Feb) 19.3 14 517 23 4
1974(Oct) 18.5 13 619 125 20
1979 13.8 11 577 303 53
19831 25.4 23 633 10 2
19871 22.6 22 633 25 4
19922 18.3 20 631 11 2
Source: The figures except the ratio B/A in the table are collected from various parts of
Butler and Butler (1994).
Until 1979 the figures are about the Liberal party.
1. the Alliance.
2. the Liberal Democrats.
However, the three-party competition in British politics seems confirmed in the 
1992 election after the formal merger of the Liberal party and the SDP into the 
Liberal Democratic Party (originally called the Social and Liberal Democratic 
Party). The election marked the first time since 1945 that the third party 
continued to secure high rates of support in three consecutive elections. As seen 
in Table 4.2, its share of votes since 1983 has fallen but stayed around the 20 
per cent level, and the number of seats won has been between 20 and 23. The 
party’s ratio of lost deposits also improved, but this effect was partly due to a 
1985 decrease in the threshold for retaining the deposit from 12.5 to 5 per cent 
(a change made at the same time as the deposit level was increased). This shift, 
plus increased support, meant that the symbolic stigma of ‘losing its deposit’
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was almost removed from the Liberal Democrats after 1985, also giving their 
financial position a boost.
Even though the Liberal Democrats still cannot compete for national 
government on equal terms, the party now plays a significant role in elections 
at every level. This chapter deals with the performance of the Liberal 
Democrats (including the Alliance) during the period between the 1983 and 
1992 elections. To make the exposition simpler, the term ‘Liberal Democrats’ 
often includes the period of the Liberals and the Alliance.
4.2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRAT VOTERS
In spite of the Liberal Democrats’ resurgence since 1970s, it seems very 
unlikely that the British third party can ever reclaim the leading role which it 
played before the Second World War because its pattern support looks diffuse 
and lacking in very solid attachments.
Soft voters and dispersed support
The oscillating upward trend of Liberal Democrat support in Table 4.2 
demonstrates that a big rise in one election did not produce a consistent rise in 
support at the subsequent election, and several times ended in a rather isolated 
success. Many analysts have argued that the Liberal Democrats have not 
established firmly committed support:
electoral support for the Liberal Democrats is “soft’* ... people who 
vote for the party tend to lack any sense of continuing psychological 
attachment to it. While they may support the Liberal Democrats at 
one election, they are just as likely to switch to other parties 
subsequently (Denver, 1993: 126. Emphasis in the original).
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The ‘soft’ support can be related to the fact that the pattern of the Liberal 
Democrat votes cannot be easily described in terms of social cleavages. The 
party’s support is not clearly organised in terms class divisions or the other 
important social background characteristics linked with alignments in mainland 
Britain:
The 1992 figures broadly confirm what has long been known about 
the British electorate’s political preferences: that the Conservatives 
tend to draw their support disproportionately from older voters, non- 
manual workers, non-unionised workers, owner-occupiers, and 
people employed in the private sector; that, in contrast, Labour 
support tends to be stronger among the young, manual workers 
(particularly if they are employed in the public sector), trade 
unionists, and council tenants; that the Liberal Democrats tends to 
draw their (lower levels of) support from all groups more or less 
evenly (Sanders, 1993: 188. Italics added).
This social ‘softness’ of the Liberal Democrat vote carries over also into 
patterns of regional support. Plurality rule electoral systems inherently contain 
the notion of territorial representation, and such systems usually impose a 
higher threshold for entry than a proportional representation system. Under 
such circumstances, widely dispersed support tends to be ineffective. In the 
1983 general election, for example, Labour won 27.6 per cent of total votes 
and 209 seats while the Alliance secured only 23 seats from 25.4 per cent of the 
votes, overwhelmingly because Alliance votes were evenly spread up and down 
the country. Only a handful difference in the two parties’ votes made a huge 
difference in terms of seats. As a result, a large number of votes for the 
Alliance did not affect the decision of winner and were ‘wasted’. Under a pure 
proportional representation system, approximately 180 seats would have been 
allocated to Labour and about 165 seats to the Alliance.
Table 4.3 shows the average votes needed for each party to win one seat, 
calculated by dividing the number of votes polled by the number of seats gained
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by a party. The fewer votes needed per seat, the more effectively can a party 
transform votes into seats. Geographically concentrated support helps a party 
to win seats comfortably.
Table 4.3. Ratio of Votes won divided by Seats secured
election
year
Average of 
all parties
Con Lab Lib-Dem
(Alliance)
1983 47 33 41 338
1987 50 37 44 334
1992 52 42 43 300
unit: 1,000 votes
Table 4.3 reveals that both the Conservatives and Labour have benefitted, 
as expected, with their figures markedly below average. By contrast, the 
Liberal Democrats were greatly under-represented. To win one seat in 1983, 
for example, the Liberal Democrat required 10 times as many voters as the 
Conservatives.
Although the Liberal’s electoral fortune successfully revived from the nadir 
in the 1950s, the party has never built up a ‘fortress’ of core support, socially 
and geographically. Its relatively fewer consistent voters and lack of 
geographical concentration have tended to block the Liberal’s further progress, 
and make their support constantly sway.
Dealignment and protest voting
Given that the Liberal Democrat voters are inconsistent and volatile, many 
psephologists have repeatedly concluded that its vote is very much a protest 
vote, derived mainly came from negative reasons rather than from positive 
identification. Himmelweit et al. (1985: 162) described the Liberal vote as a 
vote of disaffection.
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However, protest voting for a Liberal Democrat candidate looks inherently 
less effective than voting for a major party, given the Liberals’ heretofore 
minor role in the Commons’ two-party system. What makes dissatisfied voters 
choose a third party like Liberal Democrat? Downs considered that in a two- 
party democracy a large measure of ideological consensus among its citizen is a 
precondition for stable and effective government:
In a plurality structure, since a two-party system is encouraged and 
the two parties usually converge, voters’ tastes may become relatively 
homogeneous in the long run (Downs, 1957: 125).
In spite of the relative weakening of the classical form of class politics, the 
ideological tastes of the British voters are not homogeneous enough for the 
Conservative party and Labour party to converge on nearly identical platforms 
and philosophy. On the contrary, each party retains a distinct ideology and 
priorities over issues. Voters also have apparent party preferences. According 
to Crewe:
The electorate has a clearer perception of the parties’ priorities and 
past record. The prevalence of priority and performance voting is 
reflected in the historical constancy of the public’s preference for one 
party over the other on each issue: the Conservative and Labour 
parties each ‘own’ certain issues but very rarely ‘capture’ one from 
the other (1993: 111. Emphasis in the original; see also Budge and 
Farlie, 1983).
Therefore, a dissatisfied voter, who used to have a set of party-linked issue 
priorities, would be very unlikely to directly switch to the rival major party. A 
committed Conservative voter, for example, would be reluctant to support 
Labour even when he or she is deeply disappointed with a Conservative 
government. According to Butler and Stokes’ BES panel data, for each pair of 
the consecutive elections between 1959 and 1979 the proportion of direct 
switches between the Conservative and Labour parties never exceeded 5 per 
cent of all respondents, and its average is under 4 per cent (Crewe, 1982: 311,
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Note 11; see also Butler and Stokes, 1974: 268-275). Direct switching of 
support between the Conservatives and Labour, in recent elections, is also 
small. Only 3.2 per cent in 1983 and 5.1 per cent in 1987 of former 
Conservative supporters defected to Labour respectively; 5.1 per cent in 1983 
and 4.3 per cent in 1987 of Labour supporters in the previous election voted the 
Conservatives (Johnston and Pattie, 1991). So an immobility of party choice 
between the major rivals still characterises British politics. The plurality rule 
electoral system allows only one preference to be expressed. As a result, it 
tends to force voters to make a choice between the two major parties, and 
consequently to reduce the effective number of parties, as Duverger (1964) 
suggested. Where a class cleavage is dominant, a plurality rule electoral system 
helps to maintain the cleavage by restricting voters’ choice between the two 
classes.
The British evidence seems to fit quite well with the idea (set out in Chapter 
III) that most voters deliberate not about which major party they will support, 
but over whether or not to continue supporting their previous party. In a quality 
satisficing model, voters have in mind a benchmark against which to evaluate 
the issue positions or performances of their traditional party. As long as the 
party is considered to meet the benchmark or to accomplish what voters think 
should be done, they will continue to support; otherwise, their remaining choice 
is either abstention or protest voting. Thus,
while Liberal voting may be induced by a balanced or jointly 
negative evaluation of the Conservative and Labour parties, it may 
still be true that the more immediate trigger to a Liberal vote is the 
voter*s evaluation o f just one o f those parties .... It seems probable 
that the joint negative evaluations of many Liberal voters arise out of 
a combination of long-standing dislike of the major party they do not 
normally support plus a more immediately generated dislike of some 
aspect of their usual party (Curtice, 1983: 106. Italics added).
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The partisan dealignment in British politics need not necessarily mean that 
the traditional style of class politics has come to end. Class still remains the 
single most important social factor underlying the vote in Britain (Crewe, 1993: 
100). Instead, it could mean that voters become less patient with a 
disappointing performance of their traditional party and more ready to respond 
to it - in which case protest voting for a third party is more likely to occur. The 
weakness of traditional class politics as well as the immobility of party choice 
under a plurality electoral system provide favourable conditions for dissatisfied 
voters to protest vote. And the Liberal Democrats, located neither close enough 
to be the first preference nor far away enough to be the least preference along 
the left-right ideological spectrum which still dominates British political 
debates, seem its main beneficiary.
Voters’ Perception of the Liberal Democrats
The ‘softness’ of Liberal support signifies a lack of deep conviction about the 
voting choice. What made dissatisfied voters choose a party which looks so 
strikingly less effective than the major parties? How do voters perceive the 
Liberal Democrats in practice?
Vague policies :
Although protest voting inherently comes from negative reasons, there must 
also be some positive facts behind it. Criticising Himmelweit et c /.’s argument 
that the Liberal vote signifies departure rather than arrival (1985:162), Heath et 
al. suggested the importance of ‘an element of attraction as well as disaffection’ 
(1985: 114) enough to choose the Liberals.
However, Liberal policies do not seem to attract much attention from the 
public. Rather, the general impression of the Liberal policy position is that 
they are only roughly or dimly perceived. For example, Curtice argued:
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the Liberal party has a rather diffuse image amongst the electorate. It 
tends not to be evaluated on the basis of its policies and thus, if its 
policies do not attract voters, neither are they an encumbrance in the 
search for electoral support. Rather, the (Liberal) Party tends to be 
evaluated on vague aspects of style and there is also some tendency to 
regard it as having neither one quality nor the other of two polar 
extremes (Curtice, 1983: 107-8. Italics added; see also Crewe, 
1982).
Figure 4.2 confirms the diffuse image of the Liberal Democrat policy. Around 
a half of those surveyed, as seen in both figures, thought Liberal policies to be 
vague. If the category “Don’t know” is also included, the percentage of 
vagueness rises sharply. By contrast, both figures show that those who had 
clear perceptions of Liberal policies remained only at 30 per cent level in 
‘normal’ times.
However, as an election comes closer, voters gradually become more 
informed of the Liberal Democrat policies. The proportion of respondents in 
1987 who felt that the party had ‘clear policies’ increased from 25 per cent up 
to 39 per cent in the near-election period. Similarly, the proportion recognizing 
‘clear policies’ rose from 27 per cent to 50 per cent during the course of the 
1992 campaign. By contrast, the percentage of people answering that it had 
‘vague policies’ did not much change. This increased awareness in campaign 
period reflects that the third party can have a nearly equal opportunity of 
coverage from the media then (see Semetko, 1989).
Nevertheless, the effects of election campaigns on policy recognition for the 
Liberal Democrats is rather fleeting. As seen in both figures above, the 
percentage of people recognizing ‘clear policies’ fell rapidly from 39 to 22 per 
cent soon after the 1987 election, and at the same time, the proportion saying 
the party had ‘vague policies’ increased from 44 to 59 per cent. The same 
pattern is also found in 1992. The percentage of those who had a clear view
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dropped from 50 to 34 per cent, and the proportion of the ‘ambiguous’ answers 
(don’t know, neither/both) rose from 6 to 22.
Figure 4.2. Policy recognition for the Liberal Democrats (Alliance)
policy recognition. 1987
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30 Clear
20 Vague
Don't know
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policy recognition, 1992
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Source: BES 1983 Cross-section survey; Gallup Political (& Economic) Index, May 1987,
July 1987, March 1992 and June 1992.
The questions were asked about each of three parties including the Conservative and Labour. 
Only the data for the Liberal Democrats (Alliance) are extracted here.
The question was ‘Do you think the Liberal Democrat Party have ?’ The categories given
were ‘Clear policies’, ‘Vague policies’, ‘Neither/both’, and ‘Don’t know’. The last two 
categories were taken together here.
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* were differently asked - ‘Thinking of what the Liberal Democrats stand for, would you say 
that you yourself have a very clear idea what they stand for, a fairly clear idea or not any clear 
idea of what they stand for?’. Here the categories of ‘very clear’ and ‘fairly clear’ collapsed to 
‘clear policies’.
The sudden change of recognition indicates that voters do not normally give 
much consideration to the third party’s policies. The declining awareness of the 
third party policy strikes a contrast with the case of the two major parties. The 
percentage of ‘Clear policies’ for the Conservative increased from 71 per cent 
to 78 per cent after the 1987 election; the percentage for Labour also rose from 
38 per cent up to 45 per cent in the same survey in July 1987.
The recognition of the Liberal policies appears to be neither clear nor 
durable, understandably since rational voters need not to be much concerned 
with its policies because the party’s influence on serious national or 
international affairs is certainly limited. The occurrence of a superpower crisis 
or a war involving Great Britain, for example, also tends to have a negative 
effect on the third party popularity (Clarke and Zuk, 1989). Consequently, 
Figure 4.2 shows that the third party’s lack of efficacy under plurality rule 
undermines its credibility in policy-making process.
A Centrist party:
One of the most general perceptions of the Liberal Democrats that they are a 
centrist party. Heath et al. said,
it seems fair to regard the Alliance voter as lying at the centre of the 
main ideological continuum that differentiates both the classes and the 
Conservative and Labour parties. So on these class values, the 
conventional view that the Alliance is a centrist formation is broadly 
correct (Heath e ta l.y 1985:114).
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Figure 4.3 confirms the idea that the public see the Liberal Democrats as being 
‘in the middle’ between the Tories and Labour on virtually all economic and 
social issues (Dunleavy, 1993: 149).
The figures below suggest three characteristics. Firstly, voters consistently 
put the Liberal Democrats (or Alliance) on the almost exact middle point 5 on 
scales running from 1 to 9. In addition, the perceived position of the Liberal 
Democrats has varied little over the three elections. By contrast, voters’ own 
perceived positions and the other two major parties’ positions have changed. In 
voters’ perceptions, the Liberal Democrats almost always stay put in the middle 
as a centrist party.
Secondly, Figure 4.3 shows that the mean of voters perceptions of their own 
position was slightly on the right-side in 1983, and has gradually shifted more 
to the centre (5.7 in the 1983 election, 5.4 in the 1987 election and 5.3 in the 
1992 election). And as a result, the distance between the mean for all voters 
and the Liberal Democrats have also reduced. However, the position of the 
Liberal Democrats (or Alliance) has consistently been slightly on the left-side of 
the mean voters’ position, in spite of its perceived centrism.
Thirdly, the Liberal Democrats are also placed almost exactly in the middle 
of the major parties. The distance between Labour and the Alliance was 2.3 and 
between the Conservative and the Alliance was 2.2 in 1983. Voters perceived 
the centrist party as being effectively the same distance away from the 
Conservatives and Labour. In 1987, however, the distance between the Labour 
and Alliance was 2.0 while the distance between the Conservatives and the 
Alliance was 2.3. In 1992 both major parties moved towards the centre. The 
distance between Labour and the Alliance reduced to 1.7, and the distance 
between the Conservatives and the Alliance reduced to 2.0.
By analysing electoral programmes Budge suggests that in objective terms 
the Liberals (including the Alliance and the Liberal Democrats) have taken a 
closer position to Labour on key issue than to the Conservative since the late 
1970s (see Budge, 1994: 459, Figure la). Yet Figure 4.3 shows that voters
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tend to perceive the Liberal Democrats as staying in-the-middle along the 
ideological spectrum, irrespective of their electoral programmes. However, it 
might just be possible to argue that voters see the third party as slightly left- 
leaning because most respondents consistently perceived the Liberal Democrats 
(or Alliance) as located to the left of their own position.
Figure 4.3. Voters’ perception of party position on Left-Right Scale 
(mean position)
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Source: calculated from Gallup Political (& Economic) Index, June 1983, July 1987, and April 
1992.
The figures are averages of two surveys closest to the election.
The figures of the Alliance is an average of the Liberal and SDP in 1983 and in J 987.
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A Moderate party:
In contrast with its vague and middle-of the-road image, Liberal leaders have 
repeatedly tried to build up an image of themselves as a ‘radical* reform party. 
The word ‘radical’ may mean that the centrist party wishes to consolidate its 
own distinctive principles. However, the leaders’ wish does not seem to have 
been achieved. As Stevenson put it:
Ever since Jo Grimond set out to give the Party a distinctive place in 
the political spectrum as a non-socialist radical party, it has remained 
the preferred position to which successive third-party leaders have 
returned ... If Tony Benn was a radical and Keith Joseph was a 
radical, where exactly did the Liberal Party stand when it used the 
term to describe itself? (1993: 136-7. Italics added)
According to the directional model of party competition, the centre is not a 
place of attraction (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; see also the (anecdotal) 
examples of the Liberal Democrat positions on the NHS and nuclear weapon 
issues in Dunleavy, 1993: 149-152).
In fact the Liberal image has always been as a ‘moderate’ party, a view 
closely linked to voters’ perception that the Liberal Democrats are in the 
middle. Table 4.4 clearly shows that the Liberal image is quite different from 
those of the other parties. Only 5 per cent of those surveyed in 1987 and 1992 
thought that the Liberal party was extreme, and more than 60 per cent of the 
respondents said that it was moderate. Even though the image of the two major 
parties also became quite moderate in 1992, the majority identifying the Liberal 
Democrats as moderate rather than extreme remained two thirds of respondents, 
while for the major parties the same figure was less than a third. Thus for most 
people in Britain a centrist party could not help but be a moderate one, and not 
a radical one.
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Table 4.4. Party images as ‘extreme’ or ‘moderate’
L%1
Y ear 1983 1987 1992
Con Lab Alii Con Lab Alii Con Lab Lib-Dem
Extreme (A) 49 49 6 47 49 4 31 29 7
Moderate (B) 40 37 74 40 37 69 60 61 74
Neither, Both 6 8 6 6 7 9 4 4 6
Don’t know* 6 6 14 7 7 18 6 6 13
A - B 9 12 -68 7 12 -65 -29 -32 -67
Source: computed from BES 1983, 1987,1992 Cross-section surveys.
* includes ‘not answered’.
The Liberal Democrat image of a moderate, centrist party is also supported 
in Table 4.5 where many voters have a strong image of both the Conservatives 
and Labour as ‘good for only one class’. In spite of the two major parties’ more 
moderate image in 1992 (Table 4.4), the difference between those perceiving 
them as ‘good for only one class’ and ‘good for all classes’ changed little over 
the three elections.
In contrast, people tended to see the Liberal Democrats as ‘good for all 
classes’. Approximately 60 per cent of the respondents in 1987 and 1992 (and 
45 per cent in 1983) saw party in this light. This image of Liberal Democrats is 
surely associated with the fact that the party has not established a ‘core’ social 
identity based on a distinctive social background. While fewer than one in 
twenty respondents found it hard to respond to this question in relation to either 
major party, for the Liberal Democrats the percentage of ‘don’t know’ 
responses rises to over one in five. The image of being ‘good-for-all-classes’ 
implies that the Liberal Democrats are neither close to nor far away from most 
voters. Even though the centrist third party is not a first preference, it cannot be 
the least preference. For those who seek ‘a place of temporary refuge from 
their normal Conservative or Labour home’ (Curtice, 1983: 104), the image of 
a party which is good for all classes helps to lower these voters’ psychological 
barriers. In fact, the Conservative party, facing the Liberal Democrats’ strong
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challenge, attempted to tarnish the Liberal Democrat image as ‘the nice guys of 
British politics’ before the 1994 local and European elections (The Times, 4 
January 1994).
Table 4.5. Party image as ‘good-for-class’
1*1
Year 1983 1987 1992
Con Lab Alii Con Lab Alii Con Lab Lib-
Dem
Good for one class (A) 58 54 8 59 56 10 57 52 10
Good for all classes (B) 35 34 64 36 31 56 36 37 65
Neither. Both 4 8 8 3 9 11 4 7 7
Don’t know* 3 4 20 3 5 23 3 5 18
A - B 23 20 -58 23 25 -46 21 25 -55
Source: computed from BES 1983, 1987, 1992 Cross-section surveys.
* includes ‘not answered’.
The ‘nice guy image’ of the Liberal Democrats can make the party 
‘everyone else’ second preference’ (Curtice, 1983: 115). Table 4.6 apparently 
demonstrates that the Liberal Democrats are the second choice among most 
Conservative and Labour voters. Only a handful of the Conservative voters 
thought Labour to be an alternative, and vice versa. By contrast, around 70 per 
cent of the Conservative voters named the centrist party as an alternative; and 
more than 50 per cent of Labour voters considered the Liberals as their second 
choice.
It is also noteworthy that the Liberal Democratic party seems more popular 
among the Conservative voters. In all three election surveys of Figure 4.6, a 
greater number of Conservative voters chose the centrist third party as an 
alternative. Particularly in the 1983, the difference between the Conservative 
and Labour voters among those who selected the Liberal Democrats as a second 
choice amounted to 17 per cent - perhaps reflecting the fact that Labour’s vote 
was so low that it included more ‘bedrock’ supporters, who will only ever vote
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for it. And among Liberal Democrat voters, a greater number selected the 
Conservative as their second choice than Labour. In 1987, the gap was as large 
as 18 per cent.
Table 4.6. Party of Second Choice
i % l
Voted fo r
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats*
2nd choice 1983 1987 1992 1983 1987 1992 1983 1987 1992
Con 13 17 12 42 50 40
Lab 5 8 7 35 32 35
Lib-Dem1 76 70 64 59 59 49
Others2 1 2 8 6 8 20 3 4 9
Don’t know3 18 20 21 21 16 18 18 14 16
N 1447 1414 1255 920 994 1047 794 751 476
Source: computed from BES 1983, 1987, 1992 cross-section surveys.
1 - includes the Alliance.
2 - includes the SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party and others.
3 - includes ‘Not Answered’.
See also Dunleavy, Margetts and Weir (1992: 4).
We noted above that shifts of party support were much more likely to occur 
via the centrist third party, rather than directly between the Conservatives and 
Labour. Conservative voters especially seem far more ready in this period to 
accept the Liberal Democrats as an alternative than Labour voters. This 
asymmetry is intriguing because the Liberal image, as seen above, is generally 
moderate, in-the-middle and good-for-all-classes.
4.3. SOCIAL BASE, ISSUE POSITIONS AND LIBERAL SUPPORT
As a third party, the Liberal Democrats are certainly less effective in terms of 
party policy because they have so little likelihood of their policies being 
implemented. The vague perception of the party’s position is related to the
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ineffectiveness of the Liberal voting. But did the issue positions of the Liberal 
Democrats not matter at all in differentiating them from the other parties? This 
section analyses the social bases of Liberal Democrat support and the effect of 
issues on it.
The Conservative voters and Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats tend to draw their support more or less evenly across 
all the social sectors. However, as Table 4.6 suggests, the centrist party appears 
to appeal more to Conservative voters. Traditionally, the Liberal has played a 
role to absorb dissatisfied voters against an unpopular Conservative government 
(Stevens, 1993: 118).
Table 4.7 also confirms the pattern that people in preponderantly 
Conservative-aligned social strata are more likely to consider the centrist party 
as an alternative. More support for the Liberal Democrats came from the 
‘upper’ or ‘professional and managerial classes’ classes than from the manual 
working class, in recent three elections. The difference in Liberal support 
between the ‘professional and managerial classes’ and the ‘manual working 
classes’ amounted to 10 per cent in the 1992 election.
Table 4.7. Votes by social classes (%)
Year 1983 1987 1992
Party
Class
Con Lab Alli­
ance
Con Lab Alli­
ance
Con Lab Lib-
Dem
Professional & 
Managerial (A)
56 13 30 53 17 28 55 19 23
Intermediate & routine 
non-manual (B)
53 19 26 54 21 23 56 26 16
Manual working 35 43 21 34 44 21 34 50 13
A - B 21 -30 9 19 -27 7 21 -31 10
Source: Crewe et. al. (1995: 19).
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Table 4.8 shows correlation coefficients about monthly opinion poll figures 
for voting intention and disapproval of the Conservative government during the 
period between January 1981 and March 1992. It is not surprising that voting 
intentions for Conservative are inversely related to the disapproval rate of 
government performance (- 0.86). Interestingly, however, the government 
disapproval rate is positively associated with support for the Liberal Democrats 
(0.21) and with ‘don’t know’ responses (0.51), not with Labour. Likewise, the 
voting intention for the Conservative has an inverse association with Liberal 
Democrat (- 0.38) and with ‘don’t know’ responses (-0.60). That is, 
dissatisfied voters, especially Conservative voters, seem either to envisage 
reserving their support or to consider the Liberal Democrats to be a viable 
alternative. Table 4.8 suggests that disapproval of the Conservative government 
did not necessarily lead to support for Labour. Rather, the Liberal Democrat 
tended to attract more support with rising disapproval of the Conservative 
government.
Table 4.8. Voting intention and government disapproval (correlation estimates)
Con Lab Lib-Dem* Don’t know
Government Disapproval - 0.86a -0 .0 4 0.21b 0.51a
Con 0.04 - 0.38a - 0.603
Lab -0.14 - 0.15°
Lib-Dem 0.11
Source: computed from Gallup Political (& Economic) Index, from January 1981 to March
1992.
* includes the Liberal, SDP, and Alliance, 
a: p <  0.01, b: p < 0.05, c: p < 0.10
However, this finding seems paradoxical because the Liberal Democrats 
seek
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to replace the Labour Party as the principal party o f opposition and
the kind o f voters the party has attracted It has been notable that
at no time have Liberal, Alliance or Liberal Democrat leaders ever 
espoused publicly the aim, not of replacing Labour, but o f replacing 
the Conservatives (Stevenson, 1993:138).
These social characteristics can be more easily traced in the regional 
context. As a result o f the development of geographical polarisation in British 
politics, the number of marginal seats has fallen, and the number o f one-party 
dominant regions have increased. According to Curtice and Steed, all regions 
(except Wales)
have moved fairly consistently towards either Labour or the 
Conservatives since 1955 ....At one extreme, Scottish cities have 
experienced a total deviation of some 27.5 percentage points towards 
Labour, while rural constituencies in Southern and Midland England 
have moved altogether some 15 percentage points towards the 
Conservatives (1986: 212-3).
Figure 4.4. Regional pattern of Liberal support
30
o
O
1987
1983
1992
South Midlands North Wales Scotland
Source: computed from Dorling (1993) British General Election Results 1955-1992.
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Figure 4.5. The Liberal Democrats’ share of the votes by region and seat
1983
Con seat 83
Lab seat 83
GL SW EM YH SC
SE WMEA NW WA
1987
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Con seat 87
10 Lab seat 87
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1992
Con seat 92
Lab seat 92
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SE EA WM NW WA
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Source: computed from Dorling (1993) British General Election Results 1955-1992.
GL-Greater London; SE-South East; SW-South West; EA-East Anglia; EM-East Midlands; 
WM-West Midlands; YH-Yorkshire & Humberside; NW- North West; N-North; WA-Wales; 
SC-Scotland
Yet even though Liberal Democrat support is geographically more evenly 
distributed than that for the major parties, there is some distinctive regional 
patterning of support. Figure 4.4 reveals that the Liberal Democrats gained 
more support in southern England - the south east, south west and East Anglia 
than in the northern parts of Britain. In spite of the decline in third party votes 
since 1983, the pattern of regional support has been preserved almost intact 
over the three elections. Given that southern England is a heartland of 
Conservative support, it is clear that Liberal Democrat support geographically 
overlaps most with Conservative voting.
More significantly, the Liberals tend to win more votes in Conservative 
seats than in the Labour seats up and down the country (Figure 4.5). In regions 
where the Conservatives have strongly established their support such as the 
south east and south west, the gap in the third party vote share in Conservative 
seats and in Labour seats became wider. By contrast, wherever Labour is 
regionally strong, the centrist party does not seem to be such a viable 
alternative. However, this pattern apparently contradicts the general image of 
the Liberal Democrats as a party in-the-middle and good-for-all-classes. What 
made the Liberal Democrats more attractive among Conservative voters than 
among Labour supporters?
Issue positions and Liberal support
Despite the general perception of Liberal Democratic policies as vague, there 
are some ‘traditional’ Liberal issues. As Stevenson said:
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Often split down the middle on particular questions, the (Liberal) 
Party could still attempt to push particular ‘Liberal’ issues, such as 
constitutional reform in the shape of reform of the Lords and 
electoral reform, regional issues and internationalism. There was also 
a growing pressure group within the Party for the cause of civil 
liberties (Stevenson, 1993: 33)
However, the problem is that voters’ awareness of such ‘Liberal issues’ does 
not often square with voters’ of these issues. For example, in spite of the 
Liberal’s salient position on the European issue, Liberal Democrat voters did 
not pay special attention to the issue (Table 4.9) compared with those backing 
the major parties. Only 41 per cent of Liberal voters surveyed said that the 
influence of the EC issue was important on their voting choice whereas 56 per 
cent thought Europe was not an important issue. By contrast, more number of 
Conservative voters (52 per cent) answered that the issue was important.
Table 4.9. The influence of the Europe issue on Liberal voting, 1992 election
Europe seen as: (%) Conservative Labour Lib-Dem
important1 52 40 41
not very important 34 40 45
not at all important 8 11 11
don’t know2 5 9 3
Source : computed from BES92.
1 - includes (extremely important’ 
2- includes ‘not answered’.
Table 4.10 shows voters’ evaluation of party policy on various issues. 
Inflation, defence, industrial dispute, law and order, and Europe are all the 
Conservatives’ key issues; Labour dominates welfare issues such as the NHS, 
homeless, transport and pensions. By contrast, the Liberal Democrats were not 
seen as the most preferred party on any single issue. Himmelweit et al. also 
found that Liberal voters did not consider their party to be best at handling the
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major problems like inflation, taxation, unemployment, industrial relations or 
law and order (1985: 164). However, the Liberals received a relatively good 
evaluation on such issues as education, environment and the NHS.
Table 4.10. Evaluation of Parties by Issues
Year 1983 1987 1992
party
issue
Con Lab Alli­
ance
Con Lab Alli­
ance
Con Lab Lib-
Dem
inflation & price 56 20 10 53 24 10 44 29 9
unemployment 32 35 15 31 41 14 25 47 10
national defence 55 19 13 53 22 13 52 21 8
industrial dispute 48 27 10 49 28 10 47 30 8
NHS 30 41 13 26 44 16 25 50 11
education & school 37 33 13 33 38 17 27 40 19
law & order 50 20 10 43 27 12 41 27 9
homeless1 19 48 11
’‘‘environment1 22 22 19
Europe2 48 23 12 40 22 9 47 24 12
public transport1 24 45 10
taxation1 42 31 11
pensions1 29 46 8
women1 24 35 11
Source: Gallup Political (& Economic) index, June 1983, June 1987, April 1992.
The question in all surveys except in the 1992 post election survey was “Which party do you 
think has the best policy to deal with?”
The question in the 1992 post election survey was “I am going to read out a list of problems 
facing the country, could you tell me for each of them which party you personally think would 
handle the problem best?”
Each figure in the table except in the 1992 survey is an average of the four consecutive week 
polls conducted just before each election.
1 - were not asked in 1983 and in 1987.
2 - was asked about ‘Common market’ in 1983 and 1987.
* The share of the Greens was 20.3 in the 1992 election survey.
Three characteristics of the issue evaluation for the Liberal Democrats are 
noteworthy. First, the Liberal Democrats tend to appeal on ‘everyday’ or 
‘family’ issues like social services, education, and health, rather than ‘grand 
national issues’ like management of the economy or defence. In a study of the
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1987 election, Miller et al. also discovered that the Alliance was relatively 
salient only in such issues as health, social services and education (1990: 280). 
Issues such as education, environment and the NHS are ‘tangible’ issues that 
the public would encounter in daily life, and where Liberal Democrat 
councillors may also have established some credibility or recognition of the 
party’s position.
Table 4.11. Most important issues by party support (1987) (%)
Issue Conservatives Labour Alliance
prices 24 25 24
unemployment 36 57 33
taxes 33 23 21
defence 47 29 31
health/social services 32 35 35
crime 23 11 23
education 37 32 43
Source: computed from BES :987 cross-section survey.
The data above was extracted from the question ‘...which three were the most important issues 
facing you and your family? ....start with the most important, and then the second, and then the 
third'. This table only includes the percentages of those citing the issue as in the most important 
three issues.
Similar results can be also found in Table 4.11. Labour voters in 1987, 
understandably, were intensely worried about unemployment, followed by 
health and social services and then education. Among Conservative voters 
defence was easily the most salient issue, followed by unemployment, education 
and taxes. By contrast, Alliance voters were more concerned about education, 
then health/social services, and with unemployment ranking third.
Issues such as education, health, and social services are ones on which local 
authorities can have some impact, even though these are controlled nationally. 
The Liberal Democrats can wield some influence on policy processes locally, 
and partly offset its lack of efficacy at the national level. Therefore, the 
relatively high evaluation of the Liberal Democrats on such issues seems related
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to its growing support in local politics. As Johnston and Pattie discovered in an 
analysis of the 1992 general election:
each of the three (parties) performed better in the constituencies 
where it also controlled the local government(s): both Conservative 
and Labour parties performed particularly badly in constituencies 
where the Liberal Democrats were in control locally (1993: 202).
Among the ‘tangible’ issues, education is the most striking one. The 
proportion of the public saying that the Liberal Democrats had the best 
education policy consistently increased from 13 per cent in 1983, to 17 per 
cent in 1987, and to 19 per cent in 1992 (Table 4.10). The Liberal Democrats 
also have tried to highlight the issue. For example:
Mr. Ashdown renewed his appeal to voters to treat Thursday’s (local) 
elections in England and Wales as a referendum on the Government's 
treatment o f education. The Liberal Democrats were the only party to 
say education was the number one priority (The Guardian, 29 April 
1995. Emphasis added).
Secondly, the Liberal’s issue ratings in Table 4.10 seem easily affected by 
dominant election issues, particularly ‘grand national issues’ such as 
unemployment or defence (Figure 4.6). The relatively high evaluation of 
Liberal (Democrat) on such issues may be more related to growth of public 
interest and the media coverage, rather than its policy position itself. The more 
hotly an issue is debated during a campaign period, the more likely it is that the 
third party has opportunities to address its policy to the public. For example, 
Labour’s unpopular policy of unilateralism provoked debates both in the 1983 
and 1987 elections. The Alliance kept a relatively high rating on the defence 
issue, but, as a matter of fact, facing the 1987 election the Alliance did not take 
a united position on defence position. At their 1986 conference it suffered a 
‘damaging split on defence policy between the Liberals and the SDP’(Miller et 
a f  1990: 106).
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Figure 4.6. Salience of issues (selective)
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■ Issue8320
Issue920
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Source: computed from Gallup Political (& Economic) Index, BBC Election Survey (June 1983, 
July 1987); Post-election Survey (April 1992).
The question was Think of all the urgent problems facing the country at the present time. 
When you decided which way to vote which TWO issues did you personally consider most 
important?’.
Such issue ratings can easily disappear as the salience of the issues 
diminishes and the media assign less time to it, in which case public recognition 
of Liberal Democrat policies can soon disappear, too. As seen in Table 4.10, 
the Liberal’s rating on unemployment was apparently the party’s most salient in 
1983 (15 percent), but its percentage declined to 10 percent in 1992, along with 
the general decrease in the public concern (from 72 to 36 per cent of all 
respondents) (Figure 4.6). This is also the case with the national defence.
Thirdly, in terms o f issue evaluation, the Liberal Democrats are inversely 
related to the Conservative, except on the national defence in 1983 and 1987 
(Table 4.10). The Liberals were ranked low where the Conservatives were 
rated high on such issues as inflation, industrial dispute, law and order, and 
Europe. The Liberals were rated comparatively high where the Conservatives 
were assessed low (that is, where Labour was rated high). Miller et al. also 
found out that the pattern of Alliance ratings on issues was most similar to
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Labour (Miller et al, 1990: 280, 281, Table 8.6). Thus the Liberal Democrats 
gain more support socially and regionally where the Conservatives are strong, 
but do better on ‘Labour’ issues than on ‘Tory’ ones.
Table 4.12. Effect of evaluation of issues on party choice (logit model)
Effect 1987 1992
vote by crime
Con 0.351 0.03
Lab -0.141 0.07
Alliance -0.211 -0.10
vote by education
Con -0.061 -0.20
Lab -0.04 0.141
Alliance 0 . 101 0.061
vote by unemployment
Con -0.291 -0.07
Lab 0.201 0.07
Alliance 0.081 -0.01
vote by living standards
Con -0.361
Lab 0.241
Alliance 0.121
vote by NHS*
Con -0.461 -0.571
Lab 0.361 0.441
Alliance 0 . 101 0.121
vote by prices
Con 0.231 0.35
Lab -0.111 -0.011
Alliance -0.131 -0.341
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 165.40 131.54
Concentration 0.09 0.21
Source: computed from BES 87, 92.
The question was ‘Since the last general election.... , would you say that prices have 
increased or fallen?’ The answers included 5 ordinal categories. Here they collapsed into two - 
increase or fall. The questions were not asked in the 1983 survey.
The figures in the table are additive estimates (x ).
1 : z-score > 1.96
* asked about ‘social service’ in the 1987 surveys.
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This relationship between issues and Liberal (Democrat) voting is also 
found in a logit model seen in Table 4.12. The estimates show the effects of a 
critical assessment of each issue on party choice. The positive sign indicates a 
positive effect on voting for a party, and the negative sign means a negative 
effect. Those who were concerned about crime and prices tended to vote 
Conservative. Those with critical assessments on unemployment, living 
standards and the NHS were likely to choose Labour. Negative evaluations of 
crime and prices - Conservative issues - had inverse effects on Liberal voting. 
By contrast, those who were dissatisfied with the quality of education, the NHS 
and living standards were more likely to vote Liberal Democrat. This is the 
same pattern of issue salience as in Table 4.10 and 11. Clearly the Liberal 
Democrats appealed more to those worried about ‘Labour issues’ than to those 
focusing on ‘Conservative issues.’
Even though the Liberal Democrats tend to win more support from former 
Conservative voters, the centrist party cannot appeal to middle-class voters by 
preaching Tory attitudes on issues where the Conservative party is perceived as 
the champion. However, (dissatisfied) Conservative voters can be impressed 
when the Liberals adopt moderate left policy positions on ‘Labour issues’, 
which are usually the Conservative’s weakness. Thus, the Liberal’s issue appeal 
seems more effective when dissatisfaction arises directly from the 
Conservative’s mishandling of education, environment or social services, all 
issues where the Liberal Democrats can do something at least at local level, and 
can raise their credibility.
In addition, a governing party is likely to be vulnerable to criticism from 
opposition over time, which can be effective. The long-standing Conservative 
government since 1979 partly helped to raise the Liberal Democrat’s electoral 
fortune by producing a steady stream of dissatisfied Conservative voters. For 
Labour supporters the Liberal’s salient issues do not look impressive, since 
Labour is a more effective vehicle. Liberal Democrat cannot afford to play a
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similar ‘supplementary’ role to Labour because ‘Conservative issues’ like 
inflation, defence, law and order are national issues beyond the third party’s 
capabilities. Thus, the Liberal Democrats may be a less attractive alternative 
among Labour supporters even when they are not satisfied with Labour’s 
performance.
4.4. THE IMAGE OF THE PARTY LEADER
Although traditionally in a parliamentary system campaigns are party-centred 
rather than simply leadership-focused, a study of leadership effects on the 1992 
election showed that John Major was a considerable asset to his party compared 
to both his Conservative predecessor and his Labour counterpart (Crewe and 
King, 1994: 133). Even in the 1983 and 1987 elections, the leadership factor 
had some important effects on voters’ choices (see Graetz and McAllister, 
1987; Stewart and Clarke, 1992; Bean and Mughan, 1989). Graetz and 
McAllister (1987: 485) pointed out that three major reasons for the increasing 
role of leadership effects in British politics: weakened partisan commitment, 
reduced party abilities to mobilise mass support through traditional door-to-door 
canvassing, and the exploitation of modern mass communication. As a result: 
Party strategists, recognizing that party leaders are dominant figures 
on the political stage and receive enormous coverage in the mass 
media, make the leaders focal points of their electioneering efforts, 
and thereby reinforce their salience in the public mind (Stewart and 
Clarke, 1992: 468).
In a sense, it is not surprising that voters pay attention to who will be ‘a leading 
figure’ in the executive. By contrast, third party leaders tend to draw less 
attention because of their low likelihood of becoming ‘a leading figure’.
However, the impact of leadership of a third party can still be considerable 
in other ways, because the leader may well be the only personality within the
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party to keep drawing regular attention from the media. His (or her) personal 
performance and evaluation often play a significant role in building up the 
favourable or unfavourable image of the party. Crewe and King explain the 
impact of party leadership on voting as a three-way relation.
Party leadership can influence the electoral fortune of his party in 
either or both of two distinctive ways. First, he can influence the 
party he leads - its ideology, its policies, its image - in such a way 
that the party as a whole, including himself as leader, is made more 
or less attractive to voters; that is, he can influence voters indirectly 
via his influence within his party. Second, he can influence voters 
directly via the effects that his own personality, characteristics and 
style have upon them, irrespective of the image of his party as a 
whole. It goes without saying that personality images and party 
images are bound to affect each other; and the leaders’ so-called 
direct effects are largely mediated in practice by television and the 
press (Crewe and King, 1994: 126-7).
They argue that leadership effects on voting are rather indirect in Britain.
However, third party leaders seem more likely to have a direct influence on 
voters’ choice because his/her party is relatively weaker and its stances less well 
known. More often than not, third party leaders may attract high opinion poll 
evaluations which are then undermined by the lower assessment of his/her 
party. Table 4.13 shows the difference between party leader’s personal 
popularity (Table 4.13a) and the overall evaluations of their leadership, taking 
into account their party (Table 4 .13b).
Thatcher gained some additional points when voters bore her party in mind; 
Major relied more upon his personal rating. Kinnock enjoyed a higher personal 
evaluation in 1987 than when his party was taken into account. However, the 
relationship switched over in 1992. There is a yawning difference between the 
personal popularity of third party leaders and their overall ratings. Personal 
approval ratings for third party leaders were usually more favourable than the
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public’s overall estimation of them, especially for Steel (in 1983) and Ashdown 
(in 1992).
Table 4.13. Evaluation of Party leaders 
a) when considering leadership only
leader leadership only*
1983 1987 1992
Thatcher 46 42
Major 47
Foot 13
Kinnock 31 21
Steel 35 10
Jenkins 6
Owen 17
Ashdown 22
Don’t know 7 7 9
Source: Gallup Political (& Economic) Index (June 1983 ; July 1987 ; April 1992).
* was asked “ Leaving aside your general party preference, who would make the best prime 
minister (party leaders)? ” .
b) when taking everything into account
party taking everything into account**
19831 19871 1992
Conservatives 51 53 39
Labour 17 20 37
Liberal 10
SDP 5
Alliance 4 15
Lib-Dem 12
others 0 0 2
don’t know 14 9 10
Source: Gallup Political (& Economic) Index (June 1983 ; July 1987 ; April 1992). 
** was asked “Taking everything into account, which party has the best leader?
1: the average of two consecutive surveys. Decimals rounded.
To take a slightly closer look at the effects of party leaders on party 
popularity, a simple regression (OLS) analysis was conducted on Gallup
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opinion poll data for the period 1981-92 (Table 4.14). As expected, the 
popularity of major party leaders made a significant impact on voting 
intention. The regression coefficient of Thatcher is as high as 0.72, and the 
coefficient for Foot is 0.53. By contrast, a third party leader’s influence on 
voting intention is not so great. In spite of the high personal popularity of Steel 
and Ashdown (as seen in Table 4.13), the corresponding coefficients are only
0.11 and 0.18 respectively. David Owen had the highest coefficient among the 
third party leaders.
Table 4.14. The effect of party leaders on voting intentions, 1981-92
(regression estimates)
intercept b t-ratio r2
Con Thatcher 4.31 0.72 21.09 0.79
Major 18.80 0.30 1.60 0.15
Lab Foot 15.75 0.53 4.78 0.42
Kinnock 2.70 0.86 1.59 0.02
Lib Steel 2.46 0.11 2.19 0.06
SDP Jenkins 0.7 0.23 3.58 0.56
Owen -8.64 0.35 14.91 0.76
Lib-Dem Ashdown 2.51 0.18 8.31 0.61
V oteln t = a +  b*  A pvL eader 
a: intercept
V o te ln t: voting intention for a party 
ApvLeader : approval of party leader
Source: computed from Gallup Political (& Economic) Index (January 1981 - March 1992).
However, it is important to distinguish between evaluations of party leaders 
in the mid-term period and in election campaigns. Whereas voters tend to make 
a more serious assessment to a party as an election comes closer, they are more 
ready to express dissatisfaction straightforwardly in mid-term period, frequently 
reflected in by-election results.
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Table 4.15. The effects of party leaders on voting intentions in near-election 
periods (regression results)
1983 (Jan. 1982- May 1983)
intercept b t-ratio r2
Con Thatcher -3.80 0.87 15.03 0.94
Lab Foot 15.54 0.52 2.26 0.25
Lib Steel 16.00 -0 .1 3 -0 .8 9 0.05
SDP Jenkins -0 .61 0.25 3.58 0.59
1987 (Jan. 1986 - May 1987)
intercept b t-ratio r2
Con Thatcher 2.68 0.77 7.09 0.77
Lab Kinnock 11.68 0.47 5.39 0.66
Lib Steel 2.01 0.11 1.99 0.21
SDP Owen -17.19 0.51 2.99 0.37
1992 (Jan. 1991 - March 1992)
intercept b t-ratio r2
Con Major 16.94 0.33 1.78 0.20
Lab Kinnock 20.89 0.33 0.84 0.05
Lib-Dem Ashdown -6 .01 0.34 2.79 0.37
* Source: computed from Gallup Political and Economic Index (January 1991-March 1992). 
The same regression equation as Table 4.15 was applied here.
Table 4.15 shows regression results for the 13 to 15 months immediately 
before general elections. Generally speaking, the effects of party leadership 
tend to increase in these near-election periods. Particularly, Thatcher’s approval 
rate was strongly associated with voting intention for Conservative in 1983 and 
1987, while the Labour leadership in this period had relatively less effects on 
voting intention. Among the Liberal leaders, Ashdown’s role was quite 
impressive in 1992. He was the only leader with consistent results. As seen in 
Table 4.13, his personal popularity was fairly high, and as associated with 
Liberal Democrat voting as the other party leaders in the near-election period.
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4.5. BY-ELECTIONS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRAT SUPPORT
The Liberal’s lagging electoral fortunes often bounced back as a result of a 
sudden by-election victory, as at Orpington in 1962. The high popularity of the 
SDP when it was launched was partly attributed to a string of by-election 
victories. Between 1955 and 1979, the Liberals obtained 27 seats from by- 
elections, which is equivalent to a third of total number of parliamentary seats 
taken by the Liberal party during that period. From 1979 to 1992, the Liberal 
Democrats (including the Alliance) scored 11 by-election victories.
Figure 4.7 shows that almost every by-election victory of the Liberal 
Democrats (Alliance) was accompanied by sudden large rises in support. 
Especially, the victories under the 1979 conservative government effectively 
came from nowhere. Even though the Liberals had disappointing results in 1979 
(about 10 per cent share of vote), the Alliance raised its share of votes by as 
much as 35 per cent on average in the next four by-elections, and the pattern of 
large increases was then an enduring one.
The increased share of the Liberal Democrats (Alliance) votes sometimes 
maintained increased support up to the first ensuing general election. However, 
Figure 4.7 shows that in most cases by-election victories do not seem to have 
established the long-term support. The Liberal Democrats have successfully 
defended only four seats out of eleven by-election victories since 1979 in the 
ensuing general elections (Bermondsey, Glasgow Hillhead, Greenwich, and 
Brecon and Radnor). By 1992 the Liberal Democrats managed to retain only 
one seat (Bermondsey) among seats won in by-elections since 1979. Norris and 
Feigert also found out that support mobilised for third parties in British by- 
elections proved largely ephemeral (Norris and Feigert, 1989).
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Figure 4.7. Changes of Liberal support following by-election victories
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Source: computed from Butler and Kavanagh (1980,1984,1988,1992)
* The sitting SDP MP Rosie Barnes in Greenwich did not join the Liberal Democrats, remaining 
as Independent SDP candidate in the 1992 election. The Liberal Democrats did not put up a 
candidate. The figure of the 1992 election was the vote share of Barnes.
There are some similarities in the pattern of Liberal support in general elections 
and in by-elections. Firstly, the Liberal Democrats fared better in former 
Conservative seats. As seen in Table 4.16, the Liberal Democrats won nine 
victories out of eleven from the Conservatives, capturing three seats from the 
Conservative party in each Parliament period. By contrast, the Liberals gained 
only two seats out of 28 by-elections in former Labour seats between 1979 and 
1992. Particularly during the 1987-92 period, the Liberal Democrats captured 
none of thirteen by-elections seats previously held by Labour. In addition, 
whether they won or lost, the Liberal Democrats tend to garner more votes, in 
Conservative seats, running on average 10 per cent higher support in by- 
elections in former Conservative seats compared with former Labour seats 
(Table 4.17). The idea that the Liberal Democrats have been broadly seen as a 
more acceptable alternative among Conservative voters than among Labour 
voters is reinforced (see Figure 4.5).
Table 4.16. The number of Liberal (Alliance, Liberal Democrats)’s
by-election victories, 79-92
Year Liberal’s seat(s)
gained from Con 
(no. in competition)
gained from Lab 
(no. in competition)
retained 
(no. in competition)
7 9 - 8 3 3 ( 7 ) 1 ( 9 )
8 3 - 8 7 3 ( 9 ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( 1 )
8 7 - 9 2 3 (10) 0 (13)
Total 9 (26) 2 (28) i  a )
Source: computed from Norris (1990) and Butler and Kavanagh (1980, 1984,. 1988, 1992).
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Table 4.17. The Liberal Democrat share of the vote in by-elections (79-92)
Seat in competition Mean (%) Std Dev Cases
previously Conservative 32 13 26
previously Labour 22 15 28
previously Liberal 60 1
Democrat*
All seats 27 16 55**
Source: computed from Norris (1990) and Butler and Kavanagh (1980, 1984, 1988, 1992).
* The Liberal Democrats retained the seat in the by-election at Truro in March 1987.
** There were all 56 by-elections from after the 1979 general election to before the 1992 
general election. Liberal Democrat did not put up its candidate in the by-election at Glasgow 
Central in June 1980.
Secondly, the Liberal Democrats won more support in less marginal seats. 
Where the Liberal Democrats captured seats in by-elections, the size of a 
majority in the previous general election - the difference between the winner 
and the next runner-up - amounted to 22 per cent, as shown in Table 4.18. So 
the Liberal Democrats have tended to achieve rather unexpected by-election 
victories in quite safe (usually Conservative) seats with a more than 20 per cent 
margin of victory, whereas Labour victories have come in much less ‘safe’ 
seats.
Table 4.18. Majorities at the previous general elections in seats
changing hands in by-elections, 1979-92
Changing seats Mean (%) Std Dev Cases
to Conservative (1) 1
to Labour 12 10 6
to Lib-Dem 22 14 11
Source: computed from Norris (1990) and Butler and Kavanagh (1980, 1984,. 1988, 1992).
Thirdly, Liberal issue positions in by-elections had some similar effects on 
voters’ choices as in general elections. Before the Fulham, Rydale, and West 
Derbyshire by-elections, in March 1986, the BBC surveyed the saliency of a
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series of fourteen issues in the election, and approval of the government’s 
performance on these issues (Norris, 1990: 155). As in general elections the 
most notable issues among the Alliance voters were unemployment, education 
and the NHS - on all of which Alliance voters showed high rates of disapproval 
of government performance. That is, the Alliance by-election voters too were 
interested in such ‘Labour issues’ even though many of them previously voted 
Conservative. Because of the immobility of major party choices, dissatisfaction 
on these ‘Labour’ issues was not enough to make them directly shift to Labour; 
instead they backed the Liberal Democrats (Alliance) by protest voting.
Liberal Democrat support in by-elections is thus dependent on basically the 
same reasons as in general elections. The centrist third party has attracted many 
dissatisfied Conservative supporters in fairly safe Conservative seats. The main 
difference is that voters are less reluctant to express dissatisfaction with the 
governing party in by-elections. As a result, the Liberal’s by-election victories 
often resulted from abrupt increases in support. However, such support quickly 
gained in a by-election may be just as quickly lost (Norris, 1990: 225).
4.6. TACTICAL VOTING AND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
The impacts of tactical voting on third party are fairly complex, and are 
explored in Table 4.19 which looks at those 1992 BES respondents who said 
that they voted for a party which was not their most preferred choice in the 
general election. As expected, the Liberal Democrats lost many votes for 
tactical reasons. Over four fifths of the tactical voters for the Conservatives, 
and over half those for Labour, answered that they really preferred Liberal 
Democrats. (Labour’s figure reflects the fact that they also absorbed tactical 
voters who really preferred other parties, particularly the SNP in Scotland).
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Table 4.19. Tactical voting in the 1992 general election
voted Conservative voted Labour voted Lib Dem
% who really preferred
Conservative - 14 29
Labour 7 - 64
Liberal Democrats 84 55 -
others 9 30 8
(N) (55) (69) (SO)
Source: computed from BES92
* Respondents who gave ‘don’t know, not answered’ are excluded from the N and the % 
figures.
People giving answers irrelevant to tactical voting (such as the same choice between the real 
choice of voting and the really preferred party) are also excluded.
However, Table 4.19 also demonstrates that the Liberal Democrats were a 
beneficiary of tactical voting. Many Labour identifiers especially voted for the 
third party, amounting to nearly two thirds of tactical voters for the Liberal 
Democrats. Given that Liberal Democrats were strong in the Conservative 
heartland, their viability attracted tactical choices among Labour identifiers 
where their first preference party has little chance of winning.
Table 4.20. The regional locations of tactical voters for the Liberal Democrats 
in the 1992 election
really preferred Conservatives Labour
North 5 8
Midlands 3 6
South 6 32
Wales 2 0
Scotland 7 5
Total N 23 51
Source: computed from BES92.
The same standards were applied as in Table 8.2.
Given the small numbers of tactical voters uncovered by the particular BES 
question, we cannot explore the regional distribution of tactical voters for the
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Liberal Democrats very deeply. However, although the small numbers data in 
Table 4.20 needs to be treated with caution, it is striking that nearly two thirds 
of those who really preferred Labour but voted for the Liberal Democrats were 
from southern England. By contrast, there is no distinctive regional pattern of 
tactical voting among Conservative sympathisers, although it might be higher in 
Scotland. Overall the balance of tactical voting effects measured in the BES was 
rather even: the Liberal Democrats attracted 80 tactical voters from all other 
parties, and lost 90 to the two major parties combined.
4.7. LIBERAL DEMOCRAT VOTING AND ABSTENTION
In many western countries, voters who are poorer or placed ‘lower’ on socio­
economic grades are usually more likely to abstain than are well-off or ‘upper 
class’ voters (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). Thus, turnout rates are usually higher 
in right-wing party strongholds, while leftist parties (those left-of-centre in 
Pacek and Radcliff‘s terms) often win most support in low turnout 
constituencies. Such a relationship between class and turnout rate is also found 
in the three British elections between 1983 and 1992.
Table 4.21. Turnout rate and Party support (correlation coefficients)
election year Con Lab Lib-Dem N
1983 0.31 -0.38 0.27 633
1987 0.27 -0.33 0.23 633
1992 0.56 -0.51 0.24 634
Source: computed from Dorling (1992) British General Election Results 1955-1992.
All figures in the table are statistically significant at p < 0.001.
Table 4.21 shows that the coefficients of Labour vote are pretty negative, 
which suggests Labour tends to win votes where the turnout rate is low.
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Interestingly enough, the correlation became inversely stronger in 1992 while 
the actual turnout rate rose by 2.4 per cent in comparison with the previous 
election. By contrast, the correlation coefficients of Conservative and Liberal 
Democratic vote (including the Alliance) are positive. Both parties tend to win 
vote where the turnout rate was high. The positive sign of the coefficients of 
the Liberal Democrats seems understandable given that support for the Party is 
largely overlapped with the Conservative.
However, this correlation does not mean that an increase of participation in 
voting would be favourable to the Liberals. In fact, in spite of the increase of 
the turnout rate since 1983, the share of the Liberal Democratic vote has fallen. 
In particular, between 1987 and 1992, its share reduced by 5.4 per cent in 
Great Britain.
Table 4.22. The effects of changes in turnout rates and the safeness of seats
on voting for the Liberal Democrats in 1992
Great Britain South1 South2 North3
intercept 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.18
Turnout9287 -0.93 -1.03 -1.62 -0.72
ConLab87 0.23 0.28 0.45 0.19
r2 0.35 0.28 0.40 0.26
F 170.20 48.58 55.14 28.05
S> — a + &/*Turnout9287 +  £2*ConLabi37
LD: the share o f Liberal Democrat vote in a constituency in 1992 
a : intercept
Turnout9287: change of the turnout rate between 1987 and 1992 in a constituency 
ConLab87: difference in the share of vote between Conservative and Labour in 1987 
in a constituency
Source: computed from British Election Results, 1955-1992.
1. South includes South East, South West, and East Anglia, and London.
2. excludes London
3. North includes North, North West and Yorkshire-Humberside.
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Table 4.22 shows the results of a regression analysis of the effects of 
changes in turnout rate between 1987 and 1992, and the Conservatives’ 1987 
strength in a constituency, on Liberal Democratic support in 1992. The Liberal 
Democrat share of the vote is positively related to prior Conservative strength. 
The safer Conservative seats had been in the previous election, the higher share 
of votes the Liberal Democrats tended to win in 1992. This relationship is 
especially conspicuous in south England excluding London where the 
Conservative predominance has traditionally been very strong.
In spite of the positive correlation between the turnout rate and Liberal 
Democrat voting, the Liberal Democratic vote is inversely associated changes 
in the turnout rate. As more people decided to participate in voting in 
comparison with the previous election, so the Liberal Democrat share of the 
vote decreased, even though the actual turnout rate rose in 1992. In other 
words, the decrease of the Liberal vote occurred together with the rise of 
turnout rate. This pattern is most obvious in southern England, where the 
association is very strong (its estimate in South England is -1.62).
The quality-satisficing approach argues that abstention as well as third party 
voting can occur together (see Chapter III). Even though a third party can be an 
alternative to abstention, the two choices basically share the same causes - 
negative evaluation of major parties. Thus, an increase in the turnout rate 
which reflects reduced dissatisfaction with the government or both major parties 
would also reduce the likelihood of third party voting. The inverse association 
between increases of the turnout rate in 1992 and Liberal Democrat voting 
suggests such a relationship. A more detailed or rigorously tested relationship 
between turnout rate and party choice seems quite difficult to trace because of 
the complicating impacts of various socio-economic factors.
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4.8. CONCLUSION
The Liberal Democrats are not a ‘minor’ party any more, since they have won 
above or close to 20 per cent of votes consistently since 1983 in a wide variety 
of elections - for the House of Commons, and in local elections. However, the 
main attraction of the third party does not lie in its policy appeal, since many 
voters perceived Liberal policy as being vague probably reflecting their 
estimation that it has only a low likelihood of being effective. Instead Liberal 
Democrat voting seems to be strongly associated with the immobility of party 
choice in Britain, where they can serve as an acceptable vehicle for dissatisfied 
major party voters who will not cross-over completely by supporting the rival 
party. The Liberal Democrats’ image of being moderate and middle-of-the-road 
helps the party maximize this role.
The geographical polarisation so evident in British politics has also provided 
favourable conditions for Liberal support. The joint occurrence of a collective 
aversion to the major rival party and dissatisfaction with the traditionally 
supported party in a region has a potential to make expressing a second 
preference for the third party seem more viable. In spite of its image as a 
centrist party, the Liberal Democrats seem to have been a more acceptable 
alternative to former Conservative voters than to Labour supporters - even 
though the salient issues for the Liberal Democrats is close to those for Labour. 
When traditional Conservative voters are disillusioned, the Liberal Democrats 
can capitalize on some of the key issues involved, and can often develop a local 
profile on such welfare issues, thereby enhancing their apparent efficacy. By 
contrast, the Liberal’s issue position is not so attractive to Labour supporters 
because it widely overlaps with Labour’s. In spite of the long-term growth and 
consolidation of their support, the Liberal democrat voters also still lack a firm 
identity and are less durable than people who back the major parties. If the 
causes of the dissatisfaction are solved or mitigated, then the protest voters 
may soon return to their traditional fold.
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Chapter V
VOLATILE VOTERS AND THIRD PARTY SUPPORT: 
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CANADA (1984-1988)
5.1. PARTY POLITICS IN CANADA
In the 1993 federal election, Canadian party politics seems to enter into a new 
stage. The Liberal Party came back to power after ten years in exile with a 
clear majority of seats. By contrast, the previously ruling Progressive 
Conservative party was almost demolished. The number of its seats declined 
from 165 to only two, and the Conservatives’ political prospects looked 
uncertain. Contesting its first federal election, the Bloc Quebecois grew from 
nowhere to become the official Opposition party. A new party, the Reform 
Party, attracting voters in the western provinces, emerged as a strong third 
party, and the previous third-ranked federal party, the New Democratic Party 
(NDP) could not even form an official parliamentary group, winning only 9 
seats.
Although abrupt changes on quite this scale are very unusual, the 1993 
result is not an completely isolated case in Canadian elections. There are some 
characteristics in Canadian politics which enable such a huge swing of support 
to occur. This section examines basic features of Canadian party politics, 
focusing on the period up to the late 1980s when federal politics was dominated 
by the Conservative vs Liberal rivalry, with the NDP as the long-time third 
party which survived (and indeed flourished) under Canada’s plurality rule 
system.
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Volatile voters and weak ideology
Party support in Canadian elections has frequently fluctuated (see Figure 5.1). 
Apart from the 1993 election, another great change o f party support is to be 
found in the 1950s. Between 1949 and 1958, the number o f the Conservative 
seats rose from 41 to 208, while the tally of Liberal seats fell from 190 to 48. 
Particularly, in 1958, the Conservatives won 96 more seats than in the previous 
year’s election, and the Liberals lost 61 seats only in one year’s time. By 
contrast, the CCF/ND P has never exceeded a 20 per cent of share of seats 
between 1935-1993.
Such recurrent fluctuation suggests that Canadian voters are volatile and that 
their long-term partisan commitment is weak. According to LeDuc (1988: 39- 
46), 41 per cent of a national sample between 1974 and 1980 changed their 
federal party identification. Even in a short period between 1979 and 1980, 32 
per cent o f voters failed to support the same party.
Figure 5.1. Parties’ shares of seats in the House of the Commons, 1935-1993 
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This volatility of Canadian voters has influenced the characteristics of the 
party system, making it flexible and non-ideological. It is often called a 
‘brokerage’ party system:
Rather than having well-defined support from one election to the next 
based on long-term loyalties of social groups, brokerage parties re­
create coalitions at each election. Rather than dividing the electorate 
among themselves along clear and relatively stable lines of social 
cleavage, such parties constantly compete for the same policy space 
and the same voters....They organize around leaders, rather than 
around political principles and ideologies (Clarke et al.t 1991: 9-10).
Thus, the policy positions of parties are not always consistent. For example, 
the Conservative party used to take a negative position towards free trade, but 
initiated the controversial Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 
1988. By contrast, the Liberal Party, a pro-free trade party in the past, came 
out against the FTA in 1988 (see Johnston et a/. ,1992 : 78-111).
Voters’ volatility and the flexibility of party policies can be related to the 
weakness of class politics. In Canadian politics, ideology is not so strong a 
binding force between parties and voters as it is in many European countries. 
For instance, the NDP, which claimed to form a Labour party for Canada when 
it was launched, has not been very different from the other two parties in terms 
of ideology and policy positions. The party did not depend heavily on support 
from working class voters, and most industrial workers did not choose the NDP 
as their first preference party. As Clarke et al. pointed out:
While it might be difficult to imagine working-class trade unionists 
from the English Midlands supporting the Conservative party of 
Margaret Thatcher, it is much easier to envision their Canadian 
counterparts moving easily between any of the three main Canadian 
parties (1991: 46).
So party choice of Canadian voters is not likely to be programmed by 
ideology. Short-term factors such as issues, leaders, and government style and
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performance tend to play an important role in party choice instead of clearly 
defined ideological programmes.
Party support and regional cleavages
However, there are other social cleavages which strongly influence voters’ 
choices. The most distinct cleavage is the ethnic-cultural cleavage between 
French Canadians and English Canadians. Particularly since Quebec 
nationalism developed in early 1960s, a phase often called the ‘Quiet 
Revolution,’ the ethnic-cultural agenda over Quebec’s constitutional position 
have often commanded Canadian politics, through to the 1995 referendum on 
Quebec’s independence. For example, the Official Language Act of 1969 was 
enacted in response to the ‘Quiet Revolution’, declaring Canadian federal 
institutions to be officially bilingual. In 1971, an attempt was made to seek 
‘patriation’ of Canada’s constitution, plus an amending formula and a charter of 
rights and freedoms, known as the Victoria Charter, but this move was rejected 
by Quebec. In 1987 the Meech Lake Accord was proposed for constitutional 
change, but the accord was not ratified in the provinces of Manitoba and 
Newfoundland. Another proposal for major constitutional change was tabled in 
1992, and an agreement was hammered out between the prime minister and 10 
provincial premiers, called the Charlottetown Accord. However, the 
Charlottetown Accord was massively rejected in a referendum in 1992. All 
these events were focused on Quebec’s claims for special constitutional status, 
and the backlash against them in some English-speaking provinces.
In addition to the ethnic-cultural cleavage between English and French 
Canada, there is another important cleavage: a core-periphery divide between 
the centre and the western provinces. Since the Confederation, the eastern part 
of Canada, essentially Ontario and Quebec, has dominated industry, business 
and politics. In the other provinces, especially in the four western provinces 
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia), a long-standing sense
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of grievance against the East has been developed. There is a common belief that 
people in the western provinces are exploited by the ‘Easterners’.
This feeling is based on the perceived economic and political 
domination of the rest of the country, especially by the tiny Golden 
Horseshoe area of southern Ontario and Montreal ... The main thrust 
of western discontent... hinges on a feeling of marginalization and 
alienation from the centres of economic and political power (Jackson 
and Jackson, 1994: 119).
The western provinces feel that they have been regarded as an ‘appendage’ to 
the Canadian Confederation, as a Saskatchewan premier once described it 
(Blakeney,1977: 240). The discontent has simmered on even as the local 
economy in the western provinces grew strongly:
Made confident by their enormous resource revenues, the provinces 
of Alberta and British Columbia, in particular, sought greater 
political clout within the federation to match their recent wealth 
(Jackson and Jackson, 1994: 248)
In terms of party politics, the Liberals have never been a viable alternative 
in the Canadian-west until the Conservative collapse in the 1993 election. The 
normal pattern was for the NDP to be the main competitor with the 
Conservatives in the western provinces. In spite of the core-periphery conflict, 
the western provinces are part of ‘English Canada’ so that they are not 
sympathetic to the cultural and linguistic aspiration of the Quebeckers.
Four provinces in the Atlantic region (Newfoundland, Prince Edward 
Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick) form another periphery. Those provinces 
are relatively ‘have-nots’, and tend to depend on subsidies from the federal 
government. However, they do not have a strong feeling of ‘exploitation or 
deprivation’, and more importantly, the Atlantic provinces have not established 
as a strong political identity as the western provinces have. In spite of its 
peripheral status, voting patterns in the Atlantic region have been very similar 
to those amongst Ontario’s voters.
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Consequently, the two political cleavages co-exist in Canada - between 
French Canada and the English Canada and between central Canada and the 
west - and partly cross-cut each other. Particularly in the western provinces, the 
ethnic-cultural cleavage is juxtaposed with the core-periphery cleavage. Clarke 
et al. argue that the existence of ‘many’ cleavages forced parties to play a role 
as a broker to integrate the nation (1991: 10). In spite of the characteristics as 
brokerage parties, political parties in effect depended more upon some parts of 
the country than upon others. Figure 5.2 shows a different pattern between 
regions in terms o f parties’ shares of seats.
In the period between 1962 and 1988, the Liberal Party dominated federal 
elections in Quebec where its share of seats was 64 per cent. Indeed before the 
1984 election, the Liberal’s share of seats in Quebec was on average 76 per 
cent. By contrast, the Liberals did not win much support in the western 
provinces where the party took only 12 per cent of seats. Especially in each of 
the three elections during 1979 to 1984, the Liberals won only 2 or 3 seats out 
o f 80 in the western provinces.
Figure 5.2. Regional share o f seats, 1962-1988
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Source: calculated from Canada Votes, 1935-1988.
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The Conservatives received strong support in the western provinces, where 
their share of seats was 64 per cent between 1962 and 1988. In contrast, the 
Conservatives stayed weak in Quebec until the Party won unexpected landslide 
victories in both the 1984 and 1988 elections. Apart from these two unusual 
surges, the Conservatives have won only 7 per cent of seats there. The 
weakness of the Conservatives in Quebec is closely related to its normal image 
as an English party. As Perlin pointed out the Conservative party’s
inability to find accommodation on major issues has contributed to its 
alienation of key social groups - most importantly French Canadians 
... The reduced presence of francophones in the Conservative caucus 
left it in the control of an anglophone majority unsympathetic to 
French concerns, with the result that when new issues arose touching 
on these concerns the party took positions that led to further
francophone defection  Since Quebec elects one-forth of the
members in the House of Commons, the effect was to put the 
Conservatives at a permanent national disadvantage (Perlin, 1988: 
79-80).
Regional variation of support also strongly affected the NDP. The NDP 
depended greatly upon voters in the western provinces where the Party took 23 
per cent of seats between 1962 and 1988, about twice the Liberals’ share of 
support there. In Ontario, the NDP gained 9 per cent of the total seats. By 
contrast, the NDP was not popular in Quebec. Even though the NDP kept 
garnering around 10 per cent of vote in Quebec during the period, it failed to 
secure a single seat in French Canada. The NDP also gained extremely poor 
results in the Atlantic provinces, gaining only four out of the 323 local seats 
during the 1962-1988 period.
It is clear that there were different patterns of party competition between 
regions. As Johnston et al.{1992: 63) said, no party was truly national. A basic 
pattern of cleavage and party competition can be drawn as in Figure 5.3. The
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three parties took a different position in terms of the two cleavages : between 
English Canada and French Canada and between the core and the (western) 
periphery. In Quebec, the Liberals enjoyed a predominant support until the mid 
1980s, and the Conservatives took a minor position. In the west, the 
Conservatives generally competed with the NDP while the Liberals were locally 
not in contention. Only in Ontario, was full three-party competition established 
(or at least ‘two-and-a-half party politics as it was often dubbed). The NDP 
traditionally took the ‘half position. In the Atlantic region, the two major 
parties have competed, and in spite of its periphery status in political and 
economic terms, voting pattern there was generally similar to Ontario’s, except 
that the NDP was weaker.
Figure 5.3. A basic pattern of cleavage and party competition
Core
Periphery
The CCF and the NDP
Although the two major parties had been continuously dominant in every 
election before 1993, many third parties emerged and disappeared in the 
twentieth century, a pluralization which is also associated with the 
characteristics of the ‘brokerage’ party system. Given that Canada is a federal 
state in which each province has different economic, historical and cultural 
backgrounds, it has often proved difficult for the two parties (even ‘catch-all’
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parties) to appease people from all parts of the country. New parties have 
usually emerged in periphery regions, based on voters’ discontent with the two 
major parties. Gagnon and Tanguay (1989: 222) called them protest parties, 
‘since their emergence and growth invariably signal the failure of the two 
traditional parties to articulate the demands or act on the grievances of 
significant social groups (ethnic, regional, class, or linguistic)’. Once the major 
parties could accommodate discontent, protest parties typically began to lose 
their momentum of support. Few third parties could extend support beyond the 
one province where they had originated, accentuating their difficulties in 
building up durable support in competition with the major brokerage parties.
In terms of the durability as well as the regional range of their support, the 
New Democratic Party had been the most successful third party in Canadian 
politics. The roots of the NDP date back to the Depression of the 1930s when 
its predecessor, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was 
formed. The CCF was initiated by the farmer-labour Ginger Group in 
Parliament composed of some remnants of the Progressive party and labour 
members. In 1932, the delegates gathered in Calgary and decided to form a Co­
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) to incorporate ‘the three major 
classes in the community whose interests are the same - industrial workers, 
farmers, and the middle class’ (Lewis and Scott, 1943; quoted in Archer, 1990: 
11). The CCF was composed of farmers, labour representatives and 
intellectuals. Although trade unions participated in the CCF, it was not 
supposed to be a party of organised labour, because
affiliation was to take place at the level of union locals rather than 
federations or national and regional councils... In addition, both a 
block vote at party conventions and block representation on the party 
council were rejected in favour of a system of representation which 
gave affiliated unions less representation per capita than constituency 
organizations had (Archer, 1990: 15-6).
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The CCF depended heavily upon electoral support in the western provinces. 
Among the 112 seats which the CCF gained from 1925 to 1958, all except 12 
came from the west (the exceptions being four seats from Nova Scotia, and 
eight from Ontario). However, the CCF never secured a single seat in Alberta 
where a rival third party, Social Credit, was strong. After 1945, the CCF’s 
support as well as union enthusiasm ran out of steam, partly because of the lack 
of a formal linkage with organised labour, and partly because of the heavy 
parliamentary dependence on MPs from rural, agrarian western provinces.
In 1958, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) proposed the need for a 
broadly based people’s movement which would embrace the CCF. In 1961 the 
CCF was formally dissolved and the New Democratic Party was launched. The 
NDP sought to represent working class interests much more than the CCF. No 
farm organisations have ever been affiliated with the NDP. Rather, the NDP 
combined organised labour and individual members represented through 
constituency associations, with the balance of power held by the latter 
(Archer, 1990: 24).
Although it was an apparent successor to the CCF, the new party generally 
secured improved support across most regions (see Figure 5.4). The NDP won 
more support in all provinces except in Saskatchewan where its average vote 
slightly declined by 2 per cent between 1962 and 1988. The most conspicuous 
change took place in industrial Ontario where its support considerably increased 
by about 10 per cent, reflecting an initially clearer appeal to class politics, in 
contrast with CCF’s more farm-orientated image.
However, in spite of this slight improvement, the formation of the NDP did 
not massively boost the party’s fortunes. The NDP’s support basically remained 
the same pattern as the CCF, although the support for the NDP was more 
regionally extended.
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Figure 5.4 Support for the CCF and the NDP by Province
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Nfl - Newfoundland; PEI - Price Edward Island; NS - Nova Scotia; NB - New' Brunswick; 
Que - Quebec; Ont -Ontario; Man - Manitoba; Sask - Saskatchewan; Alta - Alberta;
BC - British Columbia
Source: based on Whitehom (1991: 326. Table 1).
North western territories and Yukon were excluded.
* CCF: 1935-1958 * NDP: 1962-1988
The limited success of the NDP was partly attributable to the two party 
system in Canada produced by the plurality rule electoral system. Like other 
countries adopting the Westminster model, Canada has never experienced a 
coalition government (except the wartime coalition in 1917). Each of two major 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, has taken over government for 
lengthy periods while third parties have stayed out of office. In addition 
Canadian voters often seem to display a ‘split identity’ between the federal and 
provincial level. Federal election results are often different from those at 
provincial level. For example, the Progressive Conservatives in British 
Columbia used to be a dominant party in federal elections, before 1993 at least. 
However, the Conservative party has been extremely weak in the provincial 
elections, winning only 1 per cent of the vote in British Columbia in the 1983 
and the 1986 provincial elections, although they were in government at the
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federal level. By contrast, Social Credit, which was completely obliterated in 
federal politics since 1980, has maintained a strong position in British 
Columbia’s provincial politics.
If the evaluation of a governing party’s performance in a provincial 
government has little to do with party support in a federal election, third parties 
could hardly enhance their efficacy at the federal level as long as they had no 
likelihood of winning a federal government. In spite of the general growth of 
its support since 1962, the NDP has not overcome its perceived lack of efficacy 
at the federal level, which in turn forced the party to come to terms with 
playing a minor role in federal policy decision-making.
5.2. PARTY CHOICE IN THE 1984 AND 1988 FEDERAL ELECTIONS : 
A LOGISTIC ANALYSIS
Compared with other elections, the two elections held in 1984 and 1988 show 
some different features. First of all, in the 1984 federal election, the 
Progressive Conservatives secured a majority of seats in all of the four regions 
(Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and the West) for the first time since the 1953 
election (Table 5.1). In particular, the Conservatives won an unusual landslide 
victory in Quebec where the party used to be weak, garnering 58 out of 75 
seats. It was a huge leap of support in comparison with the previous election in 
which the party had won only one Quebec seat. Overall the Conservatives 
occupied 75 per cent of the seats in Parliament. This pattern of Conservative 
support continued in the 1988 election, where the party won a majority of seats 
in the three largest regions (losing its majority in the Atlantic region only), and 
suffered only a modest decline in its share of seats in Parliament, down to 57 
per cent. The Conservatives even added 5 more seats in Quebec at the expense 
of the Liberals in 1988. In contrast to the Conservative’s breakthrough in
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Quebec, the Liberal party did not overcome the weakness in the west. The NDP 
also did not extend its support beyond its ‘traditional’ pattern.
In an attempt to analyse the pattern o f the NDP support in both elections, a 
logistic regression analysis was attempted: (for the survey data used here, see 
Appendix 1). Four variables were taken into account: region, income, 
leadership and election issue. As noted, region is an important category 
influencing party support in Canada. Ten provinces were collapsed into five 
regions : the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces, and 
British Columbia. To see whether class makes impact on voting, party choice 
by household income was considered. If class matters, voters from low income 
household should be more likely to vote for the NDP and less likely to support 
the Conservative party.
Table 5.1. Seats won by region 1984-1988
Atlantic Quebec Ontario1 W est2
1984
Liberal 7 17 14 2
Conservative 25 58 67 61
NDP 0 0 13 17
others 0 0 1 0
1988
Liberal 20 12 43 8
Conservative 12 63 46 48
NDP 0 0 10 33
others 0 0 0 0
Source: Canada votes, 1935-1988.
1 : The number of seats in Ontario increased from 95 in 1984 to 99 in 1988.
2 : The number of seats in the four western provinces increased from 80 in 1984 to 89 in 1988.
As pointed out earlier, short-term effects were important in Canadian 
elections. Two variables to represent short-term effects were included: 
leadership and election issues. The leadership effect was measured by a 
thermometer scale which ranged from 1 to 100 degrees. The higher the 
thermometer goes, the more satisfied voters are with a leader. Election issues
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were based on an open-ended question in each election survey about the most 
important election issue.
In the tables below, coefficient (b) for categorical variables estimates the 
log odds o f being in one category over the others. For continuous variables 
such as party leadership, the coefficient estimates the change of the log odds on 
the response for a one-unit increase in the thermometer. Exp(b) is the 
multiplicative estimate. The results are given in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Table 5.2. A logistic regression o f party choice in 1984
Liberal Conservative N DP
variable
constant
b
-3.991
Exp(b) b
-4.431
Exp(b) b
-4.99'
Exp(b)
Party leader 0.051 1.05 0.081 1.08 0.061 1.06
Region
Atlantic 0 .77’ 2.16 -0.28 0.75 -0.293 0.75
Quebec 0.45' 1.57 -0.073 0.93 -0.263 0.77
Ontario 0.19 1.21 -0.15 0.86 -0.03 0.97
Prairie -0.49' 0.61 0.20 1.22 0.16 1.18
B.C. -0.921 0.40 0.30 1.35 0.422 1.52
Issue
general economy 0.24 1.28 -0.19 0.83 0.01 1.01
unemployment 0.17 1.19 -0.13 0.88 0.322 1.38
change government -0.591 0.56 0.501 1.65 -0.452 0.64
others 0.17 1.19 -0.18 0.84 0.12 1.12
Income
low -0.13 0.88 -0.11 0.89 0.24 1.27
middle 0.08 1.09 0.14 1.15 -0.17 0.85
high 0.05 1.05 -0.02 0.98 -0.07 0.93
-2Loglikelihood = -2Loglikelihood = -2Loglikelihood =
1016.6 1158.7 993.4
Chi-Square = Chi-Square = Chi-Square =186.3
187.1 (pO .001) 439.2 (p<0.001) (p<0.001)
R 2l  = 0.18 R V = 0.27 R2l = 0.19
N = 1928 N = 1928 N  = 1928
1 p < 0.01 ; 2 p < 0.05 ; 3p<0.1
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Table 5.3. A logistic regression of party choice in 1988
variable
Lib
b
eral
Exp(b)
Consei
b
rvative
Exp(b)
N
b
DP
Exp(b)
constant 
Party leader
-3.281
0.041 1.04
-3.661
0.061 1.06
-5.67'
0.071 1.07
Region
-1.051Atlantic 0.841 2.31 -0.10 0.90 0.35
Quebec -0.09' 0.92 0.06 1.06 0.402 1.49
Ontario 0.401 1.49 -0.08 0.93 -0.24 0.78
Prairie -0.293 0.75 0.24 1.27 0.10 1.10
B.C. -0.86' 0.42 -0.12 0.89 0.801 2.22
Issue(FTA)
in favour -1.29' 0.28 1.84' 6.28 -0.971 0.38
opposed 1.29' 3.64 -1.841 0.16 0.971 2.63
Income
low -0.242 0.79 -0.02 0.98 0.282 1.32
middle 0.07 1.07 -0.02 0.98 -0.08 0.93
high 0.17 1.18 0.04 1.06 -0.20 0.82
-2 Log likelihood = -2 Log likelihood = -2 Log likelihood =
1034.9 778.9 898.9
Chi-Square = 568.0 Chi-Square = 1100.1 Chi-Square = 445.3
(p<0.001) (p<0.001) (p<0.001)
R l= 0.35 R l= 0.41 R L = 0.33
N = 1946 N = 1946 N = 1946
1 p<0.01 ; 2 p < 0.05 ; 3p<0.1
Some clear patterns of party support can be extracted from the two tables. 
First o f all, the results from the logistic regression confirm that party choice 
varied between regions. In the western provinces including the prairie provinces 
and British Columbia, the Liberals remained weak. By contrast, the NDP won 
good results in the west, particularly in British Columbia. Its multiplicative 
estimates in British Columbia were 1.52 in 1984 and 2.22 in 1988. Support for 
the NDP was extremely poor in the Atlantic. Interestingly enough, the
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multiplicative estimate of Quebec for the NDP was 1.49 in 1988, which 
indicates that Quebec voters were one and a half times more likely to vote for 
the NDP than would be expected if regions were unrelated to vote choices. 
However, the party failed to win any seats there. Another interesting finding is 
that the b coefficient of Quebec for the Liberals, the traditionally dominant 
party in Quebec, was slightly negative (- 0.09) in the 1988 election (about 
Quebec voters in 1988, see also section 5.7). For the Conservative party, which 
won much support across the country, most coefficients turned out not to be 
statistically significant.
Secondly, party leadership made a considerable impact on vote choice. In 
both elections the coefficients of party leadership were positive for all three 
parties. Given the disadvantage of third parties, the influence of the NDP 
leader, Ed Broadbent, was remarkable. The multiplicative estimate for him in 
the 1988 election was the highest among the three leaders, at 1.07. Each 
additional point he gained on the thermometer is thus estimated to have 
increased the odds of voting for the NDP by 7 per cent.
Thirdly, some election issues also made a significant impact on vote 
choices, with a clear pattern of party support over issues. For example, in the 
1984 election the issue of ‘change government to the Conservatives’ was crucial 
to voting choice. The multiplicative estimate of the then ruling Liberal was 0.56 
while the estimates for the main opposition (the Conservatives) was 1.65. The 
third party, NDP was disadvantaged in terms of this issue (its estimate was 
0.64), since it could not present itself as a credible alternative government to 
the Liberals, a common problem for third parties under plurality rule. 
However, on unemployment issue the NDP, as Canada’s most leftist viable 
party, tended to attract voters.
In 1988, the Free Trade Agreement with the United States dominated the 
election. Voters clearly aligned their party positions around the issue. At this 
point the Conservatives were the only party in favour of the FTA, while both 
opposition parties were against it. Voters who favoured the FTA were 6.3
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times more likely to vote for the Conservatives than if the FTA issue was not 
related to the vote choice. By contrast, voters who said ‘No’ to FTA tended to 
choose the Liberals or the NDP. The estimates are 3.64 and 2.63 respectively.
Fourthly, the effects of household incomes on voting did not emerge clearly. 
Even though voters from low income households were more likely to vote for 
the NDP (for example, 1.32 times as likely as if no relationship is assumed in 
1988), most coefficients were not statistically significant in either election. The 
logistic analysis confirms that ideology was not an overriding factor in voting 
choice in Canadian politics. Rather, short-term factors such as election issues 
and party leaderships made a significant impact on voters. Regions are so 
important that the influence of short-term factors varied from region to region. 
With the findings here, the relationship between each factor and the NDP 
voting is addressed in the following sections.
5.3. ELECTION ISSUES AND NDP VOTING
Even though the logistic analysis suggests that election issues affected voters’ 
choice, it still seems dubious how much the NDP voting is related to its issue 
positions. As a third party, the NDP’s role in federal policy-making has 
certainly been limited. This section looks in more details at the effects of 
election issues on NDP voting.
The NDP support and Issues in the 1984 and 1988 elections
Canadian voters tend to regard an election as an opportunity to evaluate the 
performance of a government party, particularly when economic conditions are 
not favourable, or voters are not satisfied with government performance:
Most campaigns provided an occasion for voicing concerns and 
grievances, rather than for offering fundamentally different long-term
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strategies to ease economic troubles... There is, indeed, a tendency to 
see elections as an opportunity to “throw the rascals out” more than 
one of directing the future (Clarke et a/., 1996: 21. Emphasis in the 
original).
Table 5.4. Election issues in the 1984 federal election
issue unemployment general economy time for change others
per cent 37 32 17 14
Source: computed from PSC84
The categories were regrouped depending on an open-ended question about the most important 
election issue. Unspecified answers like don’t know, no issues were excluded.
In the 1984 federal election economic issues were important. Table 5.4 
shows that just under two in every five respondents rated unemployment as the 
most important election issue. If issues of general economic performance are 
included, 69 per cent of those polled took economic issues seriously. Whereas 
economic issues are frequently important in many countries’ elections, a notable 
special factor in 1984 was a the time for a change concern, with over one sixth 
of respondents putting ‘changing government to the Conservatives’ as the most 
important issue in the 1984 election. At this stage the Liberal party had 
dominated Canadian politics since 1963. The Liberal party uninterruptedly 
governed the country between 1963 and 1979. In the 1979 election the 
Progressive Conservative succeeded in taking over government. However, only 
seven months later they had to hold a new election because of a defeat over the 
budget. In the ensuing 1980 federal election, the Liberals took power back from 
the Conservatives. Therefore, the need for change was not only about the four- 
year Liberal government since 1980 but also about a long-standing Liberal 
dominance since 1963. Moreover, economic dissatisfaction tends to the 
government party being blamed for mismanagement, and elections in Canada 
tend to be seen as an opportunity to ‘throw the rascals out’. Among
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dissatisfied voters the categories of economic issues and need for change of 
government could indicate the same meaning: discontent against the incumbent 
government.
Table 5.5. Evaluation of government in handling the economy by party choice
(1984) (%)
evaluation \ voted for Liberal Conservative NDP
Good job 52 24 26
Poorjob 34 66 64
depends / don’t know 14 11 11
Source: PSC84
The original question had five ordinal categories (except don’t know), which collapse into two 
ordinal categories here.
As shown in Table 5.5, evaluation of government performance in handling 
the economy clearly varied between the Liberals and opposition parties. Two 
third of voters for opposition parties such as the Conservative and the NDP 
were dissatisfied with government performance on the economy. Although 
about a half of the Liberal voters took a positive view, a third of them were 
also unhappy with the government’s performance.
In the 1988 federal election, there was effectively a single issue - the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. While prime minister, 
Murloney supported the project, many Canadians worried about FTA’s negative 
impacts:
Besides its uncertain economic effects, free trade might be 
represented to the public as a policy that could have a multiplicity of 
negative noneconomic consequences - namely, that it would open 
Canadian borders to American cultural and political domination 
(Kornberg and Clarke, 1992: 202. Italics in the original).
The FTA became the important electoral issue when John Turner, the then 
opposition Liberal party leader, blocked the passage of a comprehensive free
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trade agreement with the United States using the Liberal majority in the Senate, 
saying
the issue is so fundamental that the people of Canada deserve and 
must have the right to judge....I think the issue becomes democracy.
Let the people decide (Globe and Mail, 21 July 1988; quoted in 
Johnston et al., 1992:3).
Table 5.6. Election issues in the 1988 federal election
issue Free Trade 
Agreement
Meech Lake 
Accord
abortion fiscal
deficit
environment others
per cent 93 1 1 1 1 3
Source: computed from PSC88 (post-election survey).
The categories were regrouped depending on an open-ended question about the most important 
election issue. Unspecified responses like ‘Don’t know, none, etc.’ were excluded.
Table 5.7. Voting choice by Attitude toward the FTA (1988) (%)
Attitude to FTA Liberal Conservative NDP
in favour 14 95 19
opposed 86 5 81
Source: computed from PSC88 (post-election survey).
Throughout the campaign period, the FTA issue dominated the media and 
voters’ attention. Over nine tenths of those polled thought that the FTA was the 
most important issue in the 1988 federal election (see Table 5.6). Attitudes 
towards FTA were almost completely divided along party lines, with supporters 
of the ruling Conservatives the only ones to favour the Agreement, and 
opposition parties’ voters strongly opposed (Table 5.7).
However, party positions on a certain election issue were differently 
appreciated between regions. In 1984, even though the Liberal government was 
very unpopular and the perceived need to ‘change government to Conservative’ 
was high, the evaluation of each party varied from region to region (Figure
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5.5). The then opposition Conservatives’ popularity ran high across the 
country. However, while the NDP was the second favourite in the western 
provinces and Ontario (where the Liberal party’s popularity was lowest) the 
N DP’s ratings were lower than the Liberals in most provinces in the Atlantic 
region and Quebec.
Figure 5.5. Party thermometer* in the 1984 federal election by province
Lib
Con
NDP
Source: PSC84.
*The scale used here runs from a completely negative score of 0, to a completely positive 
score of 99. The values in the figure above were mean values of party thermometer by province.
A similar pattern of party thermometer scores occurred in the 1988 federal 
election (see Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7), when the Conservatives enjoyed their 
highest evaluation among ‘yes-voters to the FTA ’ (Figure 5.6). The NDP 
ranked lowest across all the provinces in this group o f voters. Predictably the 
Conservative had lower thermometer scores among ‘no-voters to the FTA ’ than 
the Liberals and the NDP (Figure 5.7). Generally speaking, the ratings for the 
Liberals gradually declined as one moved westward from the eastern provinces, 
while on the whole the N D P’s scores gradually rose with the same transition. 
Even though the Liberals had a higher thermometer score in Alberta and
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Manitoba than the NDP, the trend of party support looked similar to the pattern 
in the 1984 election shown in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.6 Party thermometer o f Yes-voters to FTA in 1988
Lib
Con
NDP
Source: PSC88.
♦The scale used here runs from a completely negative score of 0, to a completely positive score of 99. 
The values in the figure above were mean values of party thermometer by province.
Figure 5.7. Party thermometer o f No-voters to FTA in 1988
Lib
Con
NDP
Source: PSC88.
♦The scale used here runs from a completely negative score of 0, to a completely positive score of 99. 
The values in the figure above were mean values of party thermometer by province.
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Even when the NDP’s position on a certain issue like the FTA appealed to 
some voters, its support varied from region to region, running lowest in the 
Atlantic provinces and Quebec, but beating the Liberals in most western 
provinces.
Competence, unemployment and NDP voting
Nadeau and Blais (1990) argued that voters’ perception of party competence 
differed between parties. Using Gallup survey data they found that the NDP 
(which has never been in government) was consistently ranked low in terms of 
‘national unity’ and ‘international affairs’, unlike the two major parties. They 
also found that the evaluation of a party’s competence to handle inflation was 
related to the party’s popularity, often reflecting public discontent with the 
government. Nadeau and Blais, therefore, concluded that:
the data highlight the very serious problems facing the NDP. On the 
two important issues of international affairs and national unity, only 
about 10 per cent of respondents selected the NDP as the most 
competent party.... Moreover, it is difficult for the party (NDP) to 
improve its image substantially, since the evidence seems to indicate 
that voters’ perceptions are mainly affected by the performance of the 
party forming the government (1990: 330-1).
The low evaluation of the NDP’s competence on ‘national unity’ reflects a 
perception that the party could not excel at resolving conflicts between regions 
and ethnic groups in Canada. As Whitehorn pointed out:
the public generally perceives the NDP as less relevant on 
constitutional issues than on social programmes or on the 
environment. The re-emergence of extensive debate upon the twin 
topics of constitutional matters and Quebec’s status is not likely to 
bode well for the NDP (1991: 337)
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Another issue on which the NDP sought votes was ‘unemployment’, and 
here by contrast, the NDP was highly evaluated. Table 5.3 showed that the 
odds ratio of the unemployment issue to the NDP was 1.32, which means that 
voters were 1.32 times more likely to vote for the NDP than if the issue was 
not related to vote choice. As a left-wing party which advocates social welfare 
and full employment, the fact that the NDP has been trusted on unemployment 
issue is not surprising. However, the effectiveness of the NDP on 
unemployment issue is still doubtful. As long as the NDP stayed out of 
government, the third party will not be able to resolve such a national economic 
issue.
By studying the CCF-NDP popularity and economy, Erickson (1988) tested 
a hypothesis that the popularity of social democratic parties would be positively 
related to increasing unemployment, and would suffer in a period of rising 
inflation. Given CCF’s origin in a time of a high unemployment in the 
Depression, and the CCF-NDP’s ideological disposition, the hypothesis seems 
plausible. However, her findings were against the hypothesis. The CCF-NDP 
tended to lose support in periods of high unemployment. Instead the NDP’s 
popularity appeared to increase with inflation:
CCF-NDP economic policies were not substantially different from 
those of the major parties. They presented no real alternative to the 
economic models and solutions offered by the Liberals and 
Conservatives. Thus, in periods of rising unemployment, the major 
parties would attract support from the CCF-NDP because they have 
more experience in governing and in the private sector (Erickson, 
1988: 114-5. Italics in the original)
According to her finding, the NDP was not seriously seen as a competent party 
to handle even ‘unemployment’. It is interesting that the NDP’s popularity rose 
in high inflation periods although the third party was unlikely to govern, and 
Nadeau and Blais showed that attitudes on inflation were closely related to 
performance of a governing party. It seems that the NDP’s popularity in the
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periods of rising inflation mainly came from negative reactions against 
government performance rather than the efficacy of NDP policy prescription, 
and thus took on a protest voting character.
The general picture for the NDP is that although it was credited in voters’ 
minds with concern for the ‘unemployment’ issue, and could attract protest 
voting in high inflation periods, in both cases voters were expressing worry 
about the government’s handling of the issue rather than being attracted 
positively by the NDP’s policy positions, which they did not expect to be 
implemented.
5.4. LEADERSHIP EFFECT AND THE NDP SUPPORT
Party leadership images have been an important short-term factor influencing 
Canadian voters’ choices. Where parties do not differ much in terms of 
ideology and policies, the style and competence of a party leader can help 
voters to distinguish between them, as Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above shown. The 
logistic analysis suggested that the NDP leader, Ed Broadbent enjoyed fairly 
high popularity.
Of the three leaders, Ed Broadbent seemed the most comfortable in 
the role .... Under his leadership the NDP had moved up to 20 
percent of the total vote; in 1980 and 1984 the party’s election-day 
share was higher than most observers predicted from pre-election 
polls, which redounded to Mr Broadbent’s credit (Johnston et 
a l ,1992 : 170-1).
In the 1988 election under his leadership, the NDP won their best electoral 
result - 43 seats and 20 per cent of votes.
In Canada, TV debates are conventionally held between party leaders during 
an election campaign. Given the importance of short-term factors in Canadian 
politics, TV debates can make a strong impact on a party leader’s personal
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popularity and his/her party image. Particularly, TV debates during a 
campaign period provided good opportunities for the third party to attract media 
attention, even though non-major parties often tend to be ignored over various 
important national and international issues. Broadbent’s popularity was partly 
attributed to his good performance in TV campaign debates in 1984: ‘As 
happened in 1979, Mr. Broadbent’s effective, sometimes witty, use of the 
stiletto helped him turn in the best performance in the strict sense’ (Toronto 
Globe and Mail, quoted in Morley,1988 :134).
Table 5.8. Thermometer score for party and leadership (mean)
Liberal voters Conservative voters NDP voters
Thermometer* Lib leader Lib party Con leader Con party NDP leader NDP party
1984 46 44 59 57 53 43
1988 45 51 50 54 53 46
Source: PSC 84 and PSC 88 post-election survey.
♦The scale used here runs from a completely negative score of 0, to a completely positive score of 99.
Table 5.8 displays that there is a clear distinction in the feeling- 
thermometers between parties and leadership. Broadbent’s personal popularity 
exceeded his party’s popularity by 7-10 points. In 1984 both the Conservative 
Prime Minister Murloney and the Liberal leader ran a couple of points ahead of 
their parties, but by 1988 both were running behind them again by 4 and 6 
points respectively. In 1984 Broadbent was ranked second amongst party 
leaders, and top in 1988. Given the NDP’s low scores, it is clear that 
Broadbent’s personal popularity was a key asset for the party (see Figures 5.8 
and 5.9).
Although Broadbent’s performance was highly regarded, there was a 
difference in his evaluation between regions, reflecting the NDP’s traditional 
pattern of support. As seen in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, his ratings were high 
in Ontario and in the west (especially in British Columbia). By contrast, he was
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ranked relatively low in Quebec in 1984, and in the Atlantic provinces in 1988, 
where the NDP was traditionally weak.
Figure 5.8. Thermometer of party and leader, 1984 (NDP) 
6 0 -------------------------------------------------------
6SNDP leader-THERM 84
□  NDP partv-THERM 84
Atlantic Quebec Ontario West
Figure 5 .9. Thermometer of party and leader, 1988 (NDP)
60i-------------------------------------------------------
leader-THERM 88 
party - THERM 88
However high Broadbent personal popularity was, the image o f the party 
leadership did not necessarily convert people to support for the NDP. One 
reason could be voters’ concern about ‘wasted votes’. Besides, where a party 
has a strong negative image this effect can overshadow the party leader’s
Atlantic Quebec Ontario West
fflNDP
□  NDP
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image. For example, among those who disliked the NDP’s image as a working 
class party, the party leader’s good image did not help to boost party support. 
As Clarke et al. (1991: 96) say:
The negative aspects of Broadbent’s public image had less to do with 
the man than with his party. To a large extent, Broadbent tries to 
move the party closer to the centre of the political spectrum, and to 
present a moderate, thoughtful alternative to the Liberals... 
Broadbent, like his predecessors, could never completely break free 
from an identification with party and ideology. “Don’t like the party 
that he leads...too socialist...not Broadbent himself, but some of his 
ideas...who sides with...his party” .
Table 5.9. Reasons for vote choice
1984 1988
why \ voted for Lib Con NDP Lib Con NDP
leaders 19 31 23 16 23 17
candidates 39 21 19 23 23 18
parties 40 46 57 57 50 63
all/don’t know 3 2 2 4 3 3
Source: PSC 84 and PSC 88 post-election survey.
The question was ‘In deciding how you would vote in the recent Federal election, which was the 
most important to you?’
Table 5.10. Impact of performance in TV debates on party choice (1988)
choice \ TV debate* Turner (Lib) Murloney (Con) Broadbent (NDP)
Liberal 48 5 22
Conservative 29 88 21
NDP 21 5 54
others 3 3 3
Source: PSC 88 post-election survey.
* The question was ‘ Thinking just about the debates, which of the leaders impressed you the 
MOST favourably?’. It allowed multiple choices like ‘Turner and Murlony, etc.’, which were 
excluded here. Unspecified answers such as ‘don’t know/N.A.’ were also excluded.
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Table 5.9 confirms the discrepancy between leadership popularity and 
voting choice. About 60 per cent of the NDP voters answered that party image 
was the most important reason for their electoral choice, which was higher than 
any other parties. In spite of Broadbent’s successful performance and 
popularity, the influence of the party leadership on the NDP voting was not so 
strong. Only 17 to 23 per cent of the NDP voters were impressed by the party 
leadership. Interestingly, the effect of the NDP party leadership went down 
from 23 per cent in 1984 to 17 per cent in 1988 while the thermometer score 
for the NDP leadership was highest among the three leaders in 1988 (see Table 
5.8). A similarity can be found in Table 5.10. Only half of those who were 
impressed with performance of Turner or Broadbent in the 1988 TV debates 
voted for the Liberals or the NDP. The favourable image mattered only for 
Mulroney. Nearly nine tenths of those impressed with his performance on TV 
voted the Conservatives.
So even if Broadbent’s popularity was quite high, its impact on the NDP 
voting must not be overestimated. To some extent, the image of the party 
leader could played a complementary role to the party’s image and policy 
positions. For the NDP the regional variation in leadership perceptions was 
important because any good performance by its leader would not make the same 
impact geographically. Where the party had already established its support, a 
favourable image of the party leadership contributed to boosting votes. But 
where the NDP was unpopular, the popularity of the party leadership was 
hardly influential.
5.5. THE NDP SUPPORT IN ONTARIO
Apart from the western provinces, the NDP has continued to gain support in 
Ontario which is the centre of Canadian economy and politics. Since the 
aggregate distribution of Ontario voters’ preferences is relatively balanced
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between parties, NDP voting there is less likely to rely on the immobility of 
party choice. Rather, support for the leftist NDP could possibly be associated 
with the fact that working class voters concentrates in Ontario. This section 
examines the characteristics of the NDP voting in Ontario in comparison with 
its support in western provinces.
Regional support: Ontario and the West
Voting for the NDP was influenced by ‘who was in government’, as seen in 
Figure 5.10. In the 1984 election when the Liberal was in government, former 
Liberal voters accounted for 27 per cent of the NDP vote nationally. By 
contrast, in the 1988 election when the Conservatives were a governing party, 
former Conservative voters contributed 27 per cent of the NDP vote nationally, 
in spite of the seemingly large difference of ideology between the two parties.
At a sub-national level, however, patterns of vote shifting to the NDP were 
again different between regions.
Figure 5.10. Shift of vote to the NDP
1) 1980 -> 1984
59% 12%
NDP _____ > NDP „_____  Con
2) 1984 -> 1988
59% 27%
N D P  ► NDP  ^ Con
A L A k A L A k
27% 2% 13%
Lib others
Source: computed from PSC 84 and 88 post-election surveys.
* Parties in italics indicate party choice in the preceding election.
1%
Lib others
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show that patterns of vote shifting were different 
between the western provinces and Ontario. Two features are noteworthy.
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Firstly, the NDP attracted more former Liberal voters in Ontario than the 
national average, amounting to 30 per cent in 1984. Even when Liberal support 
in Ontario greatly increased in 1988, the NDP vote there was not much eroded; 
former Liberal voters still made up over a fifth of the NDP vote in 1988.
Secondly, NDP support was more likely to be related to the Conservative 
support in the western provinces. In 1984 when support for the Conservative 
increased, the NDP did not capture those who had voted for other parties. By 
contrast, when the Conservative popularity fell (its number of seats in the west 
decreased from 61 in 1984 to 48 in 1988), the NDP drew support mainly from 
the former Conservative voters. The percentage of the former Liberal voters in 
the western provinces stayed almost the same.
Figure 5.11. Shift of vote to the NDP (Ontario)
1) 1980 1984 2) 1984 -> 1988
54% 15% 60% 18%
NDP ► NDP * Con N D P  ► NDP « Con
30% 1%
Lib others Lib others
Figure 5.12. Shift of vote to the NDP (the western provinces)
1) 1980 1984 2) 1984 1988
81% 10% 68% 21%
NDP ♦NDP* Con NDP ► NDP 41 Con
10% 0% 11% 1%
Lib others Lib others
Source: computed from PSC 84 and 88 post-election survey (both for Figure 5.11 and 5.12). 
* Parties in italics indicate party choice in the preceding election.
The difference between Ontario and the West can be also found in the 
regional shares of seats. Table 5.11 shows that in the West when the 
Conservatives increased their seats, the NDP’s seats declined, and when the 
Conservatives lost seats, the NDP increased its representation. In contrast, the 
Liberal’s seats changed little in the western provinces. By contrast, the NDP 
was not a major contender in Ontario, where shifts of seats mainly occurred 
between the two major parties. Nevertheless, changes in the NDP’s small 
numbers of seats were inversely related to the Liberal Party and positively 
related to the Conservative party.
Table 5.11. NDP seats in the West and Ontario
1) West________    (%)
1979 1980 (79-80) 1984 (80-84) 1988 (84-88)
Liberal 4 3 (-1) 3 (0) 9 (+6)
Conservative 74 64 (-10) 76 (+12) 54 (-22)
NDP 23 34 (+11) 21 (-13) 37 (+16)
2) Ontario (% )
1979 1980 (79-80) 1984 (80-84) 1988 (84-88)
Liberal 34 55 (+19) 15 (-40) 43 (+28)
Conservative 60 40 (-20) 71 (+31) 46 (-25)
NDP 6 5 (-D 14 (+9) 10 H )
Source: calculated from Canada votes, 1935-1988
The NDP voting and the trade unions
Ontario is not only the industrial centre of Canada but also the centre for the 
trade union movement, and NDP voting there may indicate some impact of 
class voting: ‘The NDP’s new-found strength in Ontario ... represented the 
injection of class politics ... Neither of the old parties could readily displace the 
NDP’s connection to the union movement’ (Johnston et al.,1992: 63). Union-
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affiliated members are geographically concentrated in Ontario. In 1987, for 
example, 76 per cent of unions affiliated with the NDP were located only in 
Ontario (see Figure 5.13) Even though the NDP party membership was 
distributed in the western provinces of Ontario, trade union movements were 
never active outside Ontario. Thus, the impacts of the trade union membership 
on the NDP voting, if any, would be limited to Ontario. In the other provinces, 
its impact was small enough to be ignored.
Figure 5.13. Affiliated unions and NDP party membership by province (1987)
40
Hi union affiliated 
□  party membership
N f l NS Que Man Alta
PEI NB Ont Sask BC 
Source: computed from Whitehom (1991: 329. Table 4, 5).
We noted above that the role model for the NDP was the British Labour 
party. Unlike its predecessor, the CCF, the NDP intended to build up stronger 
ties with organised labour. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), having 
formed just before the launch of the NDP, was one o f main driving forces to 
set a working class party. However, the linkage between trade union and the 
NDP still remained weak. Archer analysed the reasons for weaknesses of the 
linkage (Archer, 1990: 27-40). First o f all, the newly launched party failed to 
integrate the whole trade union movement. When union affiliations to the NDP
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reached their apex in 1963, the percentage of affiliation was only 15 per cent of 
total union members. Even when the number of union members later went up, 
the percentage of affiliation declined to less than 10 per cent. So the NDP had 
not been regarded as the predominant political wing of Canada’s labour 
movement. In addition, the relations between the trade unions and the NDP 
were individual rather than a formal organisational link.
Secondly, the largest component of NDP party finance came from 
individual contribution rather than affiliated unions. In 1986, for example, 
individual contributions provided 61 per cent of the finance for the federal 
party, whereas affiliation dues composed only 15 per cent. Even though ‘other 
unions’ (especially national and international union headquarters) contributed a 
great deal to the party in election years, individual donations have yielded the 
lion’s share o f the party’s finance.
Therefore, the relationship between union membership and the NDP voting 
was never as strong as in Britain. Contrary to the intention to strengthen the 
organisational linkage between the party and trade union, the NDP did not 
attract much support from industrial workers: ‘Being working class did not 
increase the odds that a union member would vote NDP. In other words... it did 
not make a nation-wide class cleavage in voting more likely’ (Gidengil, 1989: 
583).
Table 5.12. Union status and the NDP vote
election union status non-unionist members o f  non­ members o f  
affiliated unionsyear voted for affiliated unions
1979
Liberal 42 41 40
Conservative 43 32 29
N DP 12 20 30
1984
Liberal 26 25 8
Conservative 60 54 54
NDP 13 20 39
Source: rearranged from Archer (1990: 62-3. Table 12 and Table 13).
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As seen in Table 5.12, more members of NDP-affiliated locals members 
supported the Liberal party in 1979 and the Conservative in 1984 than the 
NDP. However, union-party affiliation had a moderately positive effect on the 
NDP vote. In Table 5.12, union members, whether affiliated to the NDP or 
not, were more likely to vote for the NDP than non-union workers. In 
particular, NDP voters among affiliated union members were about three times 
more common than among non-unionists in both elections.
5.6. TACTICAL VOTING AND THE NDP SUPPORT
As noted in previous chapters, the logic of ‘inverse’ tactical voting is based on 
regional variations in party preferences. And considering the regional variations 
of party support in Canada, the NDP could attract the ‘inverse’ tactical voters.
Table 5.13 shows how much the NDP is disadvantaged by tactical voting. 
Nearly nine in ten respondents who said that they voted tactically for the 
Liberals really preferred the NDP, as did more than a third of those who voted 
tactically for Conservatives.
Table 5.13. Tactical voting by parties in Canada (1988)
voted for (%) Conservative Liberal NDP
really preferred
Conservative - 2 10
Liberal 38 - 72
NDP 34 87 -
others 28 12 17
(N) (85) (52) (29)
Source: computed from Political Support in Canada Study (PSC) 88.
* The respondents of ‘don’t know, not answered’ are not included.
** Those answers irrelevant to tactical voting, such as giving the same choice the really 
preferred party and actual choice of voting are also excluded.
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However, the NDP was, at the same time, a beneficiary of tactical voting, 
in particular from the Liberal identifiers, even though the number of the cases 
is smaller (N=29). Over two thirds of those who voted tactically for the NDP 
really preferred the Liberals. Unlike Great Britain, where the slender available 
evidence suggested that tactical inflows and outflows from the Liberal 
Democrat support were more or less even, in Canada the outflows due to 
tactical voting were about two and a half times greater than the inflow. The 
numbers of self-conscious tactical voters for the NDP is too small for detailed 
analysis, but half of them came from the western provinces in 1988.
5.7. ABSTENTION AND THE NDP VOTING
Participation in Canadian federal elections is modest by international standards, 
while not low in an absolute sense (Clarke et al., 1991: 37). The turnout rates 
of 75-76 per cent in the 1984 and the 1988 elections were close to the historic 
average. There is some variation of the turnout rate according to spatial and 
socio-economic factors (Eagles, 1991). For example, the turnout rate in 
Newfoundland is normally lower, and young and mobile people are also less 
likely to take part in voting.
The relationship between third party voting and abstention can be well 
traced in Quebec in 1988. While most Quebeckers were in favour of the FTA1, 
their traditional first preference party, the Liberals, took an opposed position on 
the issue, putting some Quebeckers in an awkward position in terms of party 
choice, and a key issue was whether they could accept the pro-FTA 
Conservatives as an alternative. Even though the Conservatives had previously 
been very unpopular in Quebec, the 1984 election brought them an unexpected 
surge of support. So where the Conservatives had gained support in 1984, pro- 
FTA voters in Quebec could vote for the Conservatives again in 1988. By 
contrast, where the share of the Conservative vote did not increase in spite of
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the surge of its support across Quebec in 1984 (or where the Liberals defended 
their votes), pro-FTA Quebec voters could be frustrated. They were likely 
either to abstain in 1988 because there was no viable alternatives or to vote for 
a third party. Therefore, we might expect that support for the NDP or other 
third parties in Quebec would tend to increase where the turnout rate was low 
or where the Conservatives fared badly in 1984.
Table 5.14. Turnout rate and NDP voting in Quebec, 1988 
(regression estimates)
estimate vote for NDP vote for Non-major Parties
intercept 46.62 66.30
bi (turnout rate) -0.33 -0.51
b2 (Conservative! 984) -0.16 -0.22
r2 = 0.11
F = 4.38
NDP =  a -I- bi*Turnout + b2*Con84
NDP : the share of the NDP votes in a constituency (or in a riding in Canadian terms)
Turnout rate : turnout rate in 1988 in a constituency
Con84 : the share of the Conservative votes in 1984 in a constituency
Source: computed from Eagles etal. (1991) The Almanac o f Canadian Politics.
Table 5.14 confirms this hypothesis. The turnout rate was inversely 
associated with the NDP (-0.33) and all non-major parties (-0.51). The 
association between turnout rate and non-major parties (as well as the NDP) 
voting turns out to be fairly strong. The share of the Conservative votes in the 
previous election (1984) was also inversely related to support for the NDP (- 
0.16) and third parties (-0.22). This finding partly explains why the odds ratio 
of the NDP voting in Quebec rose abruptly in 1988 (see Table 5.2 and 5.3). 
The estimates of the NDP voting in Quebec changed from -0.26 (in 1984) to
0.40 (in 1988). By contrast, the estimate for the Liberals dropped in 1988 
(Table 5.3).
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5.8. CONCLUSION
One of the most distinct characteristics of Canadian politics is the fact that 
ideology did not make much impact on voting choice. Voters were so flexible 
that they did not tend to firmly commit themselves to a party. Rather, short­
term factors such as election issues and party leadership were more influential, 
but there were also marked regional patterns in voting. In spite of the 
‘brokerage’ role of major political parties, each party by the 1980s still 
depended effectively on some parts of the country:
The Liberal party could no longer command regular pluralities 
virtually anywhere outside Quebec.... the Conservatives had become 
the dominant party in English Canada but their ability to generate 
support in Quebec declined... (Johnston et al.,1992: 63)
Although the NDP claimed to be a working class party equivalent to the Labour 
Party in Britain when it was formed, the party could not compete on even terms 
in the face of the dominant regional and ethnic cleavage. The NDP has never 
won any seats in French Canada where the Liberals were a dominant party. 
Only in English Canada - the west and Ontario - has the NDP secured seats 
consistently. As a left-wing party, it also has had no strong position or impact 
on the country’s major French/English cleavage (Jackson and Jackson, 1994: 
432).
The NDP mainly represented dissatisfied western voters in federal elections, 
people with a sense of alienation and deprivation against Ontario and Quebec, 
so that the Liberal party was not taken seriously as a competitor against the 
locally dominant Conservatives. When the Conservative support increased, the 
NDP support decreased in the West, and vice versa. By contrast, in Ontario 
where trade unionists concentrated, the NDP tended to attract more former 
Liberal supporters.
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Figure 5.14. Vote Shifting and political cleavages
1) the 1984 federal election
English Canada French Canada
Core
Liberal
Conservative
“>  NDP
Liberal
Conservative
Periphery NDP
Conservative
2) the 1988 federal election
English Canada French Canada
Core
No Vote Liberal 
Yes vote -> Con
No vote -> Lib
Periphery No vote NDP 
Yes vote Con
Yes vote Conservative
Based on the basic pattern of party support introduced in Figure 5.3, vote 
shifting in the 1984 and the 1988 elections can be better understood. In the 
1984 election the Liberals were unpopular and voters wanted to replace the 
Liberal government. In Quebec where the NDP was weak, the anti-Liberal vote 
shifted to the Conservatives. By contrast, in the west where the Liberals were 
historically weak, the swing to the Conservatives eroded NDP support. In 
Ontario, the Liberals’ unpopularity helped the NDP gain 13 seats (compared 
with 5 seats in the 1980 election), although the Conservatives were the main 
beneficiary (Figure 5.14-1).
In the 1988 election in which the Free Trade Agreement issue was 
predominant, voters who supported FTA voted for the Conservatives, but those 
who were opposed made a different choice in the western provinces and in 
Ontario. In the west where the Liberals were weak, ‘no-voters’ tended to
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choose the NDP. However, the NDP was not as a viable alternative as the 
Liberals among ‘no-voters’ in Ontario (Figure 5.14-2). Most Quebeckers were 
in favour of the FTA, which gave the Conservatives another victory in Quebec.
Basically then, NDP voting depended on negative reasons.
Although the NDP was never feasible ...as a government, it became 
steadily more important in a negative sense. It almost always barred 
the Conservatives’ way to plurality and it often blocked the Liberals 
from majorities (Johnston etal., 1992: 64-5. Italics added)
The NDP has absorbed discontented voters by accommodating itself to the 
regional cleavage. In particular, for many voters in the western provinces the 
NDP was the alternative English Canadian party to the Conservatives, rather 
than a class-based party. However, the NDP had the same problem as other 
third parties under the plurality rule electoral systems. Support for the NDP 
could be ephemeral, as the 1993 plunge in votes demonstrates, which again 
suggests that it was a temporary choice to express discontent rather than attach 
support.
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NOTE
1. Opinion about the FTA considerably varied according to regions. As Table 
5.15 shows, in Ontario and British Columbia opinion was evenly divided. In 
the Atlantic region, opponents of FTA outnumbered those in favour of it. By 
contrast, the balance was greatly tilted in favour of the FTA in Quebec.
Table 5.15. Opinion about the FTA by region (%)
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairie British
Columbia
in favour 44 70 49 59 50
opposed 56 30 51 42 50
N 336 428 484 287 201
Source: computed from PCS88.
The answers of ‘don’t know’ were excluded.
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Chapter VI
THE RISE OF A THIRD PARTY IN SOUTH KOREA : 
THE UNIFICATION NATIONAL PARTY 
IN THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION
Party politics in South Korea have been dominated by conservative parties since 
the Korean War, an ‘all-out ideological war’ (taking place in the hottest period 
of the ‘cold war’) from which nothing could escape (Ko, 1995: 289). During 
the three years of the war more than one million people were killed, and almost 
all social structures were demolished. Psychologically, the war left deep-seated 
animosity and distrust between people in both parts of the Korean peninsula.
The long-standing military confrontation with the communist North after the 
truce has repeatedly strengthened the antagonism towards the communism 
among people in the South. And the prevalent ‘red-complex’ was often 
deliberately exacerbated and reproduced by the authoritarian military regime 
which lacked the legitimacy of the ruling democratically. The military sought to 
justify their intervention into politics on the pretext of preserving the country 
from another possible attack from North Korea.
Apart from the red-complex and its illegitimate political abuse, the 
suppression of the left was also associated with the industrialisation policy. The 
authoritarian regime pushed forward a state-led industrialisation policy based on 
low-income labour from the early 1960s. To keep incomes level low, trade 
union movements were tightly regulated and controlled by the state apparatus. 
The repression of labour movement as well as other left-wing political 
movements was in a tacit agreement with big business groups (chaebols). The 
chaebols needed to control demand from working class because:
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As the Korean economy was dependent upon foreign investment, it 
was critical for Korean bourgeoisie to maintain a favourable 
environment for foreign investors. Thus, the bourgeoisie had to 
repress industrial workers for the sake of political stability which was 
a necessary condition for foreign investment (Jaung, 1995: 8). 
Consequently, South Korean politics for several decades represented only 
variants of a strong conservative ideology characterised by anti-communism and 
a rapid industrialisation policy. In terms of party politics, this ‘biased* 
ideological distribution left effectively no room for left-wing parties. Not only 
every governing party but also all major opposition parties have been 
conservative parties. Socialist parties, if any, were oppressed by the military 
regime, often falsely charged with being allied with the communist North. In 
spite of democratisation the lingering effects of the ‘red-scare’ are still so 
dominant that no socialist party has yet succeeded in winning seats in the 
legislature.
Yet in other ways party politics in South Korea has been transformed into a 
different stage along with the democratisation process. This chapter pays 
attention to the cleavage structure in South Korean society which has influenced 
elections after democratisation. The sudden rise of the Unification National 
Party (UNP) is to be understood in the context of the formation of a new 
cleavage supplementing the old-established one. The first section looks at the 
background and process of establishing a new cleavage since democratisation 
began. In the second part, a log-linear model is applied to analyse party 
support in the 1992 National Assembly Election. In the third part, the reasons 
for the rise of the UNP support are addressed in the context of a regional 
cleavage.
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6.1. DEMOCRATISATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARTY 
POLITICS
After more than 25 years of the authoritarian regime, politics in South Korea 
entered into a new stage of democracy in 1986. In the wake of the mass protest 
for democracy, the military regime promised to restore political freedom and 
rules for fair elections. The democratisation brought about a new environment 
of party politics, which ultimately served as a conducive condition for the rise 
of the UNP.
Party politics under the authoritarian regime
Since the first military involvement in 1961, South Korea had been under the 
military-backed regime. During this period, party competition was 
progressively established between pro-democracy forces and the authoritarian 
regime. Opposition parties represented pro-democracy forces, and a ruling 
party served the regime. Elections were regularly held, where the military 
regime sought a belated legitimacy for their pattern of rule and tried to mobilise 
people. As far as the opposition was concerned, elections provided good 
opportunities to articulate a pro-democracy stance.
It is noteworthy that opposition support often merged into a single party, 
which usually represented a ‘unified’ pro-democracy force in the legislative 
body. Those who supported the opposition tended to vote ‘tactically’ for the 
largest opposition party to allow it a leading role. Not surprisingly, a unified 
single opposition party was seen as more effective when competing against the 
military regime. Throughout Park Chung-hee’s regime (1962-1979), the New 
Democratic Party was effectively the only opposition party competing against 
the government’s Democratic Republic Party. Similarly, the newly formed New 
Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) suddenly emerged as a single unified 
opposition party against the military-backed Chun Doo-hwan’s regime (1981-
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1987). The NKDP won 29 per cent of vote in the 1985 election, replacing the 
existing opposition parties.
In addition to an opposition party in the legislative body, there developed 
various kinds of extra-parliamentary and pro-democracy groups fighting the 
authoritarian regime. Those groups demanded more radical changes than the 
legislative opposition. Until the 1970s, the pro-democracy movement largely 
relied upon high profile leaders from religious, cultural groups or intellectuals, 
and lacked organisational networks. In the 1980s many autonomous 
organisations such as the labour movement, the student movement and human 
rights groups were created, and they often attempted to build up an umbrella 
organisation to unite the entire pro-democracy movement. The ideological 
position of those movement groups was quite diverse, ranging from the 
moderate right to extreme left. However, the main trend of the movement 
generally represented a leftist ideology in South Korean context, advocating the 
interests of the working class and the poor. The activists in those groups wanted 
a comprehensive change of society, demanding economic justice as well as 
political freedom. In spite of the ideological difference, those movement groups 
often gathered around the ‘conservative’ legislative opposition for the purpose 
of fighting the regime. One reason for this co-operation was that the extra- 
parliamentary groups were not regarded as a responsible alternative by the 
electorate, and so they could not win electoral support on their own (Im, 1994: 
275).
These united efforts played a critical role particularly in the 1985 election, 
which provided the initial momentum for democratisation. At this point, the 
extra-parliamentary groups launched a pro-democracy initiative. Those group 
members did not trust the then legislative opposition because they saw them as 
‘part of the regime’, serving as democratic embellishment. The opposition 
parties had been scornfully called ‘the second (infantry) company and the third 
company’, following the ruling party of ‘the first company’. The extra- 
parliamentary opposition groups greatly contributed to the electoral
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breakthrough of the New Korea Democratic Party in the 1985 election. The 
new official opposition party was effectively led by two well-known opposition 
leaders - Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Both had been forced to stay out 
of politics once a new military faction took over in 1981. In the wake of the 
unexpected electoral breakthrough, the NKDP took up the initiative of the pro- 
democracy movement.
Figure 6.1 represents party politics during the authoritarian periods, 
particularly in the 1980s. The vertical axis stands for the authoritarian- 
democracy cleavage and the horizontal axis represents the left-right cleavage. In 
spite of the rapid industrialisation and the consequent growth of working class, 
the left-right cleavage was not very salient. The extra-parliamentary groups 
generally represented the leftist ideology, but their efforts did not result in a 
class-based party politics. The dominant cleavage before democratisation was 
along the authoritarian-democracy axis. The opposition party and the extra- 
parliamentary forces formed a kind of alliance in spite of their ideological 
differences, united against the military regime.
Figure 6.1. Cleavage structure during the authoritarian periods (in the 1980s)
authoritarian
military regime
left right
extra-parliamentary 
pro-democracy groups
opposition party
democracy
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Democratisation through compromise between conservative parties
The most important election platform of the NKDP in the 1985 election was 
reform of the presidential election system. The existing rule provided for an 
indirect election of South Korea’s powerful President by an electoral college. 
Many people believed that a change to a direct election would be fairer and was 
essential to establish a democracy. Besides, opposition leaders reckoned that 
electoral reform would likely bring them electoral victories, making it an 
immediate priority. To win a direct presidential election, it is necessary to have 
a nationally well-known candidate. The opposition party had two well-known 
leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. By contrast, it was unlikely that 
an authoritarian leader would allow a would-be competitor for power to stay 
within the regime.
Even though the extra-parliamentary groups also saw electoral reform as the 
best way to end the military rule, they had a more radical agenda of the 
comprehensive transformation of society, emphasising a more equal distribution 
of wealth. As Choi (1993: 30) pointed out about the labour movement in the 
1980s, ‘the collective vision that emerged from the workers’ struggles was 
radically egalitarian and communitarian’. Even though those groups wanted the 
NKDP to adopt their agenda, the party was reluctant to embrace such ‘radical’ 
demands.
The mass protest for democratisation reached its apogee in the summer of 
1987, and the regime finally promised to restore political freedom and to accept 
the demands for a directly elected president. However, the mass protest ended 
in a compromise (see C-S Ahn, 1994; Im, 1994, 253-297). The opposition 
leaders accepted the pact offered by the regime instead of asking for an 
unconditional surrender. The compromise could not ultimately satisfy the extra- 
parliamentary groups because it was a political pact between the conservative 
parties (Y-H Kim, 1994: 98), ignoring ‘economic democracy’ on which the 
extra-parliamentary groups had strongly insisted.
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There may be two reasons why ‘the pact’ could be agreed, alienating the 
extra-parliamentary groups. First, the NKDP (or as it was renamed the 
Unification Democratic Party1: UDP) was inherently a conservative party, 
although the Party tried to accommodate various demands including those of the 
left. In ideological terms, there was little difference between the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and the opposition. The opposition leaders needed 
new electoral rules in order to win government. Thus, by accepting the 
compromise the opposition leaders obtained what they claimed through the 
democratic struggle against the military regime. The opposition party as well as 
the ruling party did not want any revolutionary change of the existing political 
and economic system. Moreover, since the legislative opposition saw its 
electoral support in the 1985 election as an approval of its party platform of 
‘electoral reform to a direct presidential election’, it did not need to listen to 
demands from the extra-parliamentary groups.
Secondly, even though politicians in the opposition party had fought the 
military regime, they were also part of the South Korean establishment, and so 
had no real wish for a radical change. Above all, the opposition leaders were 
office-seekers who wanted to maximise their chances of forming a government. 
When they strongly believed that they would win under the new rule, it was 
very unlikely they would refuse the compromise. In fact, each of the two 
opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung firmly believed that his 
side would shorten the odds respectively. Figure 6.2 shows the compromise 
within the conservative bloc, leaving aside the extra-parliamentary groups 
isolated on the left.
Consequently, this compromise within the conservative blocs alienated the 
left, consolidating the invincible conservative dominance of South Korean 
politics. In spite of its active role in the pro-democracy movement, demands 
from the extra-parliamentary groups were ignored by their former allies. After 
the compromise, when industrial action erupted in the wake of 
democratisation, the legislative opposition neglected trade-unionists’ demands,
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pleading instead for moderation. The party leaders worried that a clumsy 
intervention would lose conservative voters.
Figure 6.2. Compromise between the conservative parties
authoritarian
military regime
compromise
left right
extra-parliamentary 
pro-democracy groups
opposition party
democracy
Regionalism and the formation of the DLP
In spite of the ideological bias in Korean politics, the compromise within the 
conservative bloc brought about some significant changes. First, the 
compromise weakened the authoritarian-democracy cleavage. During the 
authoritarian period, the demand for democracy used to be the most effective 
electoral issue for the opposition. Once the compromise had been made, the 
cleavage became less relevant. Although the extra-parliamentary groups insisted 
on clearing out the old guard of the past authoritarian regimes, many voters 
were not seriously worried about this issue.
Secondly, the political influence of the extra-parliamentary groups was 
considerably reduced. Since the conservative parties took the initiative during 
the critical transition period, those groups were left behind. Along with 
democratisation, the trade union movement gained strong momentum, and the
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need for building a working class party increased. However, all working class 
parties (or candidates) failed to be elected, except for one candidate in a local 
election. The elections confirmed the conservative dominance of politics. A 
plurality rule electoral system, newly employed for legislative elections, also 
contributed to barring a successful entry by any new working class party (Kang, 
1996).
What is worse, the extra-parliamentary pro-democracy groups were severely 
divided over the relationship with the opposition leaders and the policy line. 
Even though those groups provided the initial momentum of the pro-democracy 
movement, they did not maintain their unity as a single force any more. Some 
of the leading figures were absorbed into the opposition parties, which further 
weakened the prospect of the leftist movements.
Thirdly, a new regional cleavage between Kyongsang and Cholla became 
visible. This is a kind of a core-periphery cleavage because the Cholla region 
historically has been alienated from central politics. The authoritarian regime, 
all of whom came from the Kyongsang region, capitalised on the historical 
discrimination against Cholla to consolidate support from the non-Cholla 
regions. In addition, the state-led industrialisation policies resulted in uneven 
regional economic development, which systematically favoured the Kyongsang 
region (M-H Kim, 1995). Authoritarian leaders such as Park Chung-hee and 
Chun Doo-hwan usually recruited political elites from their home region, 
Kyongsang. By contrast, Kim Dae-jung had been oppressed by the regime, 
becoming a political symbol of the Cholla region, his homebase.
Election results after democratisation show that voters were firmly aligned 
along the regional division. In the first presidential election after 
democratisation in December 1987, Roh Tae-woo, a former military general, 
was elected president. His victory was in large part attributable to the disunity 
of the opposition as well as to the regional cleavage. The four candidates 
standing in the presidential election each depended on support from different 
parts of the country.
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Later the 1988 National Assembly Election repeated the same pattern as the 
previous presidential election, as Table 6.1 shows. The seats in competition 
were divided between the four parties led by the four presidential candidates. 
The Democratic Justice Party (DJP), the military-backed ruling party, 
dominated in North Kyongsang. The Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), 
led by Kim Young-sam, won the lion’s share of seats and votes in South 
Kyongsang; the Party of Peace and Democracy (PPD), led by Kim Dae-jung, 
dominated Cholla whilst the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), led by 
Kim Jong-pil, one of the leading members of the 1961 military coup, gained 
much support in Chungchong. Strong regionalist sentiment sweeping the Cholla 
and Kyongsang regions caused a bandwagon effect among Chungchong voters, 
helping Kim Jong-pil to revive politically.
Table 6.1 . The distribution of seats in the 1988 National Assembly Election1
party(leader)
region
DJP
(Roh Tae-woo)
RDP
(Kim Young-sam)
PPD
(Kim Dae-jung)
NDRP  
(Kim Jong-pil)
Seoul 10 10 17 3
Chungbu2 30 8 1 7
Chungchong 9 2 0 15
N. Kyongsang 25 2 0 2
S. Kyongsang 13 23 0 0
Cholla 0 0 36 0
additional seats 38 13 16 8
Seat total 125 5 9 3 70 35
Source: Central Election Management Commission, 1988.
1. Apart from the four parties, independent candidates won nine seats, and a minor party 
secured one seat in the constituency level.
2. includes Inchon, Kyonggi, Kangwon, and Inchon.
3. The RDP won one seat in Cheju Island. The remaining two seats in Cheju were won by 
independent candidates.
However, regionalism took a further twist when three of the four parties - the 
DJP, the PPD and the NDRP - decided to formally merge, forming the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990. The main reason behind the merger
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was very practical. From the ruling DJP’s point of view, the immediate purpose 
of the merger was to establish a majority in the legislature because the ruling 
party failed to win the majority of seats on its own. On the other hand, Kim 
Young-sam, the RDP’s leader, believed that the merger would increase his 
chances of winning the next presidency.
Figure 6.3. Emergence of regional cleavage
before the 1992 South Korean National Assembly Election
authoritarian
Democratic
Liberal Party non-ChollaCholla
Democratic Party
democracy
The merger alienated Cholla, the south-western part of the country upon 
which the PPD overwhelmingly depended. The newly-formed party (DLP) was 
a kind of a ruling coalition against the opposition PPD, which was renamed the 
Democratic Party (DP) after absorbing a small party. Thus, the 1992 election 
became a competition between a party of Cholla and a non-Cholla coalition.
This merger meant that the former authoritarian regime and part of the 
opposition party were now united into a coalition force (see Figure 6.3 and 
6.4). Not surprisingly, the decision provoked strong opposition particularly 
from the extra-parliamentary groups, who regarded Kim Yong-sam’s decision 
to join the DLP as a betrayal. However, this merger signified that the old 
conflict between the authoritarian and pro-democracy forces was significantly
201
weakened. In spite of the widespread distrust and dissatisfaction in the wake of 
the launch of the DLP, politicians who joined the DLP believed that the issue 
of establishing democracy was no longer salient. What mattered politically was 
the regional cleavage. The 1992 election result showed that their calculation 
was right.
Figure 6.4. Formation of the DLP in a historical perspective
1961-1979
Military I
1980-1986
(Park Chung-hee)
Military II
(Chun Doo-hwan) 
Opposition Parties ------------------
1986-
NDRP
(Kim Jong-pil)
—► DJP 
(Roh Tae-woo)
1990-
DLP
RDP
(Kim Young-sam) —
PPD
(Kim Dae-jung) * DP
6.2. VOTING CHOICE IN THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
ELECTION
The 1992 National Assembly Election confirmed the dominance of the regional 
cleavage rather than the previous authoritarianism vs democracy cleavage. As 
the election results suggest (Table 6.2 and Figure 6.5), it is clear that the 
competition was made between a party of Cholla and a non-Cholla coalition. 
The DLP, the non-Cholla ruling coalition, gathered more than 45 per cent of 
the votes in Kyongsang and Chungchong regions where the former three parties 
of the DLP had won much support in the previous elections. However, the 
DLP remained weak in Cholla, winning only two seats. By contrast, the 
Democratic Party earned 64 per cent of the Cholla region’s votes and secured
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all but two of the seats, whereas they had fairly poor results in all the other 
places except the capital city, Seoul. The D P’s relatively good result in Seoul 
was attributable partly to a large number of immigrants from Cholla. In 
addition, Seoul residents tend to be more critical of government performance. 
However, the DP was unpopular in Kyongsang region, the major regional rival 
with Cholla, winning only one eighth of the vote.
Table 6.2. Share of vote in the 1992 National Assembly Election (%)
region* DLP DP UNP others
Seoul 35 37 19 4
Chungbu 37 25 24 10
Chungchong 45 23 20 16
Kyongsang 48 12 19 18
Cholla 22 64 5 8
Mean 39 29 17 12
* Votes in Cheju Island are excluded
Figure 6.5. Distribution of seats to parties by region
in the 1992 National Assembly Election
60
50
40
30
DLP
20
10 UNP
0 □  OTHERS
Seoul Chungchong Cholla
Chungbu Kyongsang
* Four seats for Cheju Island are excluded.
** Others were independent candidates except one seat taken by a small party in Seoul.
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The electoral result in the Chungbu region indicates that the cleavage was 
extended to non-Cholla regions beyond the Cholla-Kyongsang rivalry. The DLP 
won 31 seats in Chungbu whereas the DP earned only 9 seats. As Lee pointed 
out,
regionalist feelings spiralled as the parties and candidates 
concentrated on appealing to the loyalties of their home region. The 
strongest regional cleavages are between Cholla people and non- 
Cholla people, and specifically the high self-esteem of the Cholla 
people and the corresponding distrust of them by non-Cholla people. 
(K-Y Lee, 1994: 754)
However, the DP benefitted more than any of the other parties from the 
plurality rule electoral system, owing to its geographically concentrated 
support. By contrast, the DLP lost a considerable number of seats, which was 
widely regarded as a serious defeat for the government.
The party which showed the most impressive electoral performance in 1992, 
however, was the Unification National Party (UNP). Set up just two months 
before the election, the UNP leapt to a strong third party placing from nowhere 
by winning 24 seats at the constituency level, and a further seven seats at the 
top-up seats stage, securing 31 seats in total, a sudden success described as a 
‘Cinderella-like progress’ (Park, 1993a: 6). Given the fact that the UNP was 
not directly involved in the regional rivalry between Cholla and non-Cholla, its 
regional pattern support is quite interesting. The party gained 13 seats in the 
Kyongsang and Chungchong regions, where the three former parties within the 
DLP used to be strong. By contrast, the party mustered only 5 per cent of votes 
and won no seats in the Cholla region. This pattern indicates that the UNP was 
also strongly influenced by the regional cleavage.
204
Voters’ choice in the 1992 election : log-linear analysis
To analyse the factors which influenced voters’ choice, log-linear analysis was 
applied. Log-linear analysis seeks models to express the expected cell frequency 
as an additive function of several ‘effects’ expressed in terms of odds ratio 
(Demaris, 1992: 6-7). In log-linear analysis, the hypothesised model can be 
confirmed by a small value relative to the degree of freedom.
Three independent variables were analysed here - region (R); social status 
(S), which should reflect class politics influences if there are any; and attitude 
(A) toward the merger of the three parties into the DLP, tapping the continuing 
effects of the authoritarianism vs democracy cleavage. The data set used here 
was the 14th Korean National Assembly Election Study (hereafter KES92). (For 
the details, see Appendix 1). Regional categories (R) were collapsed into 5 
regions: Seoul, Chungbu (including Kyonggi, Kangwon, and Inchon), 
Chungchong, Kyongsang and Cholla. Voting choice (V) contained four 
categories: the three parties, the DLP, DP and UNP, and ‘Others’ (most of 
whom were independent candidates). Social status (S) was also reduced to four 
categories: professional/ managerial, middle, manual, and people outside the 
labour force. Attitude (A) toward the merger of the three party into the DLP 
was originally 5 levels of ordinal categories (including ‘don’t know’), but these 
were collapsed into two categories: positive and negative. Because the ‘don’t 
know’ respondents showed quite similar party preferences to those who had a 
positive attitude, they are included in the category of ‘positive’. The result is 
shown in Table 6.3.
The model of all two-way effects [VR, VA, VS, RA, RS, AS] cannot be 
improved significantly by the addition of any single term nor can any possible 
term be removed from this model without a significant loss of fit. Standardised 
residuals also indicates that there are few significant deviations between the 
observed cell frequencies and the frequencies expected under this model. 
According to Knoke and Burke a log-linear model with a p-value between 0.10
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and 0.35 can be accepted as fitting the data (1985: 31). The p-value of this 
model [VR, VA, VS, RA, RS, AS] comfortably fell into that range, and it can 
be accepted as the ‘best’ available fit with the data.
Table 6.3. Selected log-linear models
model likelihood ratio %2 df P
(1) [VR,VA,VS] 208.4 124 .000
(2) [VR,VA,VS,RA] 191.1 120 .000
add [RA] to (1) 17.3 4 .001
(3) [VR,VA,VS,RA,RS] 139.0 108 .024
add [RS] to (2) 52.1 12 .000
(4) [VR,VA,VS,RA,RS,AS] 117.8 105 .185
add [AS] to (3) 21.2 3 .000
(5) [VA,RA,AS,VRS] 70.7 69 .422
add [VRS] to (4) 47.1 36 .102
(6) [VR,VA,VS,RAS] 105.8 93 .172
add [RASJ to (4) 12.0 12 .443
(7) [VR,RA,RS,VAS] 111.7 96 .131
add [VAS] to (4) 6.1 9 .726
(8) [VS,RS,AS,VRA] 110.1 93 .109
add [ VRA] to (4) 7.7 12 .807
So voting choice was associated with all the three other variables. However, 
given the conservative dominance and little ideological difference between 
parties, the effect of social status needs a further examination to see whether it 
indicates effect of class politics. To measure the separate effects of each 
variable on voting choice, a logit model was employed - which can provide 
parameter estimates to measure the strength of each factor. The dependent 
variable here is voting choice (V) with R, S and A as independent variables. 
The results are shown in Table 6.4.
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These tables provide some interesting points. First, the logit estimates 
confirm that the regional cleavage dominated the 1992 election. Party choice 
clearly varied according to region, particularly between the DP and the other 
parties. In Cholla, the estimate of the DP was 3.97 while the DLP was 0.56. 
That is, the odds of voting for the DP among Cholla voters were about four 
times what would be expected if region locations were unrelated to voting. By 
contrast, the estimates of the DP were less than 1 in all the other regions except 
Seoul. Particularly in Kyongsang region, the estimate of the DP was just 0.40. 
Compared with other parties, the DLP won votes evenly across the other 
regions except Cholla. Kyongsang voters were more likely to vote for the DLP 
(its estimate was 1.59). Support for the UNP was also limited in non-Cholla 
areas. The new party appealed especially to Chungbu voters.
Secondly, manual workers tended to vote for the DLP 1.56 times more than 
would be expected if social status was not related to voting. By contrast, upper 
class voters preferred ‘non-major’ parties. The estimate of professional/ 
managerial category for ‘Others’ is 1.70, and for the UNP 1.55. Given that the 
DLP was perceived to be ideologically further to the right than the main 
opposition DP, this result confirms the weakness of left-right ideological 
influences on Korean party politics. Although voting choice was different 
between social status as the log-linear model in Table 6.3 suggested, the 
concept of class voting does not seem suitable to explain much Korean voting 
behaviour.
Thirdly, voters’ attitude toward the merger of the three parties into the DLP 
was another crucial determinant of voting. Those who favoured the merger 
were about twice as likely to vote for the Party. By contrast, those who were 
opposed to the merger were likely to vote for other parties. The estimate of 
negative attitude for DP voters is 1.75. The estimate for the UNP is 1.45 and 
the estimate for ‘Others’ is 1.27. This suggests that the launch of the DLP 
provoked considerable dissatisfaction amongst its component parties’ previous 
supporters, which lead appreciable numbers to defect.
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Fourthly, the patterns of the estimates between the UNP and ‘Others’ are 
quite similar. Those who took a negative attitude toward the merger were more 
likely to vote for the UNP or Others. In terms of social status, upper class 
voters tended to choose either the UNP or ‘Others’ while the estimates for 
working class people are relatively low. Regionally, both the UNP and 
‘Others’ were unpopular in Cholla. In non-Cholla regions the UNP and the 
‘Others’ seem to divide support. In Seoul and Chungbu, the UNP won 
relatively good results. In Kyongsang and Chungchong, the ‘Others’ gained 
more support. In sum, both the UNP and ‘Others’ drew support from those 
people who were from upper class backgrounds, lived in non-Cholla regions, 
and had a negative attitude towards the DLP.
Table 6.4. Parameter estimate of voting choice by the logit model
A) Parameter estimate of voting choice for the DLP 
effect additive estimate multiplicative z-ratio
(x) estimate (eT)
Intercept -0.89 -10.77
Regions
Seoul -0.02 0.98 -0.16
Chungbu 0.10 1.10 -0.73
Chungchong 0.04 1.05 0.24
Kyongsang 0.46 1.59 3.86
Cholla -0.58 0.56 -3.03
Social Status
professional/managerial -0.28 0.76 -1.79
middle -0.03 0.97 -0.28
manual 0.45 1.56 3.73
outside labour force -0.13 0.87 -1.24
Attitude toward the merger
negative -0.71 0.49 -10.14
positive 0.71 2.03 10.14
-2 Log likelihood = 1295.53 
Chi-Square =170.00 (p < 0.01) 
R2l = 0.12 
N =  1171
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B) Parameter estimate of voting choice for the DP
effect additive estimate
............. CO............
multiplicative 
estimate (eT)
z-ratio
Intercept -1.16 -12.81
Regions
Seoul 0.51 1.67 4.05
Chungbu -0.60 0.55 -4.01
Chungchong -0.37 0.69 -1.86
Kyongsang -0.92 0.40 -5.95
Cholla 1.38 3.97 8.92
Social Status
professional/managerial -0.32 0.73 -2.00
middle -0.01 0.99 -0.07
manual 0.08 1.08 0.63
outside labour force 0.24 1.27 2.13
Attitude toward the merger
negative 0.56 1.75 7.02
positive -0.56 
-2 Log likelihood =
0.57
1169.53
-7.02
Chi-Square =221.28 (p < 0.01) 
R2l = 0.16 
N =  1171
C) Param eter estim ate o f  voting choice for the  U N P
effect additive estimate
(x)
multiplicative 
estimate (eT)
z-ratio
Intercept -2.60 -11.64
Regions
Seoul 0.50 1.65 1.94
Chungbu 1.41 4.10 5.75
Chungchong 0.62 1.86 1.97
Kyongsang 0.11 1.12 0.39
Cholla -2.64 0.07 -3.26
Social Status
professional/managerial 0.44 1.55 2.46
middle -0.07 0.93 -0.40
manual -0.46 0.63 -2.47
outside labour force 0.09 1.09 0.64
Attitude toward the merger
negative 0.37 1.45 3.70
positive -0.37 0.69
-2 Log likelihood = 781.69 
Chi-Square =95.34 (p < 0.01) 
R \ =  0.11 
N = 1171
-3.70
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D) Parameter estimate of voting choice for Others
effect additive estimate multiplicative z-ratio
_________________________________ (t)__________ estimate (eT)_______________
Intercept -2.36 -18.28
Regions
Seoul -1.24 0.29 -4.25
Chungbu -0.11 0.90 -0.52
Chungchong 1.05 2.86 4.70
Kyongsang 0.92 2.51 5.34
Cholla -0.61 0.54 -1.98
Social Status
professional/managerial 0.53 1.70 2.73
middle 0.01 1.01 0.06
manual -0.34 0.71 -1.90
outside labour force -0.20 0.82 -1.23
Attitude toward the merger
negative 0.24 1.27 2.25
positive -0.24 0.79 -2.25
-2 Log likelihood = 699.60 
Chi-Square = 70.06 (p < 0.01) 
R2l = 0.09
___________________________________ N =  1171_________
* Z-ratio exceeding ± 1.96 would be considered significant.
The logit model confirms that the regional cleavage prevailed in the 1992 
election. Support not only for the two major parties but also for the UNP and 
‘Others’ was greatly affected by regional sentiment. Social status turns out to be 
relevant, but its effects does not entail class politics. Rather, the voting effect of 
social status seemed to represented different reactions across occupational 
grades to the formation of the DLP. All these findings suggest that the 
emergence of regional cleavage and the foundation of the DLP had a powerful 
influence on the growth in support for the new UNP.
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6.3. UNP SUPPORT AND THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
ELECTION
The prevalence of regional cleavage in 1992 indicates that immobility of party 
choice is based on geographically uneven distribution of preferences. The 
Cholla region is apparently a one-party dominant region for the opposition 
Democratic Party (previously called the PPD in the 1988 election). Cholla 
voters’ first preference was invariably the DP because it was effectively 
perceived as a party representing Cholla. By contrast, the Democratic Liberal 
Party was regarded as the representative of non-Cholla regions, though this link 
was not so strong. Strictly speaking, the non-Cholla regions are so diverse that 
it is not feasible to define them as a one-party dominant region. However, in 
spite of the less dominant position of the DLP, voters in non-Cholla regions 
usually shared a ‘biased’ preference against the DP.
The immobility of party choice in two-party politics under plurality rule 
must mean that viable voting alternatives are lacking when voters become 
disaffected their traditional party. Even in non-Cholla regions, the formation of 
the DLP generally provoked dissatisfaction, and the poor performance of the 
incumbent government caused widespread concern . But dislike of the DP made 
many non-Cholla voters highly reluctant to support them, despite their 
dissatisfaction. The regional cleavage especially hindered the DP from being a 
viable alternative to the unpopular DLP in three regions - North and South 
Kyongsang and Chungchong, on which the three former parties of the DLP had 
politically depended. The remaining choice was to abstain or vote for other 
parties (or independent candidates).
By contrast, facing the 1992 election, the DP at first remained the only 
opposition party to the DLP. Many Cholla voters were unhappy with the DP’s 
political isolation - the appearance of all other parties ‘ganging up’ against it - 
which led to stronger political ties between the DP and the region’s voters. This 
feeling was reinforced by the widely perceived mismanagement of the national
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economy by the Roh Tae-woo government. Such a strong regional tie had thus 
developed that the UNP (once formed) unable to compete effectively in Cholla. 
Besides, Cholla voters, who strongly felt that they had been deprived in the 
economic development process, may have consider the UNP to be another 
political wing of the South Korean establishment nurtured by the former 
regime, because the UNP depended heavily on corporations of the Hyundai 
Group.
As the logit model in the previous section suggested, the patterns of support 
were quite similar between the UNP and independent candidates. Three 
quarters of the twenty-one successful independent candidates were elected in 
the regions upon which the ruling DLP depended - Kyongsang and 
Chungchong, as seen in Table 6.5. By contrast, no independent candidates or 
UNP candidates were successful in Cholla.
Table 6.5. Successful independent candidates by region
region Kyongsang Chungchong Cholla other regions1
independent seats 11 4 0 ?2
UNP seats 7 6 0 11
1. included Seoul, Kyonggi, Inchon, Kangwon and Cheju.
2. included one seat won by a small party candidate.
The UNP vote was basically dependent on negative reactions against the 
DLP and the Roh government, as the logit estimates showed. However, given 
the other options such as abstention or voting for independent candidates, the 
choice of the UNP must have needed some attraction. As Heath et al. pointed 
out about support for the British Liberal Democrats, protest voting needs ‘an 
element of attraction as well as disaffection’ (1985: 114). This notion can also 
be applied to the case of the UNP voting.
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The perceived image of the UNP
When the UNP was launched, its pro-business policies and heavy dependency 
upon the Hyundai Group provoked strong psychological antagonism as well as 
some expectation. Many people worried that the influence of chaebols would 
even increase if the UNP succeeded in taking over political power. The UNP 
was often critically dubbed as ‘Chaebol-dang (the conglomerate party)’. 
Particularly, the concern about deepening ‘government-business collusion’ was 
the most frequent response from those who had negative views about the UNP’s 
foundation, as seen in Table 6.6. In spite of the public concerns about 
‘deepening government-business collusion’, how did the UNP succeed in 
attracting voters?
Table 6.6. Reasons for negative responses to the UNP
Why do you think the launch o f  the UNP undesirable? Percentage
It may deepen government-business collusion 78
It does not look serious about politics 6
It is likely to be absorbed into the ruling party 4
Other reasons 12
Source: HRI, Sisa Opinion (May 1992).
The survey was conducted during January 1992, and it was limited to residents in Seoul.
The question above was asked open-ended.
First of all, the UNP projected a fresh image to voters, providing those who 
were sick of politics with a fresh impression ‘by default’ because the new party 
had nothing to do with the existing ‘soiled’ politics. Table 6.7 confirms this 
image of freshness. Each party has a distinctive reason for support. Most 
supporters for the ruling DLP gave serious consideration to ‘political stability’, 
which may be the first concern of the establishment. The DP identifiers saw 
‘democratisation’ as an overriding issue, a comprehensible response since the 
DP was the only party to remain in the side of democracy along the old
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authoritarian-democracy axis. By contrast, the leading reason cited by UNP 
identifiers was its fresh image. If the category of ‘clean politics’ can be 
regarded as a similar answer (because clean politics was what people expected 
from a new party), almost half of the UNP identifiers expected ‘something 
new’ in politics from the UNP.
One reason for the party’s fresh image may be related to its business-like 
style of politics. The UNP was the first party to introduce the concept of 
‘efficiency’ into South Korean politics. The conglomerate-dependent party 
adapted some know-how of business-management to its election campaign. 
Many former Hyundai staff took key posts in the campaign and helped develop 
party policies. Even though it is doubtful how effectively its election campaign 
helped to attract votes, this business-like approach to the election campaign 
drew widespread attention from the public, and helped the UNP to project a 
fresh image to the electorate.
Table 6.7. Reasons for supporting each party, given by its supporters (%)
supported  party
reason for support DLP DP UNP
economic recovery 22 8 34
political stability 43 10 2
democratisation 9 39 5
clean politics 3 12 11
fresh image 1 4 36
distribution of wealth 0 6 4
local interests 18 18 8
good candidates 4 2 1
other reasons 1 1 1
100 100 100
Source: KES92 cross-section survey.
However, a more important reason for the UNP’s fresh image was that 
many of the former democracy supporters felt betrayed by the DLP merger, 
regarding it a product of political bargaining in smoke-filled rooms, without
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voters’ mandate. Many pro-democracy activists believed that the merger 
granted members of the authoritarian regime a political pardon. The merger 
also provoked anger among those who supported the authoritarian regime 
because they did not like the uneasy coalition. The merger was widely believed 
to be designed for winning elections by forcing voters to make a choice 
between two competing regions. The UNP was not dragged into the turmoil 
over the merger, because the party was set up long after the launch of the DLP. 
By distancing itself from the regional conflict, the UNP tried to project an 
image of freshness to the public who expected new parties free from ‘soiled 
region-based politics’. That is, ‘freshness’ meant not being involved in the 
existing regional rivalry.
The UNP’s image as an acceptable alternative can also be explained in 
terms of ideology. Given that the party was basically originated on, and still 
depended on a large business group, the Hyundai Group, its position was 
understood to represent the interests of big business. The UNP’s economic 
policies, such as its anti-intervention policy, and the lack of any serious 
comments on the rights of industrial workers and trade unionism in its election 
platforms, suggested strong pro-chaebol orientation. One political scientist 
criticised its ideological position as ‘a fraction of the neo-liberalistic monopoly 
capitalists’ (Chong, 1992. quoted in Yang, 1995: 96). Generally speaking, the 
ideological position of the UNP was more conservative than that of the DLP 
(for example, see Huber and Inglehart, 1995: 100. Appendix 2).
Figure 6.6 demonstrates voters’ ideological attitude (mean position) by their 
party choice. As expected, supporters of the ruling DLP were conservative 
voters. The most liberal voters supported a socialist party, Minjungdang (the 
Mass Party: MP). Given the still strong ‘red-complex’, it is understandable that 
even the position of MP voters was not far away from the centre. In fact, the 
feasible ideological distance was very narrow. Those who supported the main 
opposition Democratic Party positioned in the centre-left. Interestingly, the 
ideological position of UNP voters was almost exactly at the centre between the
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DLP and the DP. UNP supporters did not have any strong ideological 
preferences, in spite of its strong connection to the Hyundai Group, its pro- 
business policies and conservatism.
Figure 6.6. Voters’ Ideological Attitude by Party Support (mean position)
MP PNPR Independents 
(2.27) (2.58) (2.93)
1 2 
1 1 , ’ '
3 4 5
r \  1 I
4
Liberal
4 . . 4 L.
Conservative
DP UNP DLP 
(2.75) (2.89) (3.22)
voters’ ideological attitude scored:
5 - very conservative 4 - conservative 3 - in the middle 
2 - liberal 1 - very liberal
Source: calculated from J-B Lee (1992: 124. Table 7).
DLP - Democratic Liberal Party ; DP - Democratic Party ; UNP - Unification National Party ; 
MP - Mass Party (Minjungdang); PNPR - Party for New Political Reform
Students are a good example for understanding the UNP’s image as a 
‘fresh, neutral and acceptable’ alternative (Table 6.8). Students used to be an 
uncompromising driving force in the pro-democracy movement against the 
military regime. They tended to take a hostile position against the establishment 
and demanded radical changes. Ideologically, many of them favoured the left. 
Understandably, the ruling DLP was very unpopular among students; for them, 
the DLP was a mere combination of the old guard and some traitors to the 
democracy movement. Only 2 per cent of students surveyed voted the DLP. By 
contrast, a half of students chose the opposition DP which still remained on the 
side of democracy in the axis of the old cleavage between the authoritarian 
regime and democracy (see Figure 6.3).
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Table 6.8. Voting choice by students
party DLP DP UNP others
per cent 2 50 28 20 100 (N—53)
Source: KES92.
This table excludes ‘don’t know/ not answered’.
It is rather surprising that nearly three in every ten students voted for the 
UNP, despite its pro-business party and conservative orientation, suggesting 
that they were also not free from the immobility of party choice created by 
regionalism. Many students saw the DP as more ‘a party of Cholla’ rather than 
‘a vehicle for democracy’. Instead, the UNP, neither the first nor the least 
preferred party, could be a second choice.
Voters who were in favour of the UNP tended to consider the party to be at 
least ‘a less tainted’ or ‘a (regionally) neutral or impartial alternative’ rather 
than a political wing of a certain interest or ideology. This kind of perception 
enabled voters to make a positive evaluation of the achievement and success of 
the Hyundai Group and its leader Chung. The position of independent 
candidates was again similar to the UNP’s position.
Election issues and the UNP support
A single issue of the economy dominated the 1992 election, with over half of 
respondents in Table 6.9 choosing ‘economic issues such as inflation, recession, 
housing price’ as the most important problem. By contrast, political issues such 
as political reform and democratisation were much less salient. The percentage 
rating the economy as the most serious problem was highest among the UNP 
supporters. Since the image of the UNP could not effectively be separated from 
that of the Hyundai Group, the widely-known success stories about the Hyundai 
Group helped to boost the UNP’s credibility on economic management. The
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party was believed to be more competent on economic issues, even though its 
competence in government had never been tested. The UNP tried to promote its 
image as ‘a practical party for trouble-shooting’, deliberately differentiating 
itself from other parties which were criticised for being engrossed in partisan 
struggle.
Table 6.9. Election issues and party support
(%1
Issue \ party choice DLP DP UNP others mean
economy 59 55 63 46 57
political issues 10 13 12 11 11
social issues 13 12 12 16 13
other issues 18 21 12 28 19
100 101 99 101 100
Source: computed from KES92.
The question was “ Which would you think is the most important problem facing the country? 
Select TWO issues and indicate 1 and 2 according to the seriousness” . Originally, the question 
had 13 categories, but here it collapsed into four categories, dealing with only first choices.
Concerns about the gloomy prospect of the national economy were well- 
founded. From 1986 to 1988 the South Korean economy was booming and as 
Table 6.10 shows, during that period the inflation rate was low, GNP growth 
rate was higher than 12 per cent per year, and the trade surplus was increasing, 
reaching a peak in 1988. However, such favourable economic conditions 
abruptly changed in 1989. The economy went into a recession with high 
inflation and low growth. For those accustomed to rapid economic growth since 
1970s, the bleak economic situation was ominous enough to cause public 
dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. In addition, the growing 
trade deficit precipitated serious concerns about national economic prospects 
because of South Korea’s dependence upon foreign trade. Every opinion poll 
surveyed before the 1992 legislative election repeatedly showed public concern 
about the gloomy future of the national economy.
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Table 6.10. Selective Indices of South Korean Economy, 1985-1991
year
Consumer Price 
index
GNP growth rate
(%)
Balance of Payment 
(billion $)
1985 100 7 -1
1986 103 13 5
1987 106 13 10
1988 113 12 14
1989 120 7 5
1990 130 9 -2
1991 143 8 -9
Source: Bank of Korea.
It was a prevalent belief that ‘the economic crisis’ was principally caused by 
the neglect and indolence of the government party and the president, Roh Tae- 
woo. Politicians were blamed for only concerning the partisan interests, and the 
merger into the DLP was often interpreted as the evidence. That is, the 
formation of the DLP was not popular from the outset. As Park (1993a: 12). 
pointed out:
What voters felt most keenly was misrule and maladministration 
under Roh’s leadership. The policy failures brought about instability 
in prices and livelihood, inconsistency in the housing policy, the 
accumulation of a deficit in the balance of international payments, 
and rampant corruption in public office.
The sense of economic crisis among the public provided a good cause for 
Chung’s ‘new business’, the UNP. On one hand, as a successful businessman, 
he justified his decision to enter politics by criticising the economic failure of 
the Roh government. For example, he proclaimed in a panel discussion that he 
needed to create a new party ‘because 40 billion dollars o f foreign debt has 
accrued during the four years’ ruling of the DLP...Another five years of the 
DLP government would ruin the country and the people forever’. On the other 
hand, the party developed some eye-catching policy phrases such as ‘half the
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price of apartment’, or ‘10 billion dollars’ trade surplus within one year in 
government’. Some of these positions were heavily criticised for their 
exaggeration, or doubts cast over their feasibility. However, the emphasis on 
the economic issues contributed to building its image as a practical party which 
could afford to solve the economic difficulties. As seen in Table 6.7, over a 
third of those who identified themselves with the UNP trusted its ability to 
produce economic recovery. In short, the UNP succeeded in pinning down 
where voters were unhappy. By emphasising productivity in politics the party 
attracted those who were fed up with the existing party politics (particularly 
with the ruling DLP), and at the same time, those who wanted to ride out the 
perceived economic crisis.
Leadership effects
Generally speaking, political parties in Korea have relied heavily on a personal 
leadership, with decision-making power usually concentrated in a top job. 
Voters also tend to identify a party with its leadership so that it is effectively 
hard to distinguish the image of a party head from the image of the party per 
se. One reason for the importance of party leadership stems from lack of strong 
party ideological differentials, reflecting the dominance of conservative parties. 
Where the policies of competing parties are substantially similar, party leader’s 
image can make a crucial impact on voters’ choice. Besides, the dominant role 
of party leadership is also related to the presidential system. Party competition 
ultimately aims at securing the presidency, and party leaders are often the 
parties’ presidential candidates. Such identification between a party and its 
leadership has been intensified since the 1987 presidential election.
Regionalism has also influenced the overriding importance of political 
leadership. Political parties tended to win much support in leaders’ home 
regions. Initially, such sentiment was politically sparked in Cholla. The sense 
of alienation among many Cholla voters under the military regime created an
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enthusiastic commitment to the ‘home’ politician Kim Dae-jung. Their 
enthusiasm, in turn, caused a backlash among people in other regions, 
particularly, in Kyongsang and later in Chungchong. As a result, the four party 
leaders in the 1988 elections won much support in their home regions 
respectively, and this pattern continued to influence DLP support in 1992 even 
after the merger.
For the UNP the personal image of party leader Chung also made a great 
impact on voters’ perceptions. It is hard to disentangle a UNP rating from 
Chung’s leadership, since the party was completely dependent for its apparatus 
on Hyundai Group organisation and personnel, and on Chung’s personal 
fortune for its finances. The credibility accorded the newly launched party also 
owed a great deal to Chung’s personal reputation as a successful entrepreneur. 
In short, the UNP was ‘his’ party.
Chung’s predominance was also closely related to his potential candidacy 
for presidency. The intention behind the foundation of the UNP was for Chung 
to secure a foothold from which to run in the presidential election scheduled in 
December 1992, a goal around which he had planned and researched carefully 
for at least a year before he founded the UNP (Lee, K-Y, 1994: 761-2). For 
Chung the 1992 legislative elections was a dry run for a possible later tilt at the 
presidency (Morris, 1992/3: 61). In a sense, the UNP served simply as an 
electoral machine to fulfil Chung’s personal political ambition, lacking political 
principles and policy goals.
6.4. TACTICAL VOTING AND THE UNP’S SUPPORT
Tactical voting under a plurality rule electoral system seems more salient in a 
parliamentary system because an election is an event to form a party 
government. Third parties with little chance to form a government on their own 
must come to terms with disadvantages incurred from tactical voting. However,
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third parties can also suffer vote loss from tactical voting even in a presidential 
system, where a legislative election is not an event to choose the executive. 
Table 6.11 examines data about voting choices different from people’s most 
preferred party. Nearly four fifths of those who felt close to the DLP and DP 
actually voted for these parties. By contrast, only 63 per cent of those who 
really preferred the UNP chose the UNP. Even though that percentage is a little 
higher than the other three third parties in a parliamentary system, well over a 
third of people closest to the UNP cast their ballots other than the UNP. By 
contrast only one in 20 of voters closest to the DLP or DP actually supported 
the UNP. However, a quarter of voters closest to one of the ‘other’ parties or 
candidates supported the UNP, further emphasizing the links between these two 
types of behaviour.
Table 6.11. Voting choice different from a preferred party in South Korea (1992)
closer to DLP DP UNP others
voted for
DLP 80 8 15 18
DP 5 76 12 26
UNP 5 5 63 24
others 9 12 10 33
N (403) (362) (140) (89)
Source: computed from KES92.
The context for the UNP’s success in attracting ‘inverse’ tactical voting is 
undoubtedly related to the limitations on DP support imposed by regionalism. 
Table 6.11 shows that a fourth of those who felt closest to the DP voted for 
another party, a reaction concentrated among the DP identifiers in non-Cholla 
regions where it was clear that it could not succeed, because it was regarded as 
‘a party of Cholla*. The UNP seems to have been the main beneficiary of their 
tactical choice in an attempt to defeat the regional rival DLP. While the UNP
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was unpopular in Cholla itself, the party received a relatively favourable 
response from DP identifiers in some non-Cholla regions, notably Seoul- 
Chungbu, as Table 6.12 shows. But Table 6.11 shows that nationally ‘others’ 
(and even the DLP) won more votes from the tactical DP voters than the UNP. 
The low percentage of the tactical voting for the UNP seems reflects a regional 
variation in party second preferences. Despite the small number of cases 
involved Table 6.12 shows that tactical voting for the UNP among DP voters in 
Seoul-Chungbu was not matched in the Kyongsang-Chungchong regions, where 
‘others’ (mostly independent candidates) were heavily preferred by those who 
felt closer to the DP.
Table 6.12. Choice of a different party among those who felt closer to the DP
(%)
region Seoul-Chungbu Chungchong-Kyongsang
DLP 29 26
UNP 43 11
others 29 64
(N) (47)
Source: computed from KES92.
This regional variation of the ‘inverse’ tactical voting may reflect two 
factors. First, many DP supporters (especially outside Cholla) were alienated 
from the authoritarian regime, and its DLP continuation, and associated the 
UNP (or specifically the Hyundai Group) with the establishment nurtured by 
the military regime based on Kyongsang region. To such voters the UNP could 
not project its ‘fresh or neutral image’.
Second, there were a large number of viable independent candidates in the 
Kyongsang-Chungchong regions, because the merger creating the DLP resulted 
in many redundant candidates who had run in the previous election. Some of 
those rejected as DLP candidates decided to compete as independents in the 
heartland regions of the three former DLP parties, and with their established
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local reputations and previous incumbency they could seem more viable 
candidates than the brand-new UNP, and therefore attracted many tactical 
voters in these regions.
Table 6.11 suggests that overall the balance of tactical voting effects was 
very even. The UNP attracted 50 voters from all other parties and lost 52. 
Particularly in relation to the DP, among those closest to UNP there was an 
outflow of 17 people voting for the DP. But 17 people backed the UNP while 
being closest to the DP.
6.5 ABSTENTION AND THE UNP
In the 1985 legislative election the turnout rate was 85 per cent, and dropped 
nine points three years later. The turnout rate in the 1992 National Assembly 
Election was 72 per cent, which was then the lowest in the history of South 
Korea’s legislative elections. The 1992 election also produced the largest 
number of successful independent candidates, who numbered 21, compared 
with only four in the 1985 election. The multiple successful independent 
candidates as well as the low turnout rate may point to a widespread public 
discontent against existing parties: some commentators argue that non-voters in 
Korea lack confidence in politics and show passive resistance by not going to 
the polling place (Park, 1993a: 7).
Table 6.13. Turnout rate and Successful independent candidates 
in recent South Korean National Assembly Elections
1985 1988 1992
Turnout rate (%) 85 76 72
Successful independent candidates (seats) 4 9 21
Source: computed from Chosun Ilbo, The data book o f 14th National Assembly Election
Results.
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In plurality systems abstention and third party voting may rise together 
when two existing major parties do not provide adequate alternatives because of 
disaffection or immobility of party choice. In the 1992 election, the DLP 
merger and the development of regionalism effectively forced Seoul-Chungbu 
voters to be aligned with a non-Cholla coalition, although their commitment to 
the DLP was rather weak. While the previous three parties within the DLP 
represented Chungchong, and North and South Kyongsang respectively, no 
single party was perceived as representing Seoul and Chungbu. This lack of a 
strong regional commitment made voters in Seoul and Chungbu more prepared 
to respond to dissatisfaction with the Roh government (and the DLP) than 
voters in any other region. However, even when the local voters turned against 
the DLP, the remaining options were to abstain, to vote for the UNP, or to vote 
for independents - as long as the alternative DP stayed as these dissatisfied 
voters’ least preference.
Table 6.14. The effects of variations in the turnout rate on voting for the three
main parties (Seoul-Chungbu region only)
independent variable turnout92 diff9288
party DLP DP UNP DLP DP UNP
a -0.11 1.51 -0.30 0.36 0.33 0.22
b 0.66 -1.70 0.77 -0.52 1.67 -1.48
r2 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.11
F 23.491 48.571 9.081 3.20 10.521 9.89
N 96 91
iqua. 1: DLP - a  + 6*tumout92 
Equa. 2: DLP = a + 6*difif9288 
a : intercept
DLP : the DLP’s share o f vote in a  constituency 
tumout92 : the turnout rate in 1992 in a constituency
diff9288 : the difference o f the turnout rate between 1988 and 1992 in a  constituency 
The same regression equations were applied to the other parties.
* The 5 new seats in 1992 created by the boundary redistribution in these regions were 
excluded in the equation 2. 
l . p <  0.01
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Table 6.14 reports the results of an aggregate data analysis of constituency 
voting patterns in the Seoul and Chungbu region. The results show that the 
DLP and the UNP both tended to fare well where the turnout was high in 1992. 
By contrast, the association between the DP vote and the turnout rate was 
strongly negative. Interestingly, the DP tended to win more votes as the turnout 
rate increased in comparison with the previous election. (Its estimate is 1.67). 
By contrast, even though the UNP had a positive association with the turnout 
rate, the party’s share of vote tended to rise where the turnout rate fell. The 
association is quite strong (its estimate is -1.48). One possible interpretation of 
the contrast is that differing perceptions of the DP’s viability influenced 
dissatisfied voters’ decisions on whether or not to participate. Those who 
accepted the DP (because of the lingering effect of the authoritarian-democracy 
cleavage, as seen in Figure 6.3, or because they themselves had links with the 
Cholla region) were more likely to participate, supporting the DP. By contrast, 
those who could not regard the DP as an alternative tended to abstain, or vote 
for a third party such as the UNP. The effect was that greater UNP voting in 
Seoul-Chungbu accompanied a growth in non-voting, with both phenomena 
reflecting dissatisfaction and increased regional immobility of party choice.
This interpretation of the relationship between party support and non-voting 
(or voting) is necessarily tentative, and in particular does not control the well- 
known effects of socio-economic factors on turnout. Existing accounts have 
reported that such factors as the urban-rural division, levels of education and 
age all influenced the 1992 turnout rate (see N-Y Lee, 1993: 21-48; Park, 
1993b). However, Table 6.14 strongly indicates that the UNP voting was 
associated with participation in voting.
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6.6. CONCLUSION
The UNP carried out a very impressive election campaign. Applying new 
technology and methods used in business, its policy advertising was better 
organised than that for any other party. The successful campaign was believed 
to make a considerable contribution to the new party’s image of reliability and 
freshness (Yang, 1995: 94). But this successful campaign does not necessarily 
mean that the party succeeded in wooing ‘more’ voters by the means of the 
campaign. Table 6.15 shows an initial response to the UNP surveyed just 
before its official launch. Just over a sixth of those polled responded 
favourably to its advent onto the political scene. The UNP’s subsequent share 
of the votes was 17 per cent in the 1992 National Assembly election, and in 
December Chung Ju-young won 16 per cent of the votes in the presidential 
election. Thus the UNP’s support was scarcely different from the initial 
response when the party was set up. The UNP’s vigorous and impressive 
election campaign may have consolidated that initial support when otherwise it 
could have dwindled away, but the party’s methods could not extend its 
electoral base. From beginning to end, the UNP relied on a certain size of 
those who were dissatisfied with the existing parties, because the basic 
momentum of party support came from negative reasons.
Table 6.15. Approval of the UNP
desirable undesirable don’t know no interest total
percentage 18 50 26 5 99
Source: conducted by Gallup Korea for the Daily Chosun (11 Jan. 1992).
The question was “what would you like to think of the creation of the UNP?”.
The immobility of party choice created by regionalism debarred the 
opposition DP from becoming a viable alternative across the country despite the
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ruling DLP’s unpopularity. Instead, the UNP emerged as an alternative among 
dissatisfied voters in non-Cholla regions. As Bae (1995: 75) pointed out: 
Indeed, one of the main factors which resulted in the relative success 
of the UNP and its presidential candidate may have been the failure 
of the DP to widen its limited regional basis of electoral 
support....The role of accommodating the defectors was played by a 
third party in the elections of 1992.
The UNP’s breakthrough was also attributed to its ‘fresh image by default’ 
because the party was not directly involved in any part of the existing ‘soiled’ 
politics. The fresh image, in turn, helped the UNP to be seen as a centrist 
party, in spite of its policy position favouring big business and ideological 
conservatism. For some of those who were disillusioned particularly in the 
wake of the DLP merger, the UNP was considered to be ‘an impartial and 
reliable alternative’. The prevalent sceptical image of the existing politicians 
provided a favourable condition for launching a new party.
The UNP’s impressive performance ended as a one-off blip in South Korean 
politics because after coming third in the presidential race Chung Ju-young 
decided to leave politics, declaring that the association between the UNP and 
the Hyundai Group was damaging the chaebol and withdrawing his financial 
support. Soon after, the UNP collapsed. It would be controversial to speculate 
on whether the UNP might have established solid support if the party had 
continued in existence. However, its sudden break-up suggests that with the 
growth of regionalist sentiment it would be difficult for any party to survive 
without regionally consolidating support.
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NOTE
1) In May 1987, the two opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae- 
jung set up a new party, Unification Democratic Party, in order to purge those 
who took a moderate stance on the electoral reform issue out of the party. 
However, the Party was substantially the same party as the NKDP in terms of 
its leaders, members and policies.
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Chapter VII
A THIRD PARTY IN NEW ZEALAND: SOCIAL CREDIT
7.1. THE PARTY SYSTEM IN NEW ZEALAND
The New Zealand party system was known as a ‘pure’ Westminster model of 
party politics until its plurality rule electoral system was changed to a German- 
style mixed member system, following two referenda in 1992 and 1993. Since 
the beginning of the modern party system in the mid-1930s, party politics in 
New Zealand was dominated by two major parties, National and Labour, which 
generally won about 90 per cent of votes between them. One of the two major 
parties never failed to form a single party government based on a majority of 
seats. Lamare argues that the stability of the two-party system was based on 
New Zealanders’ strong party identification. Between 1972 and 1990 an 
average of around 80 per cent of those who identified with Labour or National 
cast a ballot for the party of their choice (Lamere, 1992: 51). No non-major 
parties threatened the two-party stranglehold on parliamentary power. Between 
1946 and 1993, there are only eleven successful candidates from non-major 
parties. In short, before the 1993 election New Zealand seemed to many 
observers the best candidate after the United States for the category of super­
stable two-party politics.
Stable two-party politics
As in many European countries, the two major parties in New Zealand depend 
on class-based support, with Labour representing working class interest, and 
National Party advocating middle-class interests. The basis of Labour’s support 
has been in urban electorates which have a higher proportion of those on lower
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incomes. National’s core support is in rural areas and in the wealthier city 
suburbs. As Mulgan said (1994: 254):
This social cleavage at the axis of the two-party system reflects the 
historical origins of the two parties, with Labour the socialist party of 
unionists and workers and National the anti-socialist party of farmers 
and business people.
In spite of this ideological difference, the choice between the two major 
parties seems much more flexible than in Britain. As Table 7.1 shows, 49 per 
cent of the National voters in the 1981 election put Labour as their second 
preference, and 41 per cent of the Labour voters regarded the National as their 
second preference. Compared with the British case (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 
IV), shifts of voting were much more likely to occur between the two major 
parties. Even though the actual amount of a direct switch of voting between 
National and Labour turned out to be fairly low (around 7 per cent on average 
in both 1978 and 1981), Table 7.1 suggests the potential flexibility of New 
Zealand party politics.
Table 7.1. Party of second preference (1981)
(%)
2nd preference voted for National Labour Social Credit
National 1 41 36
Labour 49 5 46
Social Credit 40 42 10
others 11 12 8
N 495 688 190
Source: computed from NZ voting survey, post-election 1981. 
The cases of ‘Don’t know’, ‘Not Applicable’ are excluded.
Apart from the class cleavage, there is a clear cultural-ethnic distinction 
between the Maori population and the Pakeha (Europeans). However, this 
cleavage has been well accommodated within two-party politics. Maori voters
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have traditionally voted for Labour rather than for National. For example, 
Labour dominated the four Maori constituencies from 1943 onward, 
successfully mobilising Maori support. In addition, because the Maori people 
were thrust to the margins of politics from the very beginning of Pakeha 
settlement (Vowels and Aimer, 1993: 28), this Maori-Pakeha cleavage has not 
been significant for electoral choice except in Maori constituencies.
Table 7.2. New Zealand election result, 1978-1993 (%)
Election year National Labour Social Credit Others
1978 40 40 16 4
1981 39 39 21 2
1984 36 43 8 141
1987 44 48 62 2
1990 48 35 22 153
1993 35 35 304
Source: Norton (1988); for the 1990, 1993 results, Vowles etal. (1995: 42).
1. New Zealand Party 12 %
2. Social Credit was renamed the Democratic Party in 1985.
3. Green 7 %, NewLabour Party 5 %
4. Alliance 18 %, New Zealand First 8 %, Christian Heritage 2 %, other 2 %.
Even though New Zealand has had stable two-party politics, support for 
third parties has risen since the 1978 election, after which the vote share of 
other parties stayed close to the 20 per cent level, with the single exception of 
1987 (Table 7.2). Voting for non-major parties under plurality rule reached its 
highest level in the 1993 election. The number of effective parties represented 
in the electorate also began to increase close to three from the 1978 election 
(Table 7.3). Some scholars understood the rise of the non-major party vote as a 
result of dealignment in New Zealand politics (Bean, 1992; Vowles et a/., 1995: 
41-60). For example, Bean argued that class politics in New Zealand declined 
as the population has tended to become more ‘middle-class* since 1960, with 
the proportion of non-manual occupations increasing steadily at the expense of 
manual occupations (Bean, 1992: see also Bean 1984: 285).
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Even though electoral volatility may increase, New Zealand kept a 
remarkably stable form of two-party system in terms of seats. Table 7.3 shows 
the effective number of parties in terms of the legislative seats remained static 
at around two, increasing above this level only very slightly in 1981 and 1993, 
so that in parliament the two-party system has never been seriously challenged.
Table 7.3. Effective number of parties in New Zealand elections (1946-1993)
Election year number of effective parties 
(legislature)
N, =  1 / Ti2
number of effective parties 
(electorate)
Nv -  1 / Vi2
1946 2.0 2.0
1949 2.0 2.0
1951 1.9 2.0
1954 2.0 2.5
1957 2.0 2.3
1960 2.0 2.4
1963 2.0 2.4
1966 2.0 2.6
1969 2.0 2.5
1972 1.9 2.4
1975 1.9 2.6
1978 2.0 2.9
1981 2.1 2.9
1984 2.0 3.0
1987 1.9 2.3
1990 1.8 2.8
1993 2.2 3.5
Source: computed from Norton (1988); for the 1990, 1993 results, Vowles etal. (1995: 42). 
T j: the share of seats taken by party i 
V i: the share of votes won by party i
Even in the 1993 election when a radical change of the existing electoral system 
was in prospect, the major parties’ share of votes fell to 70 per cent, but they 
still secured 95 out of 99 seats, leaving only four seats to third parties. In 
particular, the Alliance had to settle for only two seats despite winning 18 per 
cent of the vote. Like Social Credit in the past, the Alliance could not win 
enough seats to threaten the two parties’ stranglehold. The unexpected change
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of the electoral system to a mixed electoral system was not a direct outcome of 
the rise of new parties creating increased deviation from proportionality. Even 
in 1993 the two-party system looked fairly sustainable.
Third party politics in New Zealand
Yet in the post-war period there were third parties which drew voters* attention, 
with the initial momentum provided by Social Credit, the only consistent third 
party since it had been set up in 1953. The party’s best electoral performance 
before the 1978 election was in 1966 when the party gained 15 per cent of the 
vote, winning one seat. But the growth of Social Credit support in the 1960s 
ended in a one-off surge because its support decreased after the 1966 election. 
Its electoral fortunes revived in the 1978 election, and Social Credit support 
reached its peak in the 1981 election when the party won two seats but barely 
dented the two-party oligopoly (Aimer, 1992: 328).
Table 7.4. Non-major parties in New Zealand and their electoral results (%)
minor parties established 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993
Social Credit1 1953 16.1 20.7 7.6 5.7 1.7
Values 1975 2.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
the New Zealand Party 1984 12.3 0.3
Christian Heritage 1989 0.5 2.0
NewLabour 1990 5.2
Greens 1990 6.9
Alliance2 1993 18.2
NZ First 1993 8.4
Source: Norton (1988); Vowles etal. (1995: 42).
1 - the Democratic Party since 1985
2 - The Alliance included NewLabour, the Greens, Democrats, Liberals, Mana Motuhake.
Apart from Social Credit, the Values Party was the only party competing in 
elections before the 1980s. Based on increasing public concern about the
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environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Values was set up in 1972. 
However, the party won only 2 per cent of the votes and no seats in the 1972 
election. Until the 1978 election, the Values competed with Social Credit for 
the third party status, but thereafter lost their momentum. When the popularity 
of Social Credit dramatically dropped after 1981, a New Zealand Party (NZP) 
was formed in 1983. Trying to attract National voters, NZP won relatively 
good results in 1984 (gaining 12 per cent of the vote) in spite of failing to win 
seats. However, the New Zealand Party faded from existence once Labour 
committed itself to the market liberal agenda and National was forced to follow 
suit (Mulgan, 1994: 242).
Anticipating a new electoral system which is favourable to non-major 
parties, many new parties have been launched since the 1987 election. Those 
formed up to 1993 fell into two broad categories: splinter parties and 
ideological or one-issue oriented (cause) parties (Catt, 1995). Social Credit and 
the Values party were examples of cause parties. Social Credit advocated 
monetary reform while Values raised environmental issues. The Green Party 
was set up in 1990 replacing the defunct Values, winning 7 per cent of vote in 
the 1990 election. Another new cause party was the Christian Heritage Party. 
Advocating policies based on the Bible and strong family values, this party 
gained 5 per cent of the vote in 1990.
A more striking feature is the creation of splinter parties breaking away 
from one of the major parties. Between 1978 and 1993, three splinter parties 
were formed by sitting MPs: NewLabour, Liberal and New Zealand First (Catt, 
1995). The NewLabour Party was formed by former Labour MP, Jim Anderton 
in protest at Labour’s monetarist policies, in particular the sale of such state 
owned assets as the post offices and the Bank of New Zealand. The Liberal 
Party was created by two MPs who left the National Party in 1991. New 
Zealand First is also a splinter party formed by former National MP, Winston 
Peters and appealing to National supporters who felt betrayed by the Bolger 
National Government (Mulgan, 1994: 241).
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While third party succeeded in breaking through the two-party dominance in 
New Zealand under plurality rule the German-style ‘mixed member 
proportional’ electoral system first used in the 1996 election created quite 
different conditions for party politics. As seen in Table 7.5, no party secured 
an overall majority and the number of effective parties in the legislature 
radically increased to four, double previous levels. To form a government 
therefore required a coalition between parties, which gave a third party (or 
parties) the balance of power and substantial influence on the policy-making 
process. It seems very unlikely that two-party dominance could be maintained 
under the new election rule, so that third parties will continue to play a key 
role.
Table 7.5. Election result in the mixed member system (1996)
party number of seats share of votes (%)
National 44 35
Labour 37 28
New Zealand First 17 13
Alliance 13 10
ACT1 8 6
others l2 8
Total 120 100
Source: The Economist (19 October 1996), pp. 89-92.
1. the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers
2 .  United Party
7.2. SOCIAL CREDIT AND ITS SUPPORT
Compared with other third parties in New Zealand, Social Credit had a long 
history. When its support began to rise, it was not a new party. This section 
analyses the background of Social Credit and its pattern of support in the 1978 
and 1981 elections.
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The revival of Social Credit
The origin of Social Credit dates back to a monetary reform movement in the 
1930s, influenced by the monetary reform ideas of Major Clifford Hugh 
Douglas. His ideas for monetary reform made more impact on Canadian and 
New Zealand politics than on politics in England where they originated. The 
basic idea of the Social Credit movement focused on a shortage of purchasing 
power for available goods.
Payment made to individuals involved in the process of production - 
wages, salaries, and dividends, classified as “A” payments - were 
not sufficient to buy what was produced, the price of which was the 
sum of A payments and “B" payments, made to other organizations 
for raw materials, bank charges, and so on. The “gap” was made up 
by privately created credit, giving banks and financiers control over 
the capitalist system. Douglas proposed the creation of an 
independent credit authority to make good the “gap” through a 
system of “just prices” and “national dividends” to be paid to all 
citizens (James, 1980: 149-50. Emphasis in the original).
The ideas of the Social Credit movement spread quickly among New 
Zealand farmers who were in trouble during the depression. The Social Credit 
Association in the 1930s was concerned with the study and propagation of the 
writings of Major Douglas, alerting the public to the danger inherent in 
orthodox economics, and setting out Douglas’s positive proposals for monetary 
reform (Miller, 1989: 244). The movement developed in 1932 and 1933 and 
attracted a large number of small farmers, particularly in the North Island, the 
district of the Auckland Farmers Union.
In Canada, the Social Credit movement developed into an extreme, 
populist, right-wing political philosophy.
The core of the philosophy, while placed the Social Credit party on 
the extreme right of the political spectrum, consists in a strong
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opposition to many of the basic trends of modern industrial society...
The ills of capitalist society, according to the doctrine, cannot be 
traced to the system of private ownership, but to the control of the 
financiers over the economic system, and to their restriction of credit 
and production. The financiers- and then the Jews - could, therefore, 
easily become the scapegoats of the movement (Pinard, 1975: 11-2).
By contrast, the Social Credit movement in New Zealand did not become an 
extreme movement. Even though the movement was basically a right-wing one, 
the Labour Party found some parallels to its beliefs in Social Credit’s diagnosis 
of the ills of capitalism. Thus, Labour capitalised on the Social Credit theory 
for its electoral campaign in the 1935 election. Labour wanted to attract the 
critical anti-socialist vote in the small towns and the countryside by diluting its 
strong image with the Douglas credit theory, even absorbing two Douglas credit 
candidates into its own ranks (James, 1980: 150). Most Social Creditors at that 
time also saw the Labour Party as an effective vehicle for the implementation of 
their financial proposals (Miller, 1989: 244). However, when the Labour 
government introduced some policies adapted from Social Credit theory, the 
Social Credit movement lost momentum.
The Social Credit movement revived in 1953 when the Social Credit 
Political League was formed as a political wing of the Social Credit 
Association. Those who wanted to set up a political party believed that ‘direct 
action provided the only hope for the movement’s survival’ (Miller, 1989: 
245). In its first election in 1954, Social Credit won 11 per cent of vote, but 
failed to gain seats. In the 1966 election, Social Credit succeeded in winning a 
seat with 15 per cent of the national vote. However, Social Credit failed to 
retain the seat in the next election, and its electoral support then decreased 
election after election. The party was beset by serious internal conflicts and 
defection, and in the 1975 election Social Credit on 7 per cent support was in 
danger of losing its third-party status to the Values Party, which won 5 per cent 
of the vote. Social Credit’s political fortunes dramatically revived after the
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party leader, Bruce Beetham’s unexpected by-election victory in Rangitikei in 
February 1978. Under Beetham’s leadership, Social Credit had its heyday, 
gaining 16 per cent of votes nationally in 1978 and 21 per cent in 1981.
Patterns of Social Credit support
Social Credit voters were geographically concentrated in the North Island, 
especially in rural farm regions. As seen Figure 7.1, Social Credit was the most 
popular with voters in rural areas in the North Island at each contest. By 
contrast, Social Credit did not win so much support in the South Island, 
especially in urban areas there. This distribution of support is in a striking 
contrast to that of the Values Party, which was concentrated in metropolitan 
New Zealand, and weakest in rural areas (Johnston, 1992: 39). Interestingly, 
Social Credit support showed some continuity with long historical roots:
Its strongest support came in the regions where it had been strongest 
in the 1930s - the Waikato, the western Bay of Plenty, and 
Northland, all in the northern half of the North Island - and in the 
small-farmer regions of Taranaki, which for several reasons had 
resisted the 1930s tide. These area and, later, neighbouring 
Rangitikei, created a belt of Social Credit strength in the north and 
west of the North Island (James, 1980: 151).
However, this link does not necessarily mean that the revival of Social 
Credit was dependent heavily on the legacy of the Social Credit movement of 
the 1930s. As Miller pointed out, the party’s appeal transcended the narrow 
regionalism and sectionalism of the 1920s and 1930s, and Social Credit 
candidates frequently attained high support in the neighbouring small towns 
while polling strongly in the dairying community (Miller, 1989: 246-7). And in 
spite of the similarity of the regional pattern of support, Social Credit support 
during the 1970s and 1980s was not limited within a traditional geographical
239
boundary. As seen in Figure 7.1, Social Credit support in the 1978 and the 
1981 elections increased across the country.
Figure 7.1 Average vote for Social Credit by types o f residential areas
30
N.city 
N. rural20
N.town
S.city 
S. rural
10
S.town0
1975 1978 1981 1984
Source: computed from Miller (1989: 247. Table 2).
N : North Island 
S : South Island
The pattern of support for Social Credit by age was clearly distinguished 
from those of the two major parties. Social Credit was more popular with 
young people than the elderly (see Table 7.6). In the five surveys over five 
years, more than 50 per cent o f support for Social Credit came from young 
voters under 34 years old. By contrast, elderly voters preferred the two major 
parties. One newspaper called Social Credit ‘an emerging, young persons’ 
party’ (The New Zealand Herald, 25 July 1981). Their support for Social 
Credit had little to do with the Social Credit movement in the past, since the 
young generation certainly had no memory or experience o f the 1930s 
movement.
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Table 7.6. The popularity of Social Credit by age
Age Nov 78 Nov 79 Nov 80 Nov 81 Nov 82
18 to 24 23 32 31 30 30
25 to 34 27 26 26 23 25
35 to 44 16 12 15 17 16
45 to 54 16 10 13 14 14
55 and over 18 20 15 16 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: survey polls by NRl-The New Zealand Herald (6 Dec 1978; 21 Dec 1979; 9 Dec 1980;
Nov 14 1981; 18 Dec 1982).
Secondly, Social Credit was more likely to support in National areas, than 
in areas where Labour supporters formed a majority. As Table 7.7 shows, 
Social Credit mustered more votes in National seats than in Labour seats by 6 
per cent in 1978. Even with the increase of Social Credit vote in 1981, this 
difference in share of votes between National and Labour seats remained the 
same, 6 per cent.
Table 7.7. Social Credit’s share of vote where the two major parties won
seats won by S.C. vote in 1978 (%) std dev 1978 N
National 18 7.3 51
Labour 12 3.9 40
seats won by S.C. vote in 1981 (%) std dev 1981 N
National 23 8.6 47
Labour 17 5.8 43
Source: computed from Norton (1988).
The correlation coefficients between the three parties in Table 7.8 also 
indicate that Social Credit vote was positively related to the National vote at 
each election. That is, where National won much support, Social Credit was 
also likely to win votes.
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Table 7.8. Correlation coefficients of electoral support between the three 
parties
1978
National Social Credit
National 0.25
Labour -0.83 -0.67
1981
National Social Credit
National 0.24
Labour -0.77 -0.71
Source: computed from Norton (1988). 
N = 92.
Table 7.9. Winning parties in the constituencies where Social Credit ever won
Constituency \ year 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87
East Coast Bays - - - N N N SC SC N
Hobson N SC N N N - - - N
Pakuranga L L L N N N N SC N
Rangitikei N N N N N SC SC N N
N - seat taken by National party;
L - seat taken by Labour party;
SC - seat taken by Social Credit 
Source: extracted from Norton (1988).
The correlation coefficient between Labour and Social Credit is almost as 
negative as that between Labour and National. Where Labour was strong, 
Social Credit candidates (as well as National candidates) did not gain much 
support. Social Credit also won its only four seats in traditional National 
constituencies, which returned to National control once Social Credit’s support 
waned, and also its four by-election victories (see Table 7.9). Social Credit 
never secured a single seat from Labour. The regional variations in Social 
Credit support between rural areas in the North Island and the other areas is 
also related to the regional patterning of major party support. Labour was 
relatively weak in the North Island rural region while Labour was strong in
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urban areas (Johnston, 1992: 32-37). So the regional pattern of Social Credit 
did not overlap with Labour’s support.
This pattern of support for Social Credit is similar to that found in the 1954 
election when the party competed for the first time. Then Social Credit attracted 
dissatisfied voters with National government’s performance.
Support for the Social Credit Political League came from the right 
rather than the left....As the major issue in the 1954 general election 
was the cost of living question, it seems reasonable to view the Social 
Credit vote as largely an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
National government’s handling of the economy and the persistence 
of inflationary trends (Berendsen, 1973: 71).
7.3. VOTERS’ CHOICE AND SOCIAL CREDIT
New Zealand voters were almost entirely ignorant of the existence of Social 
Credit as a political entity until the late 1970s. Then, the popularity of Social 
Credit abruptly rose and people began to recognise it as an alternative. This 
section looks at the reasons for the sudden rise in Social Credit support.
Social Credit as a centrist party
The fact that Social Credit attracted more supporters from the right-wing 
National party is seemingly associated with ideological disposition of the Social 
Credit movement, which contained a strong right-wing ideology. Even though 
the doctrine severely criticised the ills of capitalism, it also advocated 
individualism, morality based on the Anglo-Saxon Christian tradition, and 
strong hostility to collectivism and the growing encroachment of bureaucratic 
control. As was true in the Canadian case, the Social Credit movement could 
carry an extreme right-wing ideology, verging into anti-Semitism because of
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Douglas’s distaste for money dealers. In New Zealand Social Credit ideas were 
generally considered conservative on most matters and right wing on some 
(James, 1980: 153).
Miller suggested a similar image for the Social Credit party. By analysing 
the occupational distribution of candidates between 1954 and 1987, he argued: 
Many of the non-farming occupations were in farm-related and 
weakly-unionised industries located in small towns, thus producing a 
convergence of economic interests between town and 
country....(Social Credit) remains predominantly a rural and country- 
town party....(Social Credit) is fundamentally a party of the small 
entrepreneur (Miller, 1989: 247-9).
Figure 7.2. Perceived ideological position of parties (1981)
Left (-1.00) Centre(O.OO) Right (+1.00)
J______________________ I
Labour Social Credit National 
(-0.44) (+0.05) (+0.53)
Source: computed from Bean (1984: 218).
However, many voters did not see the third party as a right-wing party, in 
spite of its ideology and the general image of the Social Credit movement. As 
seen in Figure 7.2, by 1981 Social Credit was perceived as a centrist party. Its 
location along the ideological scale was almost exactly in the centre between the 
two major parties. Like the centrist image of the Unification National Party 
despite its strong pro-business policy position (see Figure 6.6 in Chapter VI, 
p.214), New Zealand voters too perceived this right-wing party as being in the 
middle, and were apparently indifferent to, or ignorant of, Social Credit’s 
ideological position.
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In addition, Social Credit supporters are not easily classified in terms of 
class politics. The occupation of Social Credit candidates was evenly 
distributed: manual workers (25 per cent), farmers (21 per cent), administrative 
and sales personnel (18 per cent) and self-employed small business people (17 
per cent) (Miller, 1989: 247). Bean suggested that Social Credit voters showed 
‘no distinctive class base overall’ in contrast to clear patterns of support for 
National and Labour party.
Its strongest support, at least in urban areas, comes from ‘‘skilled” 
manual workers but this advantage is offset by the antipathy of their 
“ semi-skilled” colleagues (Bean, 1984: 302).
Social Credit’s image as a ‘centrist’ party and its lack of a distinctive class 
base both seem contradictory to the finding that the party gained more support 
in safe National seats. Two points can be made in this context. First, the 
centrist party image might mean that the party (by avoiding a clear right wing 
policy line) did not establish support on its own in terms of class politics. 
Second, the discrepancy between the perceived image and the policy position of 
Social Credit implies that voters did not pay much attention to Social Credit’s 
policy position or ideology. Miller argued that Social Credit was established as 
a party of principle (Miller, 1989: 252). However, Social Credit’s policies 
were not taken seriously by many voters. Some voters cast the ballots without 
recognising its philosophy or monetary reform policy.
Rather, voters fed up with the previous party needed a place to give vent to 
dissatisfaction, and Social Credit provided such place for them. As Mulgan 
pointed out:
People who voted for minor parties do not necessarily wish to 
support the party’s programme. They may simply be registering a 
negative ‘protest’ vote against the two major parties, intending to 
indicate that they would prefer to vote for one of the major parties 
but feel unable to do so...They could therefore use their vote mainly
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to send a negative message of no-confidence to the major parties 
(Mulgan: 1994: 242).
Because Social Credit was seen as an acceptable vehicle for such voters, while a 
traditional party was not satisfactory, it could also come to be seen as centrist.
Social Credit and Protest voting
The discrepancy between the Social Credit’s policy position and its perceived 
image may result from its lack of committed voters. Failing to build up its own 
distinctive class base of support, Social Credit depended more on protest voters: 
The core Social Credit vote is low...Only 2 percent of the voters 
interviewed in the 1978 Heylen survey had voted Social Credit in 
three consecutive elections... Social Credit attracts a less stable and 
less integrated voter than the other parties.... Social Credit voters in 
the 1960s were much more likely to give negative than positive 
reasons for voting for the league....There was no significant 
difference between the proportion of switchers to National and to 
Social Credit who said that the economy and party philosophy were 
elements of policy that had influenced them most. These findings 
suggest that, though there is a core of Social Crediters who believe to 
a greater or lesser extent in the party’s monetary reform policies, the 
bulk of the league’s votes at any time are protest votes (James, 1980:
162)
Table 7.10 is based on a survey carried out a few months before the 1981 
election. When asked their main reason for party choice, nearly two fifths of 
those who intended to vote for Social Credit cited ‘protest’. The percentage of 
‘protest’ increased among those who had switched their party support to Social 
Credit. By contrast, its policy appeal did not look persuasive. While the two 
major parties had established strong images on policies (general and specific), 
the influence of Social Credit policies was relatively low. In particular, the
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percentage of respondents citing ‘specific policies’ as reasons for backing Social 
Credit, which may be the monetary reform policy, was quite low - only 8 to 9 
per cent.
Table 7.10. Main reason for party choice, a pre-election survey in 1981
a) all respondents (%)
reason for party choice National
supporters
Labour
supporters
Social Credit 
supporters
general policies 45 41 30
specific policies 9 19 9
competence 14 10 10
leaders 18 7 9
protest 2 6 38
habit 7 14 1
local factors 2 2 1
other reasons 3 1 2
b) people who had switched from one party to another since 1978 (%)
reason for party choice change to 
National
change to 
Labour
change to Social 
Credit
general policies 41 34 20
specific policies 6 17 8
competence 12 3 12
leaders 33 13 9
protest 8 21 44
habit 0 0 1
local factors 0 12 2
other reasons 0 0 4
Source: The Auckland Star (15 July 1981).
The characteristics of protest voting were even more visible in safe seats - 
particularly National ones. In a study of a safe National rural area, Helensville, 
Kay reported that the major reason for changing party preference was 
dissatisfaction and disenchantment. Many of the dissatisfied National voters
247
switched to Social Credit in the 1978 and the 1981 elections (Kay, 1984). This 
finding also suggests that support for Social Credit came from negative reasons.
However, once the reasons to provoke protest are solved, then protest 
voters are likely to return to the traditional fold. Figure 7.3 demonstrates the 
lack of durability of its support. The figure is based on a survey conducted a 
few months before the 1984 election. From late 1982, the popularity of Social 
Credit began to decline in the wake of the controversial Clyde Dam decision.
Figure 7.3. Shift of voting intention in a survey poll
35% 1981 Social Credit 
voters
21%
1 f  i
16%
r
28%
National Labour
Source: The New Zealand Herald (10 March 1984).
As seen in Figure 7.3, only just over a quarter of Social Credit voters in 
the 1981 election remained ‘loyal’, over a third decided to vote for one of the 
two major parties, and a further third intended to shift to the newly launched 
New Zealand Party, again located on the right-wing party but with little else in 
common with Social Credit in terms of policy positions and philosophy. Thus 
even at its peak
it was the party, not the platform that was winning the votes, and 
there was probably an element of truth in the opinion....that “Such 
limited success as Social Credit has achieved... would have been 
achieved by any other organised third party” (Beredsen, 1973: 66).
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The efficacy of Social Credit
If Social Credit support depended heavily on protest voting and voters did not 
take serious considerations of its policy position and philosophy, any party 
could be a beneficiary of protest voting. What suddenly made Social Credit a 
viable alternative?
By-election victories:
By-election victories often provide a good opportunity for third parties to gain 
support. Since voters in by-elections need not choose a party for government, 
they are freer to express dissatisfaction with government performance. During 
the 1975 Parliament, there were four by-elections. Labour retained its two seats 
in by-elections while National succeeded in retaining one seat, losing the 
Rangitikei seat to a Social Credit candidate, Bruce Beetham. The Rangitikei by- 
election was the last by-election before the 1978 general election, after more 
than two years of the National government. East Coast Bays was the only 
National constituency out of the four by-elections during the 1978 Parliament 
and National lost the seat to Social Credit whereas Labour succeeded in 
retaining the other three seats in the period.
About the Rangitikei victory, James analysed: 
the by-election came at a time when the Government’s failure to hold 
down rapidly rising costs and contain strikes in the meat-freezing 
industry, which processed much of the electorate’s agricultural 
produce, made the Government majority particularly vulnerable to a 
protest vote by farmers and farmer-dependent small townspeople 
(James, 1980: 156-7).
Thus, according to James, the basic reason for the Social Credit victory in the 
by-elections was ‘mid-term blues’. Table 7.11 shows that support for Social 
Credit in Rangitikei suddenly rose by 12 per cent, mainly at the expense of the 
National party. In the East Coast Bays by-election Social Credit support grew
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by nearly a quarter. The National candidate gained slightly more votes in 
comparison with the previous general election. However, it seems reasonable 
to interpret that the National vote in the 1978 general election was effectively 
split between two candidates - National and National Alternative. (In 1975, the 
National majority in East Coast Bays was 24 per cent of the local vote.) If the 
voters for the National Alternative in 1978 were previously National 
supporters, the by-election result shows that Social Credit drew down the 
potential total National vote.
Table 7.11. Social Credit’s by-election victories
1) Rangitikei_______________      [%]
Nat Lab S.C. Values others
1975 general election (Nov 75) 47 14 36 2 1
by-election (February 1978) 39 11 48 2 0
difference -8 -3 +  12 0 -1
2) East Coast Bays___________     f%l
Nat Lab S.C. Values others
1978 general election(Nov 78) 35 27 20 2 17*
by-election (September 1980) 38 18 43 1 -
difference +3 -9 +23 -1
Source: Norton (1988) New Zealand Parliamentary Election Results 1984-1987. 
* National Alternative
Often a by-election victory helps to enhance the public image of non-major 
parties, by drawing more media attention to a third party than winning one or 
two additional seats in a general election when who governs is an overriding 
concern. Before the Rangitikei by-election, Social Credit’s ratings usually 
stayed at around 10 per cent or less, but Figure 7.4 shows that followed 
Beetham’s Rangitikei by-election victory the party’s rating more than doubled. 
Another sharp rise of popularity in late 1979 happened just after the 1980 East 
Coast Bays by-election victory, when Social Credit popularity rose from 19 per 
cent in July to 31 per cent in November.
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Figure 7.4. Changes o f party popularity between May 1976 and December 
1984
50-
40-
20-
Q - sc
Nat
Lab
N ov 78 Nov 80 Nov 82 Dec 84N ov 76
N ov 77 N ov 79 N ov 81 Dec 83
Source: computed from survey polls by NRB-the New Zealand Herald 1976-1984.
Party Leadership - Bruce Beetham :
In major parties their leaders are potential heads of government. Even though a 
third party leader is very unlikely to become Prime Minister, its leadership also 
plays an important role in attracting support. People do not recognise much 
about detailed policy position of a third party, but a popular party leader could 
keep drawing the media’s attention, as was the case of Social Credit:
Leadership orientation appears to assume greatest importance to 
voters in the absence o f strong party affiliations, and also may serve 
on occasions to override party preferences. Significant too is the 
substantial influence leadership orientation may have in causing 
certain voters to change allegiance after a long history o f support for 
one party (Bean, 1981: 19).
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Social Credit depended heavily on Bruce Beetham’s personal popularity. 
The Rangitikei by-election victory was owed to his personal popularity rather 
than a popular party image: ‘The league’s campaign centred around Beetham. 
Posters and advertisements showed a large photograph of Beetham and urged 
voters simply to “Give him a go” ’ (James, 1980: 157). After the by-election 
victory, Beetham’s much-reported appearances in Parliament also helped keep 
Social Credit in the news (James, 1980: 157-8).
Table 7.12. Most favoured leader in a 1981 survey
overall among party  
switchers since 1978
among incoming 
voters since 1978
Muldoon (Nat) 26 8 24
Beetham (S.C.) 26 50 27
Rowling (Lab) 17 8 15
Muldoon and Beetham 8 12 6
Muldoon and Rowling 2 2 2
Beetham and Rowling 11 10 11
all three equal 4 5 4
don’t know/ n.a. 6 5 11
Source: The Auckland Star (16 July 1981).
Table 7.12 shows a survey about approval of party leaders in 1981 when 
Beetham’s popularity reached its peak, placing him ahead of the then 
Opposition leader, Rowling. Amongst those who equally favoured two leaders, 
Beetham received the most favourable rating of the three party leaders. A half 
of those who changed their party allegiance since the 1978 election favoured 
Beetham most. He was also popular with young voters who became eligible to 
vote since 1978. Given that Social Credit’s popularity (24%) was behind both 
National (36%) and Labour (26%) in the same survey (The Auckland Star, 16 
July 1981), Table 7.12 apparently shows that Beetham’s personal popularity 
was Social Credit’s main political asset. In fact Social Credit was frequently 
dubbed a ‘one-man band’, with good reason.
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Table 7.13 also confirms Beetham’s favourable images, focusing on his 
general personality (approved by 32 per cent) and competence (27 per cent). By 
contrast, negative images were mainly related to his party and its policy 
platform, which account for a third of reasons given for his having an 
unfavourable image. The results suggest that Beetham established a favourable 
image even among those who did not like Social Credit’s policy position.
In fact, Beetham tried to build a new party image by replacing the old, 
negative image of Social Credit harping on about monetary reform policy, often 
jeered at as ‘funny money’. ‘Under Bruce Beetham’s leadership, efforts were 
directed both at removing the old “ funny money” stigma generated by the 
centrality of monetary reform doctrines and at providing the party with a more 
eclectic set of policies’ (Miller, 1989: 254). Despite of his efforts, Table 7.13 
indicates that the negative image of his party was not largely wiped out.
The personal popularity of a leader may be effective in enhance a party’s 
public rating in the short term. However, it is also very risky when the main 
attraction of a party comes from personal popularity rather than support for a 
common set of principles, because leadership popularity is more volatile than 
committed support for a set of core values. If a leader makes a wrong decision, 
the party as a whole, not just the leader him/herself, is likely to blamed. Social 
Credit became too identified with Beetham himself.
Table 7.13. Favourable and unfavourable image of Beetham
Reasons for favourable image of 
Beetham
Reasons for unfavourable image 
of Beetham
harmony 11 aggression 3
strength 6 lack of strength 9
sincerity 15 lack of sincerity 14
general personality 32 general personality 9
competence 27 lack of competence 15
party/policy 4 party/policy 34
group association 1 group association 0
other 5 other 15
Source: extracted from Bean (1984: 385, Table 10.4).
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The 1981 election created a situation in which the government majority was 
just one seat. The National Party won 47 seats, Labour 43 seats, and Social 
Credit two seats. When elected as party leader, Beetham announced that 
‘balance of responsibility’ would be the immediate parliamentary goal (Miller, 
1992: 321), a term which seemed to stress playing a pivotal role in a balanced 
situation between the two major parties. In 1977 the Ministry of Electricity had 
applied for the necessary water rights to build a dam on the Clutha at Clyde, 
and take water for generating electricity. Then, a successful judicial appeal 
against the government decision was made, and the National government 
needed a parliamentary majority to guarantee the legislation. The Opposition 
was against the high dam option. A National MP declared that he would vote 
with the Opposition, and so the Government majority was quite shaky. This 
proved to the critical case that needed ‘balance of responsibility’ in Beetham’s 
terms. However, in exchange for certain guarantees the two Social Credit MPs 
changed their position from favouring a low dam option to voting for the 
government bill (about the Clyde Dam controversy, see Miller, 1989: 255; 
Wood, 1988: 140-1).
Table 7.14. The effects of the Clyde Dam deal on public opinion ratings for
Social Credit and Beetham (per cent approval)
Feb 82 May 82 Nov 82 Apr 83 Dec 83
Beetham1 13 9 9 4 3
Social Credit1 19 19 18 9 8
Social Credit2 20 19 14 8 8*
Clyde Dam deal (July 1982)
Source: 1. polls by NRB-the New Zealand Herald, 1982-83.
2. Heylen Polls, 1982-83.
* November 1983
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Beetham’s decision over the Clyde Dam Bill soon turned out to be very 
costly. Social Credit’s rating in the opinion polls began to drop in the wake of 
the decision. As seen in Table 7.14 (and Figure 7.4), a few months after the 
Clyde Dam deal the ratings for both Social Credit and Beetham dropped sharply 
to less than half their previous level, indeed the party’s base-level before 1978. 
Once the party lost public support in this fashion, neither Beetham nor Social 
Credit could recover from the loss. The decline of its popularity triggered the 
formation of another new party, the New Zealand Party, which further 
undermined Social Credit’s support.
As Miller (1992: 321) pointed out aptly:
It proved to be a hard lesson on the costs of trying to exercise the 
balance of power, for the decision provoked derision from Labour, 
strong criticism from interest groups and the press, and earned the 
minor party little gratitude from the government. But the two MPs 
had also put the party’s credibility to the test of public opinion. The 
results were decisive ... The party’s popularity was further eroded by 
a gradual restoration of public faith in the Labour Party and the 
emergence of a rival minor party, the New Zealand Party, in 1983. 
However, it was the Clyde Dam decision which had been the catalyst 
for the party’s irreversible decline.
Thus both the sudden growth and the precipitate fall in support were largely due 
to Beetham himself.
7.4. TACTICAL VOTING AND SOCIAL CREDIT SUPPORT
Actual voting for Social Credit was not much related to party identification. As 
shown in Table 7.15, less than half of Social Credit voters in the 1981 election 
identified themselves with the party they voted for. By contrast, the two major
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parties relied much on attached support, with seven out of eight National voters 
identifying with their party, and over three quarters of Labour supporters were 
identified with Labour. This contrast suggests that Social Credit support was 
fairly shaky. Besides, the category of ‘others’ could also mean those who were 
dissatisfied with both the two major parties, given the solid two-party politics. 
The fairly high share of identifiers with ‘others’ among Social Credit voters 
also suggests that Social Credit depended on those who were not satisfied with 
the two-party politics, rather than consolidating its own supporters.
Even though Social Credit tended to attract protest voters with negative 
reasons, some voters could choose the party for tactical reasons. Inverse tactical 
voting for Social Credit seems to have risen in 1981 after its big rise of support 
in 1978. Beetham’s popularity then flew so high that the party looked suddenly 
more viable, and its vote share actually increased by 5 per cent in 1981. Table 
7.15 suggests that Social Credit was a beneficiary of tactical voting. Given the 
National government and the pattern of Social Credit support, tactical situations 
seem more obvious among Labour identifiers. With the minor role of Social 
Credit in national politics, Labour would have been a more effective vehicle to 
‘get National out’ if its local candidate had looked likely to win. However, in 
safe National constituencies Social Credit appeared more viable, which led 
some Labour supporters to vote tactically for Social Credit. Social Credit had a 
net gain from tactical voting. Social Credit won 43 from those who were 
identified with the two major parties, and lost only 8. Among Labour 
identifiers, Social Credit attracted 17. But there was an outflow of 5.
Table 7.15. Voting choice different from party identification (1981)
voted for National Labour Social Credit
party identification (%)
National 87 5 13
Labour 2 78 9
Social Credit 1 1 47
others 10 16 31
(N) (503) (710) (195)
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Source: computed form NZ voting survey, post-election survey 1981.
Table 7.16 confirms such a tactical situation which some former Labour 
voters faced. The table below sets out a regression analysis between Social 
Credit support and changes in other parties’ shares of votes between 1978 and 
1981 in the National seats. Social Credit support tended to increase where the 
National’s lead over the Labour was strong in 1978. (The estimate of NatLab78 
is 0.33). That is, the larger was the National’s majority in a constituency, the 
better Social Credit fared in 1981. This result coincides with the previous 
finding that Social Credit won more votes in safe National constituencies (see 
also Table 7.10). It is interesting that Social Credit support in the National seats 
was inversely associated with the change of the Labour’s share of vote between 
1978 and 1981. The relationship is quite strong (its estimate is -0.96), 
suggesting that some former Labour voters in National seats shifted to Social 
Credit in 1981 when the third party enjoyed high popularity. Given the low 
likelihood of Labour’s winning in the safe National seats, this pattern could be 
understood as a result of ‘inverse tactical voting’. (The estimates in the Labour 
seats do not statistically fit well.)
Table 7.16. Regression coefficients of Social Credit support in National seats
estimate
a 16.03
Nat8178 -0.03
Lab8178 -0.96
NatLab78 0.33
r2 0.38
F 8.86
SC = a + fa Nat8178 + fa Lab8178 + fa NatLab78 
SC : the Social Credit share of vote in 1981 in a constituency
Nat8178 : the change of the National’s share of vote between 1978 and 1981 in a constituency 
Lab8178 : the change of the Labour’s share of vote between 1978 and 1981 in a constituency 
NatLab78 : the difference of the share of vote between the National and Labour candidate in a 
constituency
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Tactical voting can be more conspicuous in a by-election in which voters 
tend to make a more straightforward choice. Besides, a third party is more 
likely to win by-elections, especially against a government party, as in the 
Rangitikei by-election.
The much greater drop in Labour support in Rangitikei than in other 
similar seats where Social Credit was not so well placed suggests that 
many Labour voters supported Social Credit as the best means of 
getting National out of the seat - a “tactical” rather than a “protest” 
vote (McCraw, 1979: 59).
Thus, tactical voting for Social Credit, especially from former Labour 
supporters contributed not only to gaining its initial momentum of support but 
also to helping to enlarge its electoral support in general elections (in particular, 
in the 1981 election).
7.5. ABSTENTION AND SOCIAL CREDIT
New Zealand has been well-known for the high rate of turnout in elections. 
Even though the long-term trend of turnout rate is clearly downward (Vowles 
and Aimer, 1993: 42), the lowest rate of the turnout was 82 per cent in the 
1975 election, which is still considerably high compared with other countries. 
In the 1978 and 1981 elections which this study covers, turnout rates were 85 
and 89 per cent respectively.
In spite of the usually high national turnout rate, National supporters still 
generally go to the polls more than Labour supporters. Table 7.17 shows that 
the turnout rate in the National constituencies was higher than in the Labour 
constituencies by 2 per cent. Given that Social Credit tended to gather more 
votes from former National voters, Table 7.17 suggests that Social Credit was 
likely to fare well where the turnout rate was relatively high. The difference of
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the turnout rate between National and Labour seats increased in safe 
constituencies to about 6 per cent - because the turnout rate fell by a 
considerable margin in safe Labour constituencies.
Table 7.17. Turnout rates in safe constituencies (1981)
seats safe seats*
mean std dev cases mean std dev cases
National 91.3 1.6 47 91.7 1.5 24
Labour 89.4 9.0 43 86.1 12.0 21
Source: computed from the official election result of the 1981 general election.
Because of its inaccuracy, the turnout rate of the 1978 election was not included.
* The safe seats are where there has no turnover of seat or where just one turnover occurred 
between different parties during 1946-1975. The constituencies with more than four elections 
were counted.
However, a rise in third party voting can also occur in tandem with 
abstention. As MaCraw (1992: 520) found in the New Zealand 1990 election, 
‘a strong movement to non-voting accompanied the move to the minor parties’. 
Table 7.18 shows a similar finding of the relationship between non-voting and 
third party support. The estimates show the effects of the turnout rate on Social 
Credit support (as well as non-major party voting). The estimates for ‘non­
major parties’ indicate that support for them in general was inversely associated 
with the turnout rate, irrespective of who won seats.
Table 7.18. Turnout rate and Social Credit support (regression estimates)
Social Credit Non-major parties
National seat Labour seat National seat Labour seat
Intercept 211.2 1.46 237.0 48.4
Turnout -2.07 0.16 -2.33 -0.32
r2 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.15
SC =  a + b* Turnout 
a : intercept
SC : the Social Credit vote share in a constituency 
tu rn o u t: the turnout rate in a constituency
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The ‘all third parties’ indicates the vote share of all parties but the National and Labour 
candidates.
However, there is a clear difference between the National seats and the Labour 
seats. In the National seats, Social Credit (as well as non-major parties) was 
likely to win support where the turnout rate was low. The association between 
Social Credit (and non-major parties) votes and the turnout rate is very strong. 
(The estimates are -2.07, and -2.33 respectively.) By contrast, such a 
relationship is less salient in the Labour seats.
Given that Social Credit fared better in the National seats, the difference in 
the pattern of the relationship appears meaningful. Even though the turnout rate 
was usually a little higher in the National seats, Social Credit support tended to 
rise in the National constituencies with relatively low turnout rates. As the 
quality-satisficing approach suggests, both third party voting and abstention are 
responses to dissatisfaction. The results in Table 7.18 also suggest that non­
voting can be accompanied by a rise of third party support generally.
7.6. CONCLUSION
In a stable two-party system, it is difficult for a third party (except regionalist 
parties) to establish solid support on its own. As the sudden collapse of Social 
Credit shows, the once high popularity of Social Credit depended largely upon 
floating voters, rather than committed and consistent supporters. As Chapman 
pointed out, ‘Social Credit is indeed a revolving door, filled and emptied afresh 
at each election’(1976; quoted in Kay, 1984: 106).
In spite of its inherently right-wing ideology linking back to Douglas’s 
Social Credit movement, many New Zealand voters saw the Party as in the 
middle, suggesting that they did not pay serious attention to its policy positions, 
which were not likely to be implemented. An unexpected by-election victory
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and the fresh image of its leader, Bruce Beetham provided a temporary resting 
place for those who were disaffected with the National Government but were 
reluctant to support Labour. Therefore, Social Credit won better results in safe 
National constituencies. Once Social Credit gained momentum, it mustered 
protest vote against the National government across the country as well as 
attracting some tactical voting from former Labour voters. Failing to establish 
its support, however, the third party could not ‘break the mould*. As McCraw 
(1979: 59) said: ‘Social Credit then poses no threat to the present party system. 
Rather is it an integral part of the system, playing the role that any third party 
would find thrust upon it*.
The fairly high popularity which Social Credit enjoyed during 1978 and 
1981 was closely associated with its leader, Beetham’s personal popularity. As 
a leader of a small parliamentary party which had only one or two MPs, 
Beetham played a remarkable role in enhancing the party’s image by using his 
personal political assets. However, when his personal popularity declined, the 
party support also dropped. The demise of Social Credit dramatically 
demonstrates how volatile is support for a third party under a plurality rule 
electoral system. The strictly ‘limited’ success of Social Credit also reflects the 
fact that switching between major parties in New Zealand was a much more 
realistic choice for dissatisfied voters than in Britain, despite the ideological 
differences between the two major parties. This relative flexibility of party 
choice in New Zealand served as another obstacle hindering the further 
development of the Social Credit support despite some surges in popularity.
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Chapter VIII
CONCLUSION: 
THIRD PARTY SUPPORT UNDER PLURALITY RULE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In contemporary social science the hardest of all tasks is often to relate empirical 
evidence to theoretical propositions in a way which can illuminate both. A great 
deal of the most commonplace criticism of public choice focuses on the weakness 
(or even the complete lack) of empirical testing (Green and Schapiro, 1994). 
Theoretical apparatuses of great complexity are elaborated, it is said, but never 
tested. Or tests are conducted not to cast doubt upon the intellectual paradigm 
being used, so much as to facilitate the addition of bolt-on modifications to theory, 
which then make the models fit ‘the (stylised) facts’, but in an ad hoc way. To 
avoid these criticisms, Chapter in  set out an extensive theoretical apparatus, 
which then informed the empirical investigations undertaken in Chapters IV to
v n
However, in an exploratory study of this kind there are some considerable but 
unavoidable logistical difficulties in relating the empirical analysis to the 
theoretical framework. The case study chapters necessarily relied on existing 
sources of electoral study and opinion poll data. The inclusion or framing of 
particular questions differed a good deal from country to country. And even using 
other data sources, such as aggregate data analysis of constituency voting 
patterns, there was some inevitable variation in the availability (and reliability) of 
information on possible independent variables. Perhaps most important of all was 
the rather poor coverage of third party voting patterns and party dynamics in the 
existing secondary literature. Across all four countries the coverage of third 
parties in academic work is disproportionately small compared with the literature 
on the history, organisation and political dynamics of the major parties.
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None the less the material analysed here is considerably more extensive than 
previous work on third parties, and it seems important to try and draw lessons 
from it in a more general and comparative mode than was feasible in the country 
chapters. The first part of the chapter goes to summarise some circumstantial 
conditions behind the rise of third party support which the satisficing-model 
suggests. The second section then looks at the complexities of third party 
strategies under plurality rule systems. The third part of the chapter looks at ten 
aspects of third party politics initially highlighted as important in Chapter in , and 
seeks to systematically compare and contrast the experience of the four parties 
analysed in the empirical chapters on these aspects. The final part opens into a 
topic which goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but for which our findings raise 
some interesting questions - namely the ‘rationality’ of third party leadership 
altogether.
8.1. PLURALITY RULE SYSTEMS AND THIRD PARTY SUPPORT v
This research began with some empirical evidence against ‘Duverger’s law’, which 
emphasises a relationship between electoral systems and the consequences. Even 
though Duverger (and many other political scientists later) paid attention to the 
restraining effects of a plurality rule electoral system, the rise of third party voting 
illuminates that plurality rule systems also create some favourable circumstantial 
conditions. Here some common circumstantial characteristics behind the ‘success’ 
of the four cases of third parties are summarised in light of implications suggested 
by the quality-satisficing model.
Firstly, the rise of third party support is closely related to widespread 
dissatisfaction against a (government) party. As shown in Chapter III, the quality- 
satisficing approach assumes that support for a centrist third party rises when the 
quality of a traditional party drops below the aspiration level. That is, 
‘dissatisfaction’ is a key condition for the rise of third party support. The four 
empirical cases confirm that public dissatisfaction towards a (government) party 
provides a favourable condition for third parties.
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It is not surprising that the four third parties attracted more support from 
previous voters for a government party, given that a government party is more 
vulnerable to criticism. In Britain, the Liberal Democrats during the period 
covered tended to absorb unhappy Conservative voters with the unsatisfactory 
handling of the Conservative government particularly with some ‘Labour issues’. 
In Canada, support for the NDP was related to the level of support for the 
Conservatives. Particularly in 1988, the NDP drew much support from those who 
took a different position from the Conservative’s on the FT A. From the outset, 
support for the UNP in South Korea was closely related to widespread public 
discontent towards existing political parties in the wake of the merger into the 
Democratic Liberal Party. The UNP depended much upon former DLP voters. 
Similarly, the initial momentum of Social Credit support came from a victory in a 
by-election which often reflects public dissatisfaction towards a government party 
or ‘mid-term blue’.
Secondly, the characteristic mentioned above partly explains why support for 
the four endogenous third parties is neither consistent nor stable (and why some 
third parties are short-lived). In fact, as the name of protest voting itself implies, 
the usefulness of third party support under plurality rule electoral systems is rather 
‘instrumental’. Except a small number of core supporters, most voters for a third 
party cast ballots without serious commitment to it. Because third party support 
is basically a ‘response’ to the decline of quality of a major party (as assumed in 
Chapter III ), it is a passive and reactive choice - a sort of mixtures of voice and 
exit options in Hirschman’s term. Thus, when the lapse of a major party is 
recovered, third party support will run out of steam.
The major problem of the British Liberals is that the Party lacks consistent 
voters over elections, as the ‘hotel party’ model suggests. Even though the Liberal 
Democrats showed a fairly stable pattern of support since the 1983 election, the 
survey results show that only a small proportion of them continued to choose the 
Party in the consecutive elections. Canadian voters are fairly volatile, and the 
considerable amount of NDP voters changed their party allegiance over elections. 
Besides, the UNP of South Korea was short-lived. Like the sudden success of the
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Party in the 1992 election, it faced an abrupt demise in the wake of the departure 
of the party leader, which demonstrates the Party’s lack of self-sustainability based 
on sold support. Similarly, support for Social Credit leapt up almost from nowhere 
with a by-election victory, and it abruptly waned in the wake of the miscalculated 
decision of the party leader. It turned out that Social Credit did not consolidate its 
support, either.
Thirdly, regional variation of party support creates a favourable condition for 
third party support in conjunction with the immobility of party choice. As the 
model in Chapter III suggests, a centrist party can appear as an alternative to a 
locally dominant party A when local voters are not satisfied with party A, 
replacing a rival major party at the national level. Even though a centrist third 
party attracts support from voters on both sides of the spectrum (by protest voting 
and inverse tactical voting), the third party depends more on voters on one side 
due to the skewed distribution of party preferences of the local voters. In fact, the 
rise of third party support is not indifferent to polarisation of party support under 
plurality rule electoral systems.
In Britain, the Liberal Democrats drew support where the Conservatives were 
strong like south England. Even though the Liberal Democrats did not win as 
much support in strong Labour regions, the affinity of Liberal issues close to 
Labour’s seemed to appeal in the Conservative regions. In New Zealand, regional 
polarisation of party support is not much visible. But Social Credit tended to win 
more support in safe constituencies (especially in safe National constituencies).
The model in Chapter III only assumed a party competition based on the 
ideological cleavage between left and right. However, the logic of third party 
support in that model is able to apply to the other two cases of Canada and South 
Korea by replacing the ideological rivalry with regional cleavage. Neither the UNP 
and the NDP was directly involved into the regional rivalry developed in each 
country, and as a result, each of them was probably perceived as being in the 
middle along the regional cleavage. The pattern of support for both the UNP and 
the NDP was apparently divided between regions. In Canada, the NDP, 
irrespective of its ideological propensity as a leftist party, was viable particularly in
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the western provinces (and in Ontario with a lesser extent) while the Party 
remained unpopular in French Canada, Quebec. Similarly, when the regional 
rivalry between Cholla and non-Cholla regions was developed in South Korea, the 
newly launched Unification National Party was free from it by default. 
Nevertheless, the UNP attracted support from non-Cholla regions only where the 
ruling DLP politically relied.
8.2. ELECTORAL NICHES OF THIRD PARTIES: THE COMPLEXITY 
OF THIRD PARTY STRATEGIES
The empirical evidence of this thesis suggests that voters use third parties to signal 
dissatisfaction with performance to the major parties, to prioritise issues which 
their traditional party has neglected, to try and secure tactical outcomes, to convey 
more meaning than simple abstention - and these features are present in varying 
combinations in all the cases. But many different features of each party’s situation 
influenced its chances, and there are different combinations of electoral ‘niches’ 
across the four cases. The main components of third party strategies which were 
influential in the cases studied were: ideological positioning; efficacy enhancing; 
leadership images; local adaptation; capitalising on dissatisfaction. These are in 
effect factors which helped the four parties to enhance their viability as an 
alternative. There is a common logic to the ways in which these factors influenced 
third party voting, a logic which also seems well captured by the quality-satisficing 
account. Each is discussed in turn.
Ideological positioning:
We have seen that the cumulative evidence across all four cases tends to support 
the directional model’s argument that the ideological centre-ground is not a very 
important or effective position of advocacy. Third parties are inherently 
disadvantaged compared with major parties in trying to organise their appeal 
around policy platforms, for because their chances of implementing anything are
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very low rational voters will simply not pay much attention to where they stand, or 
view it as a particularly important part of how they assess the party. Indeed in 
both New Zealand and South Korea voters assessed Social Credit and the UNP as 
being centrist parties, even while their policy platforms in objective terms were 
clearly aligned on the right. Even in Canada, the NDP has tried to blur its initial 
left-wing positions over time, by adopting a moderate-reform position close to 
centre-left Liberal positions. The Liberal Democrats in Britain have similarly 
invested great efforts in trying to define a ‘radical’ agenda with zero success. 
Voters place them in the middle and associate them with moderation.
Ideological positioning is more important for third parties in terms of what it 
rules out than in terms of positively attracting voters. Adopting strong policy 
positions or social group associated with the dominant cleavage pattern separating 
supporters of the major parties from each other is clearly inadvisable for an 
endogenous third party, such as those covered here. Their policy commitments are 
instead mainly chosen with a view to maintaining unimpeded access to the 
diversity of niches - major party supporters who are dissatisfied on issues or 
performance, tactical voters, protest voters, maybe some marginal abstainers - 
which, as seen above, it is essential for viable endogenous parties to cultivate.
Where the third party draws support more from dissatisfied supporters of 
major party A (rather than its rival B), it may be rational for the third party to 
mirror some aspects of B’s policies - as the Liberal Democrats do in the UK, 
where they provide a vehicle for Tory supporters to express dissatisfaction on 
welfare issues which are mainly ‘owned’ by Labour. In this case this linking also 
fits closely with strategies to enhance the party’s viability by stressing its local 
council successes and record. Similarly the UNP targeted DLP supporters 
discontented with the previous merger and economic performance, while also 
trying to pick up DP supporters outside the Cholla region.
Enhancing efficacy:
Perhaps a more important element of third party competition strategies was their 
efforts to seem viable to voters, to convince them that the efficacy of supporting a
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third party was not prohibitively low. The Liberal Democrats and the NDP were 
able to draw on past successes, especially expanding their support regionally in 
areas where they had already won seats. In Britain the party’s local council base 
proved a key means of overcoming the tendency for tactical voting outflows in the 
Liberal Democrats’ areas of strength, and linked closely with their only reasonably 
distinctive issue associations, championing ‘Labour’ issues in Tory areas. And the 
Liberal Democrats won better results overall where the party controlled local 
councils (Johnston and Pattie, 1993: 202). The long-term split between voters 
allegiances in federal and provincial politics detracts from the same kind of linkage 
in Canada. In a federal state a province is an integral unit of politics so that a 
political party in a province can survive without relying on the federal wing of the 
party. However, the relationship between provincial politics and federal election 
results cannot be completely denied. The pattern of the NDP support was largely 
similar between federal and provincial elections, with the party tending to win 
more support in federal elections where the Party did well in provincial elections. 
For example, in British Columbia the NDP voters are fairly consistent at both 
levels, and 64 per cent of the NDP voters there chose the same party at both tiers 
of elections (Dyck, 1991: 599; 613, Endnotes 96). By contrast, the NDP was 
unpopular even in provincial politics in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces where 
the party has stayed weak in federal elections. For the UNP the association with 
the Hyundai Group was important in allowing the party to establish itself from 
nowhere as a credible choice, attracting support from a sixth of the electorate - 
and without that linkage the party collapsed in 1993. Social Credit had no such 
additional props, however, relying more on leadership image and semdipity in by- 
elections to sustain its surge.
More generally third parties are uniquely dependent upon campaign effects 
compared with the major parties, with awareness and recognition of the parties 
rising sharply in election run-ups, especially where broadcast media rules mandate 
equitable allocations of coverage across parties, as in Britain, Canada and New 
Zealand. The UNP also attracted voters’ attention by its business-style campaign. 
The simple ‘reminder’ effect of the campaign, in drawing voters’ attention to these
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parties’ continuing existence and reminding them of the acceptable features of 
their issue positions (if not so much their positive attractions), was important in all 
the countries studied. Again this temporary recognition factor made all the parties’ 
performances respond heavily to additional stimuli, such as presentable or 
personable leaders and by-elections.
By-elections are important for third parties because the constraints on major 
party voters’ allegiances created by concerns over government policy and the 
possible victory by the rival major party are suddenly loosened, and the scope for 
both inverse tactical voting and protest voting both dramatically expand. This 
effect was most important for the British Liberal Democrats, where it 
strengthened recognition of the party with periodic dramatic victories and helped 
underpin the party’s efforts to represent itself as an efficacious choice. In New 
Zealand, the initial by-election victory was also critically important for Social 
Credit because it breached the major party monopoly in Parliament, and helped 
trigger the surge of support from discontented National supporters and Labour 
tactical voters, an effect then sustained in the next term.
Leadership images:
The unique constraints under which third parties operate - with their policy 
positions not well known amongst voters; their efficacy as a voting choice always 
precarious; their dependence on diverse ‘niche markets’ for support, often in 
tension with one another; and their dependence on campaign periods or 
exogenous shocks to enhance voter recognition - all these traits mean that a 
favourable leadership often plays an important role in winning votes. Sometimes, 
indeed, the image of the party is identified with the image of the leader, as with the 
UNP and Social Credit, so much that neither party could survive without them. 
The NDP’s good years in the 1980s were also strongly associated with impressive 
media performances by its leader, whose personal popularity exceeded his party 
popularity, and partly contributed to the party’s electoral fortune. In Britain, the 
effects of major party leadership is rather indirect (Crewe and King, 1994: 125- 
147), but for the Liberal Democrats a somewhat strengthened effect was visible,
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especially in the immediate run-up to the general election. However, as Clarke et 
al. suggested, the effect of leaders will essentially last for a short term (1979: 231- 
238). Party support based on personal popularity cannot be easily consolidated so 
that it is quite volatile. For a time an effective third party leader can hold together 
the contradictions of appealing in multiple directions to differently motivated 
groups of voters, and can sublimate voters’ worries over their party’s efficacy in 
admiration for their personal qualities. But it is a hard act to sustain over a period 
of leadership succession.
Local adaptation:
A more permanent and long-term strategy used successfully by the Liberal 
Democrats and the NDP, and important in the short-term for the UNP and Social 
Credit, is to vary the ‘face’ which the party presents across regions in relation to 
the kind of support it seeks there. Thus the Liberal Democrats stress moderate 
anti-Conservative sentiments in the Tory heartlands to attract dissatisfied protest 
voting Tories reluctant to go all the way over to backing Labour, and Labour 
tactical voters anxious to breach the Conservative regional monopoly. But in 
Labour heartland regions, the Liberal Democrats capitalise on anti-Labour 
discontents, perhaps dissatisfactions with its leadership, and try to attract Tory 
tactical voters anxious to have more of an effect locally. And the strategy works: 
as Table 8.1 shows, identifiers with both of the two major parties tend to see the 
Liberal Democrats as closer to their own party respectively by a considerable 
margin, although the effect is stronger amongst Conservative supporters.
Regional adaptation also works but in a different way for the NDP. Since 
Canada is a federal state, the political or economic interests of a province do not 
always correspond to those either of the federal government or of other provinces. 
So the provincial branches of the NDP have always had some autonomy to adapt 
policies to their local climate, and their policy positions were sometimes at 
loggerhead with those of the federal NDP. The provincial wings of the NDP also 
look after recruitment of party members, however, so that their positions were 
generally invulnerable.
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Table 8.1. Closeness of Liberal Democrats by party identification (%)
Conservative identifiers Labour identifiers
Lib-Dem closer to Con 54 36
Lib-Dem closer to Lab 30 51
No difference/Neither 16 12
N 645 500
Source: calculated from BES92.
The answers of ‘Don’t know/Not answered’ are excluded here.
The flexible third party approach is possible for several reasons. Adaptation 
strategies can work successfully partly because of the importance of locally-set 
reputations for voters’ assessment of third party efficacy, while the aspiration 
levels of influence which people seek to achieve are also set by local circumstances 
(but collectively) in the quality-satisficing view. And there is little risk of 
unfavourable repercussions nationally. The mass media do not pay much attention 
to issues raised by a third party, and voters are not also interested in policies 
which are unlikely to be implemented. Thus, a third party’s platform is vaguer and 
less constraining, and especially if it is perceived by voters as centrist it will be 
capable of differing interpretations in different areas. In turn a centrist third party 
leader is relatively free from ‘purist’ ideological disagreements within the party 
because the centre position does not serve as a distinct political pole in a two- 
party system. In addition their diminutive representation under plurality rule often 
makes parliamentary party splits or rival leadership bids very rare. So third party 
leaders can pursue a less staunch policies without being embroiled in serious 
internal feuds, and third parties are more dependent on their leadership to counter 
the numerous disadvantages.
C apita lising  on dissatisfaction:
The final strategic necessity for third parties is to be able to prevent the 
combination of dissatisfaction with the major parties and immobility across major
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party boundaries from converting into simply greater abstention, since the quality- 
satisficing approach suggests theoretically that abstention is closely connected 
with third party support, as does some of the evidence reviewed earlier in this 
chapter. Having an inoffensive ideological position, locating off the main lines of 
social cleavage dividing the major parties, being perceived as centrist, enhancing 
the perceived efficacy of supporting them, varying their message across different 
major party heartlands, having a convincing leader, and being sustained by a 
favourable flow of events (like by-election victories) all contribute to third parties’ 
ability to keep people turned on to voting, and converting some of them into 
supporters (for a time). And here too third parties under plurality rule have one 
special advantage compared with their major party rivals - clean hands and 
deniability for past mistakes. Their very exclusion from power becomes an asset, 
upon which they can capitalise, and the criteria which voters will apply to them are 
more weakly defined as a result. For example, in South Korea the third party quite 
successfully claimed efficacy on the basis of its leader’s record as a single­
organisation leader, while critiquing the government leadership for problems in 
national economic management:
The UNP campaign was geared to differentiate Chung from his 
opponents in his ability to manage the economy. For positive 
campaigning, the achievements of the Hyundai Group...were widely 
publicised, while for negative campaigning the dismal economic record 
of the Roh government and the inexperience of the two Kims (Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) in government were heavily criticised. 
(K-Y, Lee 1994: 763).
This uniquely favourable situation can lead to voters’ forming almost unrealistic 
views of third party leaders’ personalities and competencies. For example, among 
Social Credit supporters in 1981:
Of these, 75% see him [the party leader, Beetham] as honest (7.1 % 
disagree), 72% see him as understanding of other people’s problems,
92% see him as intelligent and capable, 72% see him as a good leader 
and 94% as an asset to the league (Auckland Star, 23 September 1981).
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The public disllusionment which followed Beetham’s first major act influencing a 
public policy outcome, the Clyde Dam decision, was also extensive precisely 
because voters had little previous information to go on. In the new context 
Beetham could no longer realise ‘the mandate of dissatisfaction’. Beetham’s 
decision to vote with the government was seen as ‘an act of betrayal’ (Miller, 
1985:213).
8.3. THIRD PARTIES AND THE QUALITY-SATISFICING APPROACH:
THE SOURCES OF THIRD PARTY SUPPORT
The central themes of the quality-satisficing approach to analysing party 
competition were: first, the importance of both ideological positioning and 
perceived efficacy in determining how electors cast their ballots; and second, the 
need for an integrated explanation of how citizens express a wide variety of 
reasons and motives in their votes, ranging from positive support for parties (core 
support), through tactical voting; protest voting; and non-voting. Among the most 
distinctive elements of this framework were the insistence on mixtures of ‘exit’ 
and ‘voice’ options available to citizens, the importance of regional and local 
situations in structuring different kinds of behaviour, and the stress on citizens 
assessing the ‘efficacy’ of their actions not against some objectively defined 
measure (such as ‘pivotality’) but against a community-defined aspiration level 
(which is itself adapted to the context of elections).
Many of these elements have not directly been ‘tested’ in a strict hypothetico- 
deductive sense by the empirical analysis, nor could they necessarily be so tested 
even in a much better-resourced study. Theoretical frameworks of the kind set out 
in Chapter III are partly heuristic, drawing their usefulness from their ability to put 
together previously separated empirical phenomena and show how they are 
(potentially) related. The analysis in Chapters IV to VH is congruent with, and 
illuminated by, the more theoretical propositions in Chapter III. But it is important 
to stress that the case studies also demonstrate the existence of a considerable
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range of variation in the characteristics of viable third parties under plurality rule. 
There is no ‘identikit’ model, even of the kind of basically-centrist-perceived 
endogenous third party explored here. Instead, the empirical chapters show that 
there are a wide range of electoral market niches possible, each responding to 
different amounts and versions of the same common set of influences set out in 
Chapter HI.
Table 8.2 sets out ten kinds of influences which the quality-satisficing model 
highlights as potentially significant for third-party performance, and then in 
summary fashion shows how the situation facing the Liberal Democrats, the NDP, 
the UNP and Social Credit varied along this dimension. (For the broader 
institutional similarities and variations in the constitutional, electoral system and 
party system influences between the four countries, see Chapter I). In the rest of 
this section, we shall briefly discuss each of the ten aspects (using the same 
numbering as in the table).
la: The major party cleavage pattern is important in defining the kind of niche 
which will be available for an endogenous third party to exploit. Once a primary 
line of social cleavage is defined and developed historically, major parties will find 
their ability to assemble an electoral coalition limited in some significant respect, 
and a third party will find a ‘social space’ into which it can move and hope to 
attract support, if it can overcome the basic problem of low efficacy under 
plurality rule. In the UK and New Zealand the primary social cleavage in political 
terms was occupational class, and as its salience declined and class structures 
changed, so the available niche expanded. In Canada and South Korea the basic 
cleavage was along regional lines, but in both cases this pattern was cross-cut by 
additional dimensions of major party differentiation - the development of 
brokerage politics in Canada, producing periodic recombinations of electoral 
coalitions spilling over the normal boundaries of major party appeals; and the 
resonance of older cleavages in South Korea, plus the efforts by political elites to 
manipulate voters’ choices (especially the formation of the DLP).
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Table 8.2. Ten kinds of influences which the quality-satisficing model highlights
on third party performance
Lib-Dem NDP UNP Social Credit
la cleavage 
pattern 
separating 
major parties
class region 
(mixed - 
brokerage party 
system)
region 
(mixed with pre- 
democratisation 
cleavage)
class
lb immobility o f  
party choice
low switching 
between Con and 
Lab 
(about 5 %y
high 
switching 
between Lib and 
Con
(18-22%y
moderately high 
switching 
between DLP and 
DP
(about 15%)’
low switching 
between Nat and 
Lab (potentially 
flexible) 
(about 7%)'
lc spatial 
organisation o f  
major party  
voting
gradual
polarisation
regional rivalry/ 
fluctuating with 
‘brokerage 
parties’
regional rivalry/ 
less consolidated 
in non-Cholla 
regions
fairly stable 
pattern, half of 
seat ‘safe’
2a net gains from  
tactical voting
break-even negative break-even positive
2b tactical voles 
as a share o f  
third party  
support
17 % 2 11 % 2 12-21%5 9-22 % 5
2c seat-winning 
benefits o f  
tactical voting
medium 
(higher in south 
west)
medium 
(higher in the 
West)
medium 
(more in Seoul- 
Chungbu)
low
(scattered across 
the country)
3 protest voting 
as a share o f  
third party  
support
4 6 -5 0 % 3 around 60 % 3 around 40 % 3 50-60 % 5
4a turnout levels 
and trends
high/stable high/stable high/declining 
rather rapidly
very high/ slightly 
declining
4b party fortunes 
and local 
variations in 
turnout
inversely related 
to change of 
turnout rate 
(Southern 
England, 1992)
inversely related 
to turnout rate 
(Quebec, 1988)
inversely related 
to change o f 
turnout rate 
(Seoul- 
Chungbu,1992)
inversely related 
to turnout rate 
(particularly in 
National seats, 
1981)
5 the universe o f  
non-major 
parties
SNP, 
Plaid Cymru, 
Greens
Reform (1988) PNPR,
Minjungdang
Values
1. percentage o f both major parties’ voters switching between them across elections
2. proportion o f tactical voters flowing into a third party to its total number o f voters in the survey
3. tentative estimate
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lb :  The ‘im m obility  ’ o f  m ajor p a r ty  choices  was a key influence upon the success 
potential of all the third parties covered. In the UK and New Zealand major party 
voters were most divided from each other, most reluctant to switch directly from 
one major party to another. In the periods covered by this study, only 5 per cent of 
major party voters in Britain swapped allegiances directly in this manner, and in 
New Zealand around 7 per cent did so. Nonetheless, there was a significant 
difference between the two countries, with only 10 per cent of Conservative and 
Labour voters expressing a second preference for the other main party (see 
p. 120), compared with a level of about 45 per cent in New Zealand (see p.229), 
implying at least a greater potential for flexibility across major party lines in New 
Zealand. In South Korea about 15 per cent of DLP and DP voters altogether 
switched directly between these two major rivals in the period 1987-92 
(specifically from the 1987 presidential election to the 1992 legislative election) - 
but this apparently higher level may reflect the influence of the DLP merger. In 
Canada in the 1980s between 18 and 22 per cent of major party voters switched 
between the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives (PC), reflecting the much 
higher levels of ‘trading’ between the major parties produced by brokerage 
politics, overlaying the basically fairly stable pattern of regional/ethnic alignments. 
A larger change (particularly among former Conservative voters) occurred in the 
period 1988-93, with the PC’s collapse and the Liberal surge (see Clarke e t  
a l ,  1996: 28).
lc :  The spa tia l organisation o f  m ajor p a r ty  vo ting  had important implications for 
third parties, especially the relative importance of safe one-party dominated seats 
and major party marginals. In Britain, the rise of the Liberals/Alliance took place 
at the same time as the number of major party marginals more or less halved (from 
the late 1950s to the early 1980s), although there are a mixture of cause-and- 
effect influences at work here. Of course, major party marginals were less 
common as the third party’s vote share swelled, but in addition the dwindling
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number of two-party marginals helped facilitate the third party’s growth, by 
reducing the incentives for ‘mainstream’ tactical voting and increasing the 
incentives for ‘inverse’ tactical voting. In New Zealand around half of all seats in 
1978 and 1981 had been won four times in a row by one or other of the two major 
parties, whereas the remainder had alternated between them at least once - a fairly 
stable pattern. In South Korea, the DLP merger inaugurated a new pattern which 
could not be known in detail by citizens, strengthening the DP hold on Cholla but 
not consolidating the DLP as much as its political leaders had hoped and expected.
Table 8.3. Swings of major party support in Canada (1984-1988)
Leeds-Grenville Northumberland
1984 1988 change 1984 1988 change
Con 61.4 38.9 -22.5 Con 60.6 41.1 -19.5
Lib 23.4 43.4 +20.0 Lib 25.6 41.1 +15.5
NDP 14.0 11.1 -2.9 NDP 12.6 14.4 +1.8
others 1.2 6.6 +5.4 others 1.2 3.5 +2.3
Bruce-Grey Perth-Wellington-Waterloo
1984 1988 change 1984 1988 change
Con 61.0 40.9 -20.1 Con 55.8 39.1 -16.7
Lib 24.5 38.9 +14.4 Lib 28.5 37.0 +8.5
NDP 14.1 19.0 +4.9 NDP 15.5 19.0 +3.5
others 0.4 1.2 +0.8 others 0.2 4.9 +4.7
Source: selected from Eagles et al. (1991).
In Canada, the assessment of safe seats and marginal seats is especially difficult 
because at a constituency level it is quite common to see fluctuations in major 
party voting patterns (reflecting brokerage politics playing on top of the 
regional/ethnic cleavage) which are far greater than those encountered in the other 
systems. For example, Table 8.3 shows patterns of party support across four 
Conservative constituencies which were seemingly ‘safe’ in 1984, showing swings 
of major party support ranging from 12 to 21 per cent in the 1984 and 1988 
elections (both of which produced Progressive Conservative majorities nationally). 
The level of change in the 1988-93 period was appreciably greater again.
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2a: Net gains from tactical voting consist of the balance between ‘mainstream’ 
tactical voting, where people decide to use their votes efficaciously and avoid 
‘wasting’ their ballots, creating an outflow from third party voting in plurality rule 
conditions; and ‘inverse’ tactical voting, where people decide to choose a less 
efficacious party at national level which none the less has a better chance of 
winning or being in contention locally, which creates an inflow of support for third 
parties especially in safe seats for major party A where supporters of major party 
B may be attracted. The data presented in the empirical chapters is necessarily 
rather tentative because of the small numbers generated using questions about 
tactical voting or ‘real’ preferences, but they provide a useful indicator:
Table 8.4. Estimated gain/loss from tactical voting
party inflow (A) outflow (B) A/B
Lib-Dem (1992) 80 90 0.89
NDP (1988) 29 76 0.38
UNP1 (1992) 50 52 0.96
UNP2 17 17 1.00
Social Credit3 (1981) 43 8 5.38
Social Credit4 17 5 3.40
[unit: number o f cases
1: shift of ‘non-identified’ voting between UNP and all the other parties 
2: shift of ‘non-identified’ voting between UNP and DP only 
3: shift of ‘non-identified’ voting between Social Credit and the two major parties 
4: shift of ‘non-identified’ voting between Social Credit and Labour only
Source: computed from BES92 for the British case; PSC88 for the Canadian case; KES92 for the 
South Korean case; NZ post-election survey, 1981 for the New Zealand case.
As shown in Table 8.4, the Liberal Democrats lost almost as many votes in 
1992 through tactical voting outflows as they specifically attracted through 
‘inverse’ tactical voting, a pattern which also applied to the UNP in South Korea 
in the 1992 elections. The NDP clearly lost many more tactical voters in 1988 than 
it attracted, by a ratio of about 5:2. For Social Credit in 1981 the data suggest an 
even more healthy benefit, but may be a one-off anyway.
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2b: Tactical vo tes as a  share o f  th ird  p a r ty  support obviously depends somewhat 
on how tactical voting is addressed in the election studies, and there is a variation 
in questions used across the countries. Nonetheless the available data suggest that 
in Canada the NDP’s dependence on this source was actually less than the other 
parties covered, with tactical voters amounting to only one in ten of the party’s 
supporters in 1988. The Liberal Democrats were more reliant on this source, 
which constituted a sixth of their support in the 1980s elections. The UNP also 
relied on tactical voting for about a eighth to a fifth of its support in 1992 (but 
again the overall changes in party politics produced by the DLP merger and the 
democratic transition are relevant here). Lastly, at its peak in 1981 about a tenth 
to a fifth of Social Credit’s supporters’ might be labelled as tactical voters.
2c: The sea t-w inning  benefits o f  tactica l vo ting  again varied considerably, 
responding to the patterning of major party support. In the UK and Canada the 
Liberal Democrats and NDP respectively both benefited from tactical voting in 
terms of winning seats, losing support in major party marginals where they anyway 
could not be in contention, but gaining it otherwise ‘safe’ areas where they could 
capitalise on dissatisfaction with the incumbent major party. In South Korea, 
tactical voting seemed to have a more mixed impact. In Chungbu tactical voting 
was most noticeable, the UNP’s vote share was highest and the party won seats - 
as it did to a lesser degree in Chungchong and Kyongsang. Social Credit failed to 
benefit from tactical voting in terms of winning seats, in spite of the clear net gain 
from ‘inverse’ tactical voting.
3: The im portance o f  p ro test vo ting  is difficult to gauge directly in some of the 
cases, and perforce the best method of getting some fix on it is to consider it 
alongside evidence of each third party’s ability to attract ‘core supporters’ (who 
are solidly committed to the party’s principles and vote consistently for it), and 
tactical voters (see above). If these two groups could be accurately measured 
(which is in fact tricky to do), then the residual group of third party voters might
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plausibly be interpreted as protest voters. However, in some cases it may be easier 
to gauge protest voting directly from survey responses, and to at least cross-check 
different estimates. The results for our four cases, seen in Table 8.2, should be 
regarded as at best indicative.
Perhaps a quarter to three tenths of the Liberal Democrats’ voters can be 
regarded as core supporters (in the sense of voting consistently for the party 
across quite long time intervals), with further a sixth being inverse tactical voters, 
suggesting that between two fifths and a half of their voters are protest voters. 
However, the fluctuations in observed Liberal Democrat support levels over time, 
both nationally and at constituency level, show a greater consistency of support in 
the period since the mid 1970s than this estimate would suggest.
For the NDP again between a quarter and three tenths of their supporters seem 
to be core voters, with only around a tenth to an eight of their support being 
tactically motivated, leaving a large group - around three fifths of their supporters 
in the 1980s elections - to be classed as possible protest voters. The assessment of 
the UNP’s core support is difficult, since the party de facto existed for a year. 
However, as noted in Chapter VI, its support was quite stable in this period. 
Around two fifths of its supporters seem to choose the UNP for the reasons of 
protest, and just over a fifth seem from their responses to be tactical voters who 
really felt closer to other parties (such as DP supporters outside Cholla). These 
estimates leave about a third of the UNP supporters as ‘core’. The Social Credit 
support approximately doubled at the height of its surge in 1981, but then lapsed 
back to pre-1978 levels. But even in the wake of the disastrous Clyde Dam 
decision above a quarter of former Social Credit voters intended to stick with the 
third party (see p.246), suggesting the share of ‘core’ supporters. Given that 
around a tenth to a fifth gave tactical considerations, a half to two thirds of the 
party’s voters seem to be protest voters.
4a: Turnout levels and trends provide an important broad context for third party 
voting, because in Chapter El we argued that protest and tactical voting are 
closely linked with decisions about abstention. Like the major parties, third party
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leaders are well aware that small conversions of non-voters into supporters can 
have far-reaching impacts on election outcomes, but the importance of combatting 
abstentions is more salient for the lower efficacy parties. In plurality rule systems 
generally the range is from low but stable in the USA at just over 50 per cent to 
high and stable in New Zealand at well over 80 per cent (where turnout was also 
historically very high). Britain and Canada both have medium to high turnout rates 
(around 70 to 75 per cent), and despite gloomy forecasts of declining participation 
in fact these levels have been stable over time. In South Korea, by contrast, 
although turnout levels in 1992 were at 72 per cent, they were clearly falling from 
their immediate post-transition levels.
4b: The link  between th ird  p a r ty  fo r tu n e s  a n d  loca l variations in  turnout can be 
important. The Liberal Democrats in Britain fared better in areas with higher 
turnout, but these were generally safe Tory seats. The relationship between third 
party support and changes  in turnout, however, was as the quality-satisficing 
model suggests, namely that the Liberal Democrats’ 1992 vote was inversely 
related to the change in turnout between elections. A very similar finding was 
established for the UNP - its support was higher in high turnout areas, but was 
inversely related to the change of turnout from 1988 to 1992. In New Zealand the 
support for Social Credit was negatively related to turnout in National seats, and it 
is not feasible to assess the relationship between changes in turnout and the party’s 
support because of deficiencies in the 1978 data. In Canada, as shown above 
(p. 184), support for the NDP and third parties generally was mildly negatively 
related to turnout in Quebec in the period covered, but this situation may be a 
rather specific one.
5. The *u n iverse ' o f  non-m ajor p a rtie s  denotes whether the endogenous parties 
studied here (which are perceived as centrist by voters in three of the four 
countries) have rivals or competitors for the support of citizens who have been 
detached from support for the major parties. In Britain the Liberal Democrats 
faced two established exogenous third parties (the SNP and Plaid Cymru) who
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fare relatively well under plurality rule but have never ‘broken through’ in their 
regions, and one minor party (the Greens) who has yet to win a seat. In Canada 
there were no national third parties in federal elections, and competition was 
limited to the regionally-based parties (for example, Social Credit in the west and 
Quebec), until the intervention of the Bloc Quebecois in 1993, at which time the 
right-wing Reform Party was also suddenly won many seats - with a few minor 
parties in addition competing in many seats nationally without success. In South 
Korea the UNP had only one national rival in 1992, the PNPR, which fielded 111 
candidates, won less than 2 per cent of the vote and elected only one legislator 
(their party leader). A left-orientated minor party, the Minjundang, won less than 
2 per cent support and no seats. In New Zealand there has been a somewhat 
turbulent third party picture (despite the major parties’ virtual monopoly of seats) 
since the ‘success’ of Social Credit. By contrast, there was only one rival to 
Social Credit. In 1978 the Values party attracted under 3 per cent of the vote and 
no seat.
8.4. THE RATIONALITY OF THIRD PARTIES UNDER PLURALITY 
RULE
The major question in this study has been why rational voters have so extensively 
and consistently supported political parties which under plurality rule elections not 
only cannot win, but cannot even come close to being proportionately represented. 
The logic of restricting attention to endogenous third parties in Chapters I and II 
is, of course, that exogenous parties can still be relatively successful in their 
campaigns to convert votes into seats, whereas endogenous third parties have not 
been and apparently cannot be similarly successful.
Our answer falls into two connected parts, the theoretical explanation set out 
in Chapter III, and the empirical findings given in Chapters IV to VII and 
summarised above. We probably need to move away from framing public choice 
accounts in terms of voters who are overwhelmingly concerned with being
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decisive (or even significantly influential in objective terms) in large collective 
decisions (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995). Dunleavy (1996) suggests an alternative 
possible criterion around which collective actions might be structured, which he 
sums up as ‘having a useful effect’. The content of this criterion is none the less 
left almost undescribed, except in the most formal or skeletal terms. By contrast, 
the approach put forward here in Chapter III offers a much more specific model of 
the ways in which groups of voters in localities and regions define a (realistic) 
aspiration level for participation in collective processes, and then structure their 
resulting behaviour around it. The empirical analysis shows that conclusively 
establishing the utility of this framework is not feasible in a single exploratory 
study of this kind, but that the evidence meshes well with framework, and 
powerfully suggests that for third party voting at least it draws together and 
integrates into one account a great deal which is otherwise left to ad hoc 
explanation.
The logic of third party support is not simple, but diverse - a set of different 
logics and motivations which vary from group to group within the populace, from 
zone to zone along the ideological spectrum, and from place to place in 
geographic terms. The (endogenous) third party is a vehicle for discontents, a 
temporary home for tactical voters (who may then become gradually more 
integrated over time), an acceptable substitute for protest voters, a better way of 
abstaining almost for marginal voters. But the role and importance of such parties 
is no less important and interesting, no less crucial for liberal democratic 
flourishing for all that. By accepting political practitioners’ judgements that third 
parties do not do the ‘essential’ or defining job of major parties by converting 
votes into governmental power and public policy changes, we risk losing an 
adequate grip on a vital and growing part of contemporary democratic politics.
The implications of this analysis could also be more extensive in other ways 
than the narrow framing of this study might suggest. One key aspect which we 
have not had space to discuss here concerns the rationality of third party leaders 
themselves. Given the thankless nature of the task under plurality rule, why should 
rational political entrepreneurs want to lead a third party? The implicit answer in
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the literature is that third party leaders are just not good enough to become major 
party leaders, and perhaps reflecting their personal preferences or perhaps just 
reflecting the flows of chance, instead of settling for being a minor political figure 
in a major party they weighed the balance of advantages and disadvantages and 
settled to be a big fish in a small pond instead. In the case of Chung and the UNP, 
perhaps (like Ross Perot in the USA) simply under-estimated the difficulties of 
converting his economic success and business organisational resources into 
political influence - and as soon as he recognised his mistake, he made the rational 
response by pulling out. Elsewhere in the world other successful business leaders 
have jumped into politics with more success under somewhat more proportional 
systems, as with Sylvio Berlusconi in Italy, managing to convert economic into 
political power almost as quickly as Chung hoped to do, and succeeding in 
becoming major party leaders.
But Chung and Berlusconi made their interventions in periods of change, when 
the institutional arrangements for party politics were 'in flux and ambitious 
estimates of change potential could realistically be made. In the other cases 
reviewed here, the constraints on and difficulties of third party leadership were far 
too clear and obvious for the conventional implied account to be credible. Third 
party leadership seems too difficult a task to be simply the best slot that these 
political entrepreneurs could hope for. And since the emergence of leadership in 
any internally democratic organisation is a complicated competitive process, hard 
to foresee and forecast, it is worth bearing in mind that third parties in plurality 
rule typically have far fewer sub-leadership positions as well - a diminutive level of 
parliamentary representation, few if any safe seats, no prospect at all of acceding 
to government office, and very little access even for those who succeed in 
becoming MPs to the flow of benefits which legislators from the major parties can 
routinely expect. So as every stage of a political career, to opt for a third party 
seems a counter-intuitive choice. It might be objected that third party leaders at 
least do have some advantages which flow from their control of up to a fifth of 
votes - for example, greater media coverage (especially in election campaigns), a 
more routine ‘presence’ in policy debates as a position which must be heard, and
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some prospect even of holding the balance of power in hung Parliaments. Perhaps 
these potential benefits just count more for the kind of people who join third 
parties than real proximity to political power centres. Yet even here this research 
demonstrates difficulties, for third parties’ policies are less well know by voters 
than their major party rivals, and their space for defining definite policies is 
inherently constrained - so it seems hard to see how ideology- or policy-seeking 
entrepreneurs could find acceptable returns in this route.
And even for the leaders of exogenous third parties, the problem of fitting their 
motivations into a rational choice perspective remains considerable. For the 
leadership of the SNP or the Bloc Quebecois the goal of separation and the 
formation of a new nation state seems scarcely less remote over many years than 
the third party dream of reforming plurality rule electoral systems to make them 
proportional. Indeed the irony is that in New Zealand a peaceful transition of the 
electoral regime has been enacted, largely through the efforts of an eclectic 
coalition of third parties and social movements and mistakes by major party 
leaders, while the goals of an independent Scotland or Quebec remain unfulfilled.
So, third parties remain both less puzzling and more puzzling from a rational 
choice perspective than seems widely acknowledged at present. This enigmatic 
status points to their significance for academic analysis, however. As elsewhere in 
academic research, it sometimes pays to use apparently marginal puzzles - such as 
the persistence and growth of third party voting against the odds - to explore the 
limits of existing paradigms.
285
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahn, Chung-Si (1994) ^ ” ^1: «1 52^1 J i # ’ (‘Politics
in Korea and Democracy: A Perspective of Comparative Politics’), in Ahn and 
Jin (eds) (1994), pp. 1-30.
Ahn, Chung-Si and Deok-kyu Jin (eds) (1994) 1987-
1992 {Korea's democracy in transition: 1987-1992). Seoul: Beopmunsa.
Ahn, Hee Soo (ed) (1995) ^  3^ *1 -H {Political Parties and Party
Politics in Korea). Seoul: Nanam Publishing House.
Aimer, Peter (1992) ‘The Changing Party System’, in Gold (ed) (1992), 
pp.326-41.
Alt, James and Kenneth Shepsle (eds) (1990) Perspectives on Positive Political 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Archer, Keith (1990) Political Choices and Electoral Consequences: A Study o f 
Organised Labour and the New Democratic Party. Montreal: McGill- 
Queen’s University.
Archer, Keith (1985) ‘The Failure of the New Democratic Party: Unions, 
Unionists, and Politics in Canada’. Canadian Journal o f Political Science 
XVII: 2, pp. 353-66.
Arrow, Kenneth (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edition. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Bae, Sun-kwang (1995) ‘Continuity or Change: The Voter’s Choice in the 1992 
Presidential Election’, in Cotton (ed) (1995), pp. 66-82.
Bakvis, Herman (ed) (1991) Voter Turnout in Canada. Toronto: Dundum Press.
Barry, Brian (1978) Socialists, Economists and Democracy. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Barry, Brian (1974) ‘Review Article: Exit, Voice and Loyalty’. British Journal o f 
Political Science 4, pp.79-107.
Bean, Clive (1992) ‘New Zealand’, in Franklin et al. (eds) (1992), pp.284-306.
Bean, Clive (1984) A Comparative Study o f Electoral Behaviour in Australia
286
and New Zealand, unpublished Ph.D. thesis. The Australian National 
University.
Bean, Clive (1981) ‘Leadership and Voting in the 1978 New Zealand General 
Election’. Political Science 33:1, pp. 10-19.
Bean, Clive and Anthony Mughan (1989) ‘Leadership effects in Parliamentary 
Elections in Australia and Britain’. American Political Science Review 83: 4, 
pp. 1165-1179.
Beetham, David (ed) (1994) Defining and Measuring Democracy. London: Sage.
Berendsen, A.K. (1973) The Emergence o f the New Zealand Social Credit 
Political League, unpublished MA thesis. University of Auckland.
Blais, Andre (1991) ‘The Debate over Electoral Systems’. International Political 
Science Review 12, pp.239-260.
Blakeney, Allan (1977) ‘Resources, the Constitution and Canadian Federalism’, in 
Meekison (ed) (1977), pp. 238-245.
Bodman, Andrew (1985) ‘Regional Trends in Electoral Support in Britain, 1950- 
1983’. Professional Geographer 37: 3, pp.288-295.
Bogdanor, Vernon (1983a) ‘Introduction’, in Bogdanor and Butler (eds) (1983), 
pp.1-19.
Bogdanor, Vernon (ed) (1983b) Liberal Party Politics. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds) (1983) Democracy and Elections: 
Electoral systems and their political consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Brams, Steven and Philip Straffin (1982) ‘The Entry Problem in a Political Race’, 
in Ordeshook and Shepsle (eds) (1982), pp. 181-196.
Broughton, David, David Farrell, David Denver and Colin Railings (1995) British 
Elections and Parties Yearbook 1994. London: Frank Crass.
Budge, Ian (1994) ‘A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, 
Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally’.
British Journal o f Political Science 24, pp.443-467.
Budge, Ian and Hans Keman (1990) Parties and Democracy: Coalition 
Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States. Oxford: Oxford
287
University Press.
Budge, Ian and D. Farlie (1983) Explaining and Predicting Elections. London: 
George Allen and Unwin.
Burch, Martin and Michael Moran (eds) (1987) British politics: a reader 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Butler, David and Gareth Butler (1994) British Political Facts J900-1994, 
Seventh edition. London: Macmillan.
Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh (1992) The British General Election o f1992. 
London: Macmillan.
Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh (1988) The British General Election o f 1987. 
London: Macmillan.
Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh (1984) The British General Election o f 1983. 
London: Macmillan.
Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh (1980) The British General Election o f1979.
London: Macmillan.
Butler, David and Donald Stokes (1974) Political Change in Britain: The 
Evolution o f Electoral Change, 2nd edition. London: Macmillan.
Cain, Bruce (1978) ‘Strategic Voting in Britain’. American Journal o f Political 
Science 22: 3, pp.639-655.
Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina (1987) The Personal Vote:
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Catt, Helena (1995) ‘From Broad Church to Niche Marketing: The Changing 
Party System in New Zealand’, paper for the conference on ‘Party Politics in 
Year 2001’. Manchester.
Catt, Helena (1989) ‘Tactical Voting in Britain’. Parliamentary Affairs 42, 
pp.548-559.
Choi, Jang Jip (1993) ‘Political Cleavage in South Korea’, in Koo (ed) (1993), 
pp. 13-50.
Chosun Ilbo (1992) ^ll4^f| {The Data book o f the N th
National Assembly Election). Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa.
Clarke, Harold, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and John Pammett (1996) Absent
288
Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics In an Era o f Restructuring; 3rd edition. 
Toronto: Gage.
Clarke, Harold, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and John Pammett (1991) Absent 
Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections, 2nd edition. Toronto: 
Gage.
Clarke, Harold, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and John Pammett (1979) Political 
Choice in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Clarke, Harold and Gary Zuk (1989) ‘The Dynamics of Third-Party Support: the 
British Liberals, 1951 -79’. American Journal o f Political Science 33:1, 
pp. 196-221.
Clarke, Harold and Marianne Stewart (1985) ‘Short-term Forces and Partisan 
Change in Canada: 1974-80’. Electoral Studies 4:1, pp. 15-35.
Cochrane, Allan and James Anderson (eds) (1989) Politics in Transition. London: 
Sage.
Cook, Chris (1993) A Short History o f the Liberal Party 1900-92, 4th edition. 
London: Macmillan.
Cook, Karen and Margaret Levi (eds) (1990) The Limits o f Rationality. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Cotton, James (ed) (1995) Politics and Policy in the New Korean State. New 
York: St.Martin’s Press.
Cox, Gary (1994) ‘Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable 
Vote’. American Political Science Review 88: 3, pp.608-621.
Cox, Gary (1990) ‘Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems’. 
American Journal o f Political Science 34: 4, pp.903-935.
Cox, Gary (1985) ‘Electoral Equlilibria under Approval Voting’. American 
Journal o f Political Science 29, pp. 112-118.
Crewe, Ivor (1993) ‘Voting and Electorate’, in Dunleavy et al. (1993), pp. 92- 
122.
Crewe, Ivor (1982) ‘Is Britain’s Two-Party System Really About to Crumble? : 
the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance and the Prospects for Realignment’. 
Electoral Studies 1:1, pp.275-313.
Crewe, Ivor, Anthony Fox and Neil Day (1995) The British Electorate 1963-
289
1992: A Comprendium o f Data from the British Election Studies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Crewe, Ivor and Anthony King (1994) ‘Did Major win? Did Kinnock lose?’, in 
Heath et al. (1994), pp. 125-47.
Curtice, John (1983) ‘Liberal Voters and The Alliance: Realignment or Protest?’, 
in Bogdanor (ed) (1983b), pp. 99-121.
Curtice, John and Michael Steed (1992) ‘Appendix 2: The Results Analysed’, in 
Butler and Kavanagh (1992), pp. 322-62.
Curtice, John and Michael Steed (1988) ’Appendix 2 Analysis’, in Butler and 
Kavanagh (1988), pp. 316-62.
Curtice, John and Michael Steed (1986) ‘Proportionality and Exaggeration in the 
British Electoral System’. Electoral Studies 5: 3, pp.209-28.
Davis, O., M. Hinich, and P. Ordeshook (1970) ‘An Expository Development of a 
Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process’. American Political Science 
Review 64, pp.426-48.
Demaris, Alfred (1992) Logit modelling: Practical Applications. London: Sage.
Denver, David (1994) Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Denver, David (1993) ‘The Centre’, in King etal. (1993), pp.101-28.
Dorling, D. (1993) British General Election Results, 1955-1992 [computer file]. 
Colchester: ESRC Archive.
Dowding, Keith (1996) Power. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Dowding, Keith (1994) ‘The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice 
and ‘New Institutionalism’. Journal o f Theoretical Politics 6: 1, pp. 105-17.
Dowding, Keith (1991) Rational Choice and Political Power. Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar.
Dowding, Keith and Desmond King (eds) (1995) Preferences, Institutions, and 
Rational Choice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory o f Democracy. New York: Harper 
& Brothers.
Drucker, H. M.(ed) (1979) Multi-Party Britain. London: Macmillan.
Dunleavy, Patrick (1996) ‘ A Critique of Pivotal Choice Theory’, paper presented
290
to the Workshop on ‘Shaping Political Behaviour’, ECPR Joint Sessions. 
University of Oslo.
Dunleavy, Patrick (1993) ‘The Political Parties’, in Dunleavy et al. (1993), pp. 
123-53.
Dunleavy, Patrick (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. 
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Dunleavy, Patrick (1989) ‘The end of class politics?’, in Cochrane and Anderson 
(eds) (1989), pp.172-210.
Dunleavy, Patrick (1979) ‘The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, 
Domestic Property Ownership and State Intervention in Consumption 
Processes’. British Journal o f Political Science 9, pp.409-443.
Dunleavy, Patrick, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday, and Gilian Peele (eds) (1993) 
Development in British Politics 4. London: Macmillan.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Christopher Husbands (1985) British Democracy at the 
Crossroads. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts (1995) ‘The Rational Basis for Belief in 
the Democratic Myth’, in Dowding and King (eds) (1995), pp.60-88.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts (1994) ‘The Experiential Approach to 
Auditing Democracy’, in Beetham (ed) (1994), pp. 155-81.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts (1993) ‘Disaggregating Indices of 
Democracy: Deviation From Proportionality and Relative Reduction in 
Parties’, paper to ECPR Annual Workshops panel on Measuring 
Democracy. University of Leiden.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts and Stuart Weir (1992) Replaying the 1992 
General Election. London: LSE.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Hugh Ward (1981) ‘Exogenous voter preferences and 
parties with state power: some internal problems of economic models of party 
competition’. British Journal o f Political Science 11:3, pp. 351-80.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Jeffrey Stanyer (eds) (1994) Contemporary Political 
Studies 1994. Belfast: Political Studies Association of UK.
Duverger, Maurice (1984) ‘Which Is the Best Electoral System?’, in Lijphart and 
Grofman (eds) (1984), pp. 31-9.
291
Duverger, Maurice (1964) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in 
the Modern State, 3rd edition. North and North (trans). London: Methuen.
Dyck, Rand (1991) Provincial Politics in Canada, 2nd edition. Scarborough, 
Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.
Dyck, Rand (1989) ‘Relations Between Federal and provincial Parties’, in Gagnon 
and Tanguay (eds) (1989), pp. 186-219.
Eagles, Munroe (1991) ‘Voting and Non-voting in Canadian Federal elections: An 
Ecological Analysis’, in Bakvis (ed) (1991), pp. 3-32.
Eagles, Munroe and Stephen Erfle (1993) ‘Variations in third/minor party support 
in English constituencies’. European Journal o f Political Research 23, 
pp.91-116.
Eagles, Munroe, James Bickerton, Alain-G. Gagnon, and Patrick Smith (1991)
The Almanac o f Canadian Politics. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
Eijk, Cees van der (1993) ‘Comparative studies of Elections and Political 
Science’, in Keman (ed) (1993), pp.59-78.
Elster, Jon (1990) ‘When Rationality Fails’, in Cook and Levi (eds) (1990), 
pp. 19-51.
Enelow, James and Melvin Hinich (1984) The Spatial Theory o f Voting. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, Leon (1964) ‘A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties’. American 
Political Science Review 58, pp.46-60.
Erickson, Lynda (1988) ‘CCF-NDP Popularity and the Economy’. Canadian 
Journal o f Political Science XXI: 1, pp.99-116.
Evans, Geoffrey and Anthony Heath (1993) ‘A Tactical Error in the Analysis of 
Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin’. British 
Journal o f Political Science 23, pp. 131-7.
Feddersen, Timothy, Itai Sened and Stephen Wright (1990) ‘Rational Voting and 
Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule’. American Journal o f Political 
Science 34: 4, pp. 1005-16.
Ferejohn, John (1991) ‘Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in 
Early Stuart England’, in Monroe (ed) (1991), pp. 279-305.
292
Field, William (1994) ‘Electoral Volatility and the Structure of Competition: A 
Reassessment of Voting Patterns in Britain 1959-1992’. West European 
Politics 17: 4, pp. 149-65.
Fiorina, Morris (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fiorina, Morris and Kenneth Shepsle (1989) ‘Is Negative Voting an Artifact?’.
American Journal o f Political Science 33: 2, pp.423-39.
Fox, Paul and Graham White (eds) (1995) Politics: Canada. Toronto: McGraw 
Hill.
Franklin, Mark, Thomas Mackie and Henry Valen (eds) (1992) Electoral change: 
Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in western countries. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Franklin, Mark, Richard Niemi and Guy Whitten (1994) ‘The Two Faces of 
Tactical Voting’. British Journal o f Political Science 24, pp.549-57.
Frolich, N., J. Oppenheimer, and O. Young (197V Political Leadership and 
Collective Goods. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gagnon, Alain and Brian Tanguay (eds) (1989) Canadian Parties in Transition: 
Discourse, Organization, and Representation. Scarborough, Ontario:
Nelson.
Galbraith, John and Nicol Rae (1989) ‘A Test of the Importance of Tactical 
Voting: Great Britain, 1987’. British Journal o f Political Science 19, 
pp.126-136.
Geer, John and Mark Shere (1992) ‘Party Competition and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma: An Argument for the Direct Primary’. The Journal o f Politics 54: 3, 
pp.741-761.
Gidengil, Elisabeth (1989) ‘Class and Region in Canadian Voting: A Dependency 
Interpretation’. Canadian Journal o f Political Science. XXII: 3, pp.563-587. 
Gillespie, David (1993) Politics at the Periphery: Third parties in Two-party 
America. Columbia, S.C.: South Carolina Press.
Gold, Hyam (ed) (1992) New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3rd edition.
Auckland: Longman Paul.
Gold, Hyam (ed) (1989) New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 2nd edition. 
Auckland: Longman Paul.
293
Gowland, David and Anne Paterson (1993) Microeconomic Analysis. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Graetz, Brian and Ian McAllister (1987) ‘Party Leaders and Election Outcomes in 
Britain, 1974-1983.’ Comparative Political Studies 19: 4, pp.484-507.
Green, Donald and Ian Shapiro (1994) Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theory: A 
Critique o f Applications in Political Science. New Have: Yale University 
Press.
Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (eds) (1986) Electoral Laws and Their 
Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press.
Gurr, Ted (1970) Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hardin, Russell (1982) Collective Action. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
Heath, Anthony and Geoffrey Evans (1994) ‘Tactical Voting: Concepts, 
Measurement and Findings’. British Journal o f Political Science 24, 
pp.557-561.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (1994) Labour’s Last Chance?: 
The 1992 Election and Beyond. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Geoffrey Evans, Julia Field, and 
Sharon Witherspoon (1988,) Understanding Political Change: The British 
Voter 1964-1987. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (1985) How Britain Votes. 
Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Himmelweit, Hilde, Patrick Humphreys and Marianne Jaegar (1985) How Voters 
Decide. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Hinich, Melvin and M. C. Munger (1994) Ideology and the Theory o f Political 
Choice. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Hinich, Melvin and M. C. Munger (1992) ‘A Spatial Theory of Ideology’. 
Journal o f Theoretical Politics 4: 1, pp.5-30.
Hinich, Melvin and Peter Ordeshook (1970) ‘Plurality Maximization vs Vote 
Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation’. American 
Political Science Review 64: 3, pp.772-91.
Hirschman, Albert (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
294
Holland, Martin (ed) (1992) Electoral Behaviour in New Zealand. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart (1995) ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space 
and Party Locations in 42 Societies’. Party Politics 1: 1, pp.73-111.
Hudson, Ray and Allan Williams (1989). Divided Britain. London: Belhaven 
Press.
Im, Hyug-Baeg (1994) *1 ^ 7 } . ^  ^  *1 ^  °1
{The Market, the State and the Democracy: Korean Democratic Transition 
and Theories o f Political Economy). Seoul: Nanam Publishing House.
Jackson, Robert and Doreen Jackson (1994) Politics in Canada: Culture, 
Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy, 3rd edition. Scarborough,
Ontario: Prentice Hall.
James, Colin (1980) ‘Social Credit and the Values Party’, in Penniman (ed) 
(1980), pp. 148-67.
Jaung, Hoon (1995) ‘Cleavage structure and Party system in Korea: The pattern 
and development of conservative dominant party system in a new democracy’, 
paper for the conference on Party Politics in Year 2001. Manchester.
Johnston, Richard, Andre Blais, Henry Brady, and Jean Crete (1992) Letting the 
People Decide. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Johnston, R (1992) ‘Electoral Geography’, in Holland (ed) (1992), pp. 25-50.
Johnston, R. (1984a) ‘Cracking the Mould: the changing geographical pattern of 
voting in England, 1979-1983’. Area 16:2, pp.101-8.
Johnston, R.(1984b) ‘Seats, Votes, Redistricting, and the Allocation of Power in 
Electoral Systems’, in Lijphart and Grofman (eds) (1984), pp. 59-69.
Johnston, R. and C. Pattie (1993) ‘Where the Tories Lost and Won: Geographical 
Variations in Voting at the 1992 British General Election’. Parliamentary 
Affairs AC. 2, pp 192-202.
Johnston, R. and C. Pattie (1991) ‘Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 
1987: An Alternative Approach’. British Journal o f Political Science 21, 
pp.95-128.
Johnston, R. and C. Pattie (1989) ‘The Changing Electoral Geography of Great 
Britain’, in Mohan (ed) The Political Geography o f Contemporary Britain.
295
London: Macmillan, pp. 51-68.
Johnston, R. and C. Pattie.(1987) ‘A Dividing Nation? An Initial exploration of 
the changing electoral geography of Great Brtain, 1979-1987’. Environment 
and Planning (A) 19, pp. 1001 -13.
Kang, Won-taek (1996) ‘Small party entrance under plurality electoral systems: 
The Green Party in Britain and a South Korean socialist party’, paper 
presented to the Workshop on New Parties and the Party System’, ECPR Joint 
Sessions. University of Oslo.
Kang, Won-taek (1995) ‘Protest voting and Abstention in Plurality rule elections’, 
in Lovenduski and Stanyer (eds) (1995), pp. 855-68.
Katz, Richard (1984) ‘The Single-Transferable Vote and Proportional 
Representation’, in Lijphart and Grofman (eds) (1984), pp. 135-46.
Kay, A.L.G. (1984) Third Party Ebb and Flow: A Study o f Small Town and Rural 
Opinion in an Election Year, unpublished MA thesis. University of Auckland.
Keman, Hans (ed) (1993) Comparative Politics: New directions in theory and 
method Amsterdam: VU University Press.
Key, Jr. V.O. (1966) The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential 
Voting 1936-1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kim, Man-Heum (1995) ‘ *| 4  *] 3  * (‘Party politics in
Korea and Regionalism’), in Ahn (ed) (1995), pp.395-426.
Kim, Yong-Ho (1994) ‘ ^  *1 ’ (‘Democratisation and Party
Politics’), in Ahn and Jin (eds) (1994), pp.87-160.
King, Anthony, Ivor Crewe, David Denver, Kenneth Newton, Philip Norton,
David Sanders and Patrick Seyd (1993) Britain at the Polls, 1992. Chatham: 
Chatham House.
Knoke, David and Peter Burke (1985) Log-linear Models. London: Sage.
Koo, Hagen (ed) (1993) State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Ko, Seong-kuk (1995) ‘1960^tfl *]%■ 3  # 3 * 1 3  3 4 3
•^*3 ’ (‘The development and characteristics of Korean party politics 
since the 1960s’), in Ahn (ed) (1995), pp.285-308.
Komberg, Allan and Harold Clarke (1992) Citizens and Community: Political
296
Support in a Representative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Lambert, Ronald, James Curtis, Steven Brown, and Barry Kay (1986) ‘In search 
of Left/Right Beliefs in the Canadian Electorate’. Canadian Journal o f 
Political Science XIX:3, pp.541-563.
Lamere, James (1992) ‘Party Identification’, in Holland (ed) (1992), pp.51-70.
Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson (1991) Politics and Society in Western Europe, 
2nd edition. London: Sage.
Layard, P. and A. Walters (1978) Microeconomic theory. Maidenhead: McGraw- 
Hill.
LeDuc, Lawrence (1988) ‘The Flexible Canadian Electorate’, in Penniman (ed) 
(1988), pp. 37-54.
Lee, Jeong-bok (1992)
(‘Korean voting behaviour: the 14th National Assembly Election’),
jj. (Korean Political Science Review) 26: 3, pp. 113-32.
Lee, Kap-Yun (1994) ‘Democratization, Party Failure, and the Emergence of the 
Unification National Party’. Korea and World Affairs XVIII: 4, pp. 749-71.
Lee, Nam-Young (ed) (1993) I {Elections in Korea I). Seoul:
Nanam Publishing House.
Leonard, Dick (1991) Elections in Britain Today: A Guide fo r Voters and 
Students. London: Macmillan.
Levine, S. and N. Roberts (1991) ‘The New Zealand General Election of 1990’. 
Political Science 43: 1, pp. 1 -19.
Lewin, Leif (1991) Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, Arend (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study o f Twenty- 
Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofinan (eds) (1984) Choosing an Electoral 
System: Issues and Alternatives. New York: Praeger.
Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan (eds) (1967) Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press.
Lovenduski, Joni and JefFStanyer (eds) (1995) Contemporary Political Studies
297
95. Belfast: Political Studies Association of the UK.
MaCraw, David (1992) ‘ “Third Party Protest”: A Note on the Australian and 
New Zealand Elections of 1990’. Australian Journal o f Political Science 27, 
pp.517-21.
MaCraw, David (1979) ‘Social Credit’s Role in the New Zealand Party System’. 
Political Science 31:1, pp.54-60.
Macdonald, Stuart, Ola Listhaug and George Rabinowitz (1991) ‘Issues and Party 
Support in Multiparty Systems’. American Political Science Review 85: 4, 
pp. 1107-31.
Macdonald, S. and G. Rabiniwitz (1993) ‘Ideology and candidate evaluation’. 
Public Choice 76, pp. 59-78.
Maclver, Don (ed) (1996) The Liberal Democrats. London: Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Mackie, Tom and David Marsh (1995) ‘The Comparative Method’, in Marsh and 
Stoker (eds) (1995), pp. 173-88.
Mair, Peter (ed) (1990) The West European Party System. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Maisel, Louis and Joseph Cooper (eds) (1978) Political Parties: Development 
and Decay. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Marks, Gary and Clive Bean (1992) ‘Sources of Electoral Support for Minor 
Parties: The Case of the Australian Democrats’. Electoral Studies 11:4, 
pp.311-33.
Marsh, David and Gerry Stoker (eds) (1995) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science. London: Macmillan.
McAllister, Ian and Donley Studlar (1992) ‘Region and Voting in Britain, 1979- 
1987: Territorial Polarization or Artifact?’. American Journal o f Political 
Science 36: 1, pp. 168-99.
McAllister, Ian and Richard Rose (1984) The Nationwide Competition For Votes: 
The 1983 British Election. London: Frances Pinter.
McCraw, David (1979) ‘Social Credit’s Role in the New Zealand Party System’. 
Political Science 31: 1, pp. 54-60.
McLean, Iain (1987) Public Choice: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
298
Meekison, Peter (ed) (1977) Canadian Federalism : Myth or Reality. Toronto: 
Metheun.
Miller, Raymond (1992) ‘The Minor Parties’, in Gold (ed) (1992), pp. 204-15.
Miller, Raymond (1989) ‘The Democratic Party’, in Gold (ed) (1989), pp. 244-59.
Miller, W., H. Clarke, M. Harrop, L. LeDuc and P. Whiteley (1990) How Voters 
Change. London: Clarendon.
Monroe, Kristen (ed) (1991) The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical 
Reassessment o f the Theory o f Rational Action. New York: Harper Collins.
Morley, Terence (1988) ‘The New Democratic Party in the 1984 Federal General 
Election’, in Penniman (ed) (1988), pp. 120-36.
Morris, Peter (1992/3) ‘The South Korean National Assembly Elections 1992’. 
Representation 31: 115, pp.60-2.
Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Mueller-Rommel, Ferdinand and Geoffrey Pridham (eds) (1991) Small Parties in 
Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives. London: Sage.
Mughan, Anthony (1986) Party and Participation in British Elections. London: 
Frances Pinter.
Mulgan, Richard (1994) Politics in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University 
Press.
Nadeau, Richard and Andre Blais (1990) ‘Do Canadians Distinguish Between 
Parties? Perceptions of Party Competence’. Canadian Journal o f Political 
Science XXXII: 2, pp. 317-33.
Newell, James (1994) ‘The Scottish National Party and the Italian Lega Nord: A 
lesson for their rivals?’. European Journal o f Political Research 26, 
pp. 135-153.
Niemi, Richard, Guy Whitten and Mark Franklin (1992) ‘Constituency 
Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 
British General Election’. British Journal o f Political Science 22, pp.229-54.
Niemi, Richard, Guy Whitten and Mark Franklin (1993) ‘People Who Live in 
Glass Houses: A Response to Evans and Heath’s Critique of our Note on 
Tactical Voting’. British Journal o f Political Science 23, pp.549-63.
299
Nohlen, Dieter (1984) ‘Two Incompatible Principles of Representation’, in 
Lijphart and Grofman (eds) (1984), pp. 217-24.
Norris, Pippa(1990) British By-Elections: The Volatile Electorate. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Norris, Pippa and Ivor Crewe (1994) ‘Did the British Marginals Vanish? 
Proportionality and Exaggeration in the British Electoral System Revisited’. 
Electoral Studies 13:3, pp.201-21.
Norris, Pippa and Frank Feigert (1989) ‘Government and Third-Party
Performance in Mid-Term By-Elections: The Canadian, British and Australian 
Experience’. Electoral Studies 8: 2, pp. 117-30.
Norton, Clifford (1988) New Zealand Parliamentary Election Results 1946-1987. 
Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington.
Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic o f Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Ordeshook, Peter (1986) Game theory and political theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Ordeshook, Peter and Kenneth Shepsle (eds) (1982) Political Equilibrium. 
Boston. Klewer-Nighoff.
Pacek, Alexander and Benjamin Radcliff (1995) ‘Turnout and the Vote for Left- 
of-Centre Parties: A Cross-national Analysis’. British Journal o f Political 
Science 25:1, pp. 137-43.
Palfrey, Thomas (1984) ‘Spatial Equilibrium with Entry’. Review o f Economic 
Studies 51, pp. 139-156.
Papadakis, Elim and Clive Bean (1995) ‘Independents and Minor Parties: The 
Electoral System’. Australian Journal o f Political Science 30: Special Issue, 
pp.97-110.
Park, Chan Wook (1993a) ‘The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: 
A Test for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party’. Korea Journal 33: 1, pp.5-16.
Park, Chan Wook ( 1 9 9 3 b ) 1 4 t f l  ^ # * 1 * 1
’ (‘Analysis of party support in the 14th National Assembly Election’), 
in Lee, N-Y (ed) (1993), pp. 67-114.
Penniman, Howard (ed) (1988) Canada at the Polls, 1984: A Study o f the
300
Federal General Elections. Durham: Duke University Press.
Penniman, Howard (ed) (1980) New Zealand at the Polls: The General Election 
o f 1978. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
Perlin, George (1988) ‘Opportunity regained: The Tory Victory in 1984’, in 
Penniman (ed) (1988), pp.79-96.
Pinard, Maurice (1975) The Rise o f A Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Powell Jr., Bingham.(1980) ‘Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, 
Legal, and Socio-Economic Influences’, in Rose (ed) (1980), pp.5-34.
Pulzer, Peter (1967) Political Representation and Elections in Britain. London: 
Allen and Unwin.
Rabinowitz, G. and S. Macdonald (1989) ‘A Directional Theory of Issue Voting’. 
American Political Science Review 83: 1, pp.93-121.
Rae, Douglas (1967) The Political Consequences o f Electoral Laws. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Reeve, Andrew and Alan Ware (1992) Electoral Systems: A Comparative and 
Theoretical Introduction. London: Routledge.
Reichley, James (ed) (1987) Elections American Style. Washington,D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution.
Richardson, Dick and Chris Rootes (eds) (1995) The Green Challenge: The 
development o f Green parties in Europe. London: Routeledge.
Riker, William (1990) ‘Political Science and Rational Choice’, in Alt and Shepsle 
(eds) (1990), pp. 163-181.
Riker, William (1982) ‘The Two-party System and Duverger’s law: An Essay on 
the History of Political Science’. American Political Science Review 76, 
pp.753-66.
Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook (1968) ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’. 
American Political Science Review 62, pp.25-42.
Rokkan, Stein and Derek Urwin (eds) (1982) The Politics o f Territorial Identity: 
Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage.
Rose, Richard (1983) ‘Elections and Electoral Systems: Choices and 
Alternatives’, in Bogdanor and Butler (eds) (1983), pp. 20-45.
301
Rose, Richard (ed) (1980) Electoral Participation : A Comparative Analysis. 
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Rose, Richard (1974) The Problem o f Party Government. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
Rose, Richard and Ian McAllister (1986) Voters Begin to Choose: From Closed- 
Class to Open Elections in Britain. London: Sage.
Rosenstone, Stenven, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus (1984) Third Parties in 
America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Sanders, David (1993) ‘Why the Conservative Party Won- Again’, in King et al. 
(1993), pp. 171-222.
Sandler, Todd (1992) Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press.
Semetko, Holli (1989) ‘Television News and the ‘Third Force’ in British Politics: 
A Case Study of Election Communication’. European Journal o f 
Communication 4, pp.453-79.
Simon, Herbert (1995) ‘Rationality in Political Behavior’. Political Psychology 
16: 1, pp.45-61.
Simon, Herbert (1986) ‘Rationality in psychology and economics’. Journal o f 
Business 59, pp.s209-s224.
Simon, Herbert (1985) ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science’. American Political Science Review 79, pp.293-304.
Simon, Herbert (1956) ‘Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment’. 
Psychological Review 63: 2, pp. 129-138.
Simon, Herbert (1955) ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’. Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics 69: 1, pp. 99-118.
Simon, Herbert (1947,) Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Smallwood, Frank (1983,) The Other Candidates: Third Parties in Presidential 
Elections. London: University Press of New England.
Smith, Gordon (1991) ‘In Search of Small Parties: Problems of Definition,
Classification and Significance’, in Mueller-Rommel and Pridham (eds) (1991), 
pp. 23-40.
302
Steed, Michael (1979) ‘The Liberal Party’, in Drucker (ed) (1979), pp. 76-106.
Stevens, Joe (1993) The Economics o f Collective Choice. Boulder: Westview 
Press.
Stevenson, John (1993) Third Party Politics since 1945: Liberals, Alliance and 
Liberal Democrats. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stewart, Marianne and Harold Clarke (1992) ‘The (Un)Importance of Party 
Leaders in the 1987 British Election’. The Journal o f Politics 54: 2, pp.447-70.
Studlar, Donley and Ian McAllister (1987) ‘Protest and Survive? Alliance Support 
in the 1983 British General Election’. Poltica Studies XXXV, pp.39-60.
Summers, John (1985) ‘Parliament and Responsible Government in Australia’, in 
Woodward etal. (eds) (1985), pp.7-27.
Taagepera, R. and M. Schugart (1989) Seats and Votes: The Effects and 
Determinants o f Electoral System. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Taylor, Michael (1987) The Possibility o f Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Taylor, Peter (1984) ‘The case for Proportional Tenure: A Defense of the British 
Electoral System’, in Lijphart and Grofman (eds) (1984), pp. 53-8.
Teixeira, Ruy (1987) Why Americans Don't Vote: Turnout Decline in the United 
States 1960-1984. New York: Greenwood.
Thorbum, Hugh (ed) (1991) Party Politics in Canada, 6th edition. Scarborough, 
Ontario: Prentice-Hall.
Tsebelis, George (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative 
Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Tsebelis, George (1986) ‘A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical 
Voting’. British Journal o f Political Science 16, pp. 395-404.
Van Mechelen, P.(1983) The Growth o f Third Party Support in Britain. 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis. London School of Economics and Political 
Science.
Vowels, Jack, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare and Raymond Miller (1995) 
Towards Consensus: The 1993 election in New Zealand and the Transition to 
Proportional Representation. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Vowles, Jack and Peter Aimer (1993) Voters' Vengeance: The 1990Election in
303
New Zealand and the Fate o f the Fourth Labour Government. Auckland: 
Auckland University Press.
Ward, Hugh (1995) ‘Rational Choice Theory’, in Marsh and Stoker (edsX1995), 
pp. 76-93.
Ward, Hugh (1987) ‘Structural power - a contradiction in terms?’. Political 
Studies, 35, pp.593-610.
Whitehom, Alan (1991) ‘The CCF-NDP and the End of the Broadbent Era’, in 
Thombum (ed) (1991), pp. 324-41.
Wilder, Paul (1992) ‘A Close Run Thing: The United Kingdom General Election 
April 9 1992’. Representation, 31, pp.2-5.
Wittman, Donald (1983) ‘Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative 
Theories’. American Political Science Review 77, pp. 142-57.
Wolfinger, Raymond and Steven Rosenstone (1980) Who Votes?. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Wood, G.A. (1988) Governing New Zealand. Auckland: Longman Paul.
Woodward, Dennis, Andrew Parkin, John Summers (eds) (1985) Government, 
Politics and Power in Australia, 3rd edition. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
Wright, Jack (1986) ‘Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota- 
Preferential Systems’, in Grofman and Lijphart (eds) (1986), pp. 124-38.
Yang, Gil-hyun (1995) ‘Liberalisation and the Political Role of the Chaebol in 
Korea: The rise and fall of the Unification National Party (UNP)’, in Cotton 
(ed) (1995), pp. 83-108.
Zagare, Frank (1984) Game Theory: Concepts and Applications. London: Sage.
304
APPENDIX 1
The analyses presented in this study employ various kinds of data, including 
survey data, aggregate election data and some opinion poll data. Details of the 
main sources utilised are summarised below by country.
GREAT BRITAIN
1. Survey data
Name: British Election Survey, 1983; 1987; 1992.
Number of cases: 3955 (1983); 3826(1987); 5232 (1992)
Local Archive: ESRC Archive, University of Essex.
Method: interview/ cross-sectional
Some useful tables based on the BES data are also to be found in Crewe, Fox and 
Day (1995) The British Electorate 1963-1992 : A Compendium o f Data from the 
British Election Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Aggregate data
D. Dorling (1993) British General Election Results, 1955-1992. [computer 
file].Colchester: ESRC Archive.
Butler and Kavanagh (1992) The British General Election o f1992. London : 
Macmillan.
Butler and Kavanagh (1988) The British General Election o f 1987. London : 
Macmillan.
Butler and Kavanagh (1984) The British General Election o f 1983. London : 
Macmillan.
Butler and Butler (1994) British Political Facts 1900-1994. London: Macmillan.
3. Opinion Poll
Gallup Political (& Economic) Index (January 1981 - August 1992).
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CANADA
1. Survey Data
Name: Political Support in Canada Study, 1983-84 panel survey ; 1988 pre- and post­
election survey.
Number of cases : 1928 (83-84); 1946 (1988)
Local Archive: the Institute for Social Research Data Archive, York University. 
Method: interview/ cross-sectional and panel survey
2. Aggregate Data
Munroe Eagles, James Bickerton, Alain-G. Gagnon and Patrick Smith (199V The 
Almanac o f Canadian Politics. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. 
Elections Canada (1996) Canada Votes 1935-1988.
* Canada Votes 1935-1988 does not include the turnout rate of each riding.
NEW ZEALAND
1. Survey Data
Name: New Zealand Voting Survey, post-election 1981.
Number of cases: 1522
Local Archive: Social Science Data Archives, The Australian National University 
Method: interview/ cross-sectional
* The survey was designed to provide data for comparative research with Australia.
* Social Credit was under-represented in the sample while Labour was greatly over­
represented.
2. Aggregate Data
Government official election reports 1975; 1978; 1981; 1984.
Clifford Norton (1988) New Zealand Parliamentary Election Results 1946-1987. 
Wellington : Victoria University of Wellington.
* The official turnout rate of the 1978 election is not accurate.
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3. Opinion Polls
Heylen Polls (February 1976-December 1984).
Herald/N.R.B. Polls (November 1976- December 1984).
SOUTH KOREA
1. Survey data
Name : 14tfl ■£) £] -fl (The 14th Korean National Assembly Election
Study)
Number of cases: 1200
Local Archive: ^-^"33 7] (The Institute for Korean Election Studies)
*\ rS:Al ^  ^ ‘1?1 tfl (Department of Political Science, Kukmin University,
Seoul, Korea)
Method: interview/ cross-sectional
* Cheju Province was excluded from the survey.
2. Aggregate Data
5:^3 ^  iL  (Chosun Hbo) (1992) *11 14tfl •£] •%]. ^3^1 (The Data book o f
the N th  National Assembly Election). Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa.
-05] (The Central Election Management Commission) (1992) 
^ll3Efl ^ ~ 5 ]0 0 . (A Guide o f the 13th National Assembly Election).
Seoul.
3. Opinion Polls
Gallup Korea Polls (January - December 1992).
HRI Polls (January - December 1992).
* All the data are written in Korean (No English version is available).
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APPENDIX 2 
Bibliographical Notes
Apart from using a quantitative analysis, this study also pays attention to contextual 
backgrounds, examining each party’s specific history and social base of its support. A 
briefly annotated list of books to provide a basic knowledge of the four cases and 
third parties is presented here.
THIRD PARTIES (GENERAL)
It is very difficult to find a book which deals exclusively with third party voting under 
a plurality rule electoral system. Pinard’s book is one of a few to deal with a rise of 
third party under a plurality rule election. However, there are some books which 
study many non-major parties such as extreme right-wing parties under proportional 
representation. Miiller-Rommel and Pridhman’s book is an example, which is based 
on papers to a workshop at the ECPR Joint Sessions, 1987. The ECPR Joint Sessions 
in 1994 also had a similar workshop about small and new parties. In America, there 
are also some books to deal with third parties, even though the number is small. 
American authors tend to regard third party support as being rather deviant.
Pinard, Maurice (1975) The Rise o f A Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics.
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Miiller-Rommel and Pridhman (eds) (1991) Small Parties in Western Europe: 
Comparative and National Perspective. London : Sage.
Miiller-Rommel (ed) (1989) New Politics in Western Europe. London: Westview 
Press.
Gillespie, David (1993) Politics at the Periphery: Third parties in Two-party 
America. Columbia, S.C.: South Carolina Press.
Rosenstone, Stenven, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus (1984) Third Parties in
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America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Smallwood, Frank (1983,) The Other Candidates: Third Parties in Presidential 
Elections. London: University Press of New England.
GREAT BRITAIN
1. Elections
There is an abundance of books and articles about British elections. The list below is
some selective books to analyse elections between 1983-1992. Norris’ book deals
with by-elections.
Butler and Kavanagh’s series of The British General Election. London: Macmillan.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (1994J Labour’s Last Chance?:
The 1992 Election and Beyond. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Geoffrey Evans, Julia Field, and 
Sharon Witherspoon (1988,) Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 
1964-1987. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Dunleavy, Patrick and Christopher Husbands (1985) British Democracy at the 
Crossroads. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice (1985) How Britain Votes.
Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Himmelweit, Hilde, Patrick Humphreys and Marianne Jaegar (1985) How Voters 
Decide. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
McAllister, Ian and Richard Rose (1984) The Nationwide Competition For Votes:
The 1983 British Election. London: Frances Pinter.
Rose, Richard and I. McAllister (1986) Voters Begin to Choose: From Closed- 
Class to Open Elections in Britain. London: Sage.
Norris, Pippa (1990) British By-Elections: The Volatile Electorate. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
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2. The Liberal (Democratic) Party
Compared with the number of studies dealing with other major parties, a relatively 
small number of researches have been made into the Liberal (Democratic) Party. 
Most of them are about its history or the decline of its support in the 1920s. The first 
two book below are about the recent history of the Liberal Democratic party. The 
two theses listed deal with the British third party in relation with elections. 
Ashdown’s book covers his travel sketches to reveal his political views on domestic 
problems as a party leader. Crewe and King provide an account of the short history of 
the SDP.
Cook, Chris (1993) A Short History o f the Liberal Party 1900-92, 4th edition.
London: Macmillan.
Stevenson, John (1993) Third Party Politics since 1945: Liberals, Alliance and 
Liberal Democrats. Oxford: Blackwell.
Maclver, Don (ed) (1996) The Liberal Democrats. London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
Bogdanor, Vernon (ed.) (1983) Liberal Party Politics. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Van Mechelen, P. (1983) The Growth o f Third Party Support in Britain. Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science.
Joyce, Peter (1990) The Electoral Strategy and Tactics o f the British Liberal Party 
1945-1970. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. London School of Economics and Political 
Science.
Ashdown, Paddy (1994) Beyond Westminster: Finding Hope in Britain. London: 
Simon & Schuster.
Crewe, Ivor and Anthony King (1995) SDP: The Birth, Life and Death o f the Social 
Democratic Party. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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CANADA
1. Elections
Elections are regularly analysed by Canadian psephologists, and especially, the 
volume by Clarke et al. Absent Mandate is based on the Political Support in Canada 
Study, and continues to be re-edited to catch up with new elections. For example, its 
third edition deals with the 1993 federal election.
Clarke, Harold, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and John Pammett (1991) Absent 
Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections, 2nd edition. Toronto:
Gage.
Johnston, Richard, Andre Blais, Henry Brady, and Jean Crete (1992) Letting the 
People Decide. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Penniman, Howard (ed) (1988) Canada at the Polls, 1984: A Study o f the 
Federal General Elections. Durham: Duke University Press.
2. The NDP
There are some books about trade unionism and political participation by labour 
interests. However, only Archer’s book deals with the electoral relationship between 
organised labour and the NDP.
Archer, Keith (1990) Political Choices and Electoral Consequences: A Study o f 
Organised Labour and the New Democratic Party. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University.
Morton, Desmond (1974) The New Democrats 1961-1986: The Politics o f Change.
Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman.
Whitehom, Alan (1992) Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press.
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NEW ZEALAND
1. Elections
Even though there are some electoral studies before the 1980s, analytic studies about 
elections were rather rare before this period. Those cited below except Penniman’s 
are also descriptive rather than analytic.
Penniman, Howard (ed) (1980) New Zealand at the Polls: The General Election 
o f1978. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
McRobie and Roberts (1978) Election *78: The 1977 Electoral Redistribution and 
the 1978 General Election in New Zealand. Dunedin: John Mclndoe.
Gamier and Levine (1981) Election *81: An End ofMuldoonism? . Auckland: 
Methuen.
2. Social Credit
Even though no academic book has focused exclusively on the Social Credit party, 
there are some theses which study it. Bryant’s book is a biography of Social Credit 
leader, Beetham.
Raymond Miller (1987) Social Credit: an analysis o f New Zealand*s perennial third 
party, unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Auckland.
Bean, Clive (1984) A Comparative Study o f Electoral Behaviour in Australia 
and New Zealand, unpublished Ph.D. thesis. The Australian National University. 
Berendsen, A.K. (1973) The Emergence o f the New Zealand Social Credit Political 
League, unpublished MA thesis. University of Auckland.
Kay, A.L.G. (1984) Third Party Ebb and Flow: A Study o f Small Town and Rural 
Opinion in an Election Year, unpublished MA thesis. University of Auckland. 
Bryant, George (1981) Beetham. Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press.
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SOUTH KOREA
1. Elections
Even though election studies exist for the period before democratisation, serious 
attempts to analyse electoral choices have only really begun since 1986. Lee’s book 
focuses on the 1992 elections, while Kim’s book mainly deals with the 1987 
presidential election and the 1988 National Assembly Election.
Yoon’s book is an election analysis based on aggregate election data and covers the 
period between 1973 and 1992. (Each part of his book includes an English abstract). 
Kim and Kihl’s book is about elections in the 1970s under the authoritarian period.
Lee, Nam-Young (ed) (1993) I (Elections in Korea I). Seoul:
Nanam Publishing House.
Kim, Kwang Woong (ed) (1990) &7] ^  *1 (ElectionPolitics o f
Korea). Seoul: Nanam Publications, Co.
Yoon, Chun-Joo (1993) ^ * 1 ^ :  ^  - f
^  (Voting and Political Development). Seoul: Seoul National University 
Press.
Kim, Eugene and Young Whan Kihl (eds) (1976) Party Politics and Elections in 
Korea. Silver Spring, Maryland: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs.
Besides, (Korean Political Science Review) vol.26, no.3 in 1992
contains many articles about the 1992 elections. A special volume of KPSR (1991) 
covers the papers (written in English) presented to the Second International 
Conference of the Korean Political Science Association in 1991, some of which deal 
with elections before 1990s.
2. The UNP
No single academic book about the history or development of the UNP is yet
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published. Chung’s book below is his autobiography, in which he wrote about the 
history of his business and his experiences as a successful entrepreneur. However, 
many articles about the UNP and its leader Chung can be found in local monthly (or 
weekly) magazines as well as in academic journals.
Chung, Ju-young (1992) A] (There can be hardship,
but no failure). Seoul: Hyundai Munwha Sinmunsa.
3. Political Transformation
Since democratisation, many books deal with in the transformation to democracy and 
the change of party politics, some of which include the UNP case. Some of those 
books about the political transformation in the wake of democratisation are presented 
here.
Cotton, James (ed) (1995) Politics and Policy in the New Korean State. New 
York: St.Martin’s Press.
Im, Hyug-Baeg (1994) *1# . ^ 7\. ^  ^  *1 ^  31 °]-g-
(The Market, the State and the Democracy: Korean Democratic Transition 
and Theories o f Political Economy). Seoul: Nanam Publishing House.
Ahn, Chung-Si and Deok-kyu Jin (eds) (1994) 1987-
1992 (Korea'sdemocracy in transition: 1987-1992). Seoul: Beopmunsa.
Ahn, Hee Soo (ed) (1995) ^  *1 ^  (Political Parties and Party
Politics in Korea). Seoul: Nanam Publishing House.
Koo, Hagen (ed) (1993) State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
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